Silvado, a Monitor of Brazil, and its Role in the Paraguayan War

Silvado was a monitor of the Imperial Brazilian Navy, serving during the reign of Pedro II, that played an important role in the Paraguayan War. Pedro II, the last reigning monarch of Brazil, modernized his navy by replacing its wooden sailing vessels with steamships that were propelled by paddle-wheels or screws. It would be necessary, also, to arm these modern fighting vessels with the latest weapons while the emergence of the ironclad raised the prospect of warships that were impervious to the blows of enemy artillery. Ironclads, which received their baptism of fire during the Crimean War, represented the pinnacle of naval technology in the middle of the nineteenth-century and were named after the thick plates of wrought iron that protected their hulls from explosive shells and solid shot. Rising tensions in South America persuaded the Brazilian government to equip the navy with protected fighting vessels, whether constructed at the naval arsenal at Rio de Janeiro or purchased from foreign shipyards, and to arm them with modern naval guns. Ironclads either installed their batteries in a traditional broadside arrangement, such as that seen on Gloire and HMS Warrior, or housed their guns within one or more turrets. Turreted ironclads were known as monitors and were named after USS Monitor, the first ironclad to have its guns installed in a revolving tower, which was able to operate on rivers and coastal waters due to its shallow draft. Silvado, too, drew a small amount of water and the flat underside of its hull made it well suited to riverine operations or to actions in littoral waters. The main thrust of the War of the Triple Alliance, as the Paraguayan War was also known, was along the inland waterways and these conditions favoured vessels that displaced a minimal amount of water. Silvado, while absent during the Passage of Humaitá, participated in the First Passage of Curupayty and various other naval actions along the rivers and streams that wound their way through the Republic of Paraguay.

Chantiers et Ateliers de l'Océan Built Nemesis at Bordeaux.

Sir Thomas Brassey, on page 152 of the first volume of The British Navy, identifies Silvado as one of six ironclads that were built for the Imperial Brazilian Navy by the private firms of Europe. Brazil, Cabral, Colombo, Herval and Mariz-e-Barros are named as the other ironclads that were built for the Empire of Brazil by foreign shipyards. It should be noted that Silvado, rather than being referred to as a monitor, is described a central battery ship. Monsieur Arman, on page 157, is reported to have built Silvado for the government of Brazil. It is claimed that the ironclad, which is reported to have been launched in 1866, was built at Bordeaux. Brassey, in contradiction of an earlier statement that he made about the arrangement of the battery, claims that the ship-of-war housed its armaments within two turrets. Robert Gardiner, on page 406 of the volume of Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships that covers the years from 1860 until 1905, provides information about the circumstances in which Silvado entered the Imperial Brazilian Navy. It is reported that the ironclad was built in France while Paraguay, in 1865, is reported to have placed the original order for the fighting vessel. Louis Figuier, on page 571 of Les Merveilles de la Science, claims that Chantiers et Ateliers de l'Océan constructed Silvado at Bordeaux. Richard Brooks, on page 105 of the new edition of A General Gazetteer in Miniature, describes Bordeaux as an ancient town that is located in France. It is reported that the city, which is claimed to have been established upon the west bank of the River Garonne, was situated in the department of Gironde. Garonne, on page 320, is described as a river of France that drains into the Bay of Biscay at Bordeaux. Joaquim Manoel de Macedo, on page 145 of the first volume of Brazilian Biographical Annual, describes the circumstances in which Silvado entered the service of the Armada Nacional. It is reported that the monitor was known as Nemesis, rather than Silvado, while it was under construction and during its maiden voyage.

Curaissed Brigs and Curaissed Corvettes.

William Smith, on page 284 of the third volume of the new series of The Artizan, claims that the Emperor of Brazil ordered three ironclads from French shipyards. On 1st of December, 1865, It is reported that two curaissed brigs and a curaissed corvette had been ordered for the Imperial Brazilian Navy. None of the fighting vessels, however, are named while the identities of the private firms that build the ships-of-war are not revealed. Nemesis, however, may have been among the three ironclads that were ordered by the Empire of Brazil. Léon Contanseau, on page 102 of the new edition of A Practical Dictionary of the French and English Languages, explains that cuirrasé has five definitions. Curraisé, according to its fifth definition, refers to an iron-plated fighting vessel or to an ironclad. Contanseau defines curasser as the act of applying plates, which may refer to iron plates, to ships-of-war. It appears, therefore, that a cuirassed ship was an alternative term for an armoured man-of-war. Lieutenant Edward Wilson Very, on page 10 of Navies of the World, claims that Silvado was protected by iron plates that ranged from three-inches in thickness to four and a half inches in thickness. Silvado, therefore, meets the definition of a cuirassed fighting vessel. Admiral William Henry Smyth, on page 134 of The Sailor's Word-book, claims that a brig was a square-rigged sailing vessel which was equipped with two masts. Richard Henry Dana, on page xxii of The Seaman's Manuel, reports that a full-rigged brig is equipped with two square-rigged masts. Corvettes, on page 215, are described as flush-decked ships that were equipped with one tier of guns. Robert Gardiner, on page 406 of the installation of Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships which features naval vessels that were built between 1860 and 1905, describes Silvado as a full-rigged ship. Nemesis, despite the fact that it housed its batteries in turrets, appears to have mounted its guns on one tier but it appears that it was not a brig-rigged fighting vessel.

Francisco Solano López had Attempted to Procure Ironclads for the Paraguayan Navy.

Charles Ames Washburn, on pages 556 and 557 of the first volume of The History of Paraguay, claims that Francisco Solano López had attempted to procure ironclads for the Paraguayan Navy. López, who is reported to have been aware that neither the Empire of Brazil nor the Republic of Argentina owned ironclads, is claimed to have sought an advantage over the rival nations by asking foreign shipyards to build iron-plated fighting vessels for the Republic of Paraguay. It is reported that López ordered Congress to authorize a loan of $20,000,000 for the construction of ironclads by the shipbuilding firms of Europe. Washburn, on page 564, implies that the outbreak of the Paraguayan War persuaded the Imperial Brazilian Navy to equip itself with iron-cased fighting vessels. Nemesis, therefore, may been have built to serve the strategic interests of Brazil or Paraguay. It is reported, on page 178 of the second volume of Confederate War Journal, that Lucien Arman had built ships for the Confederate States Navy during the American Civil War. James Dunwody Bulloch and John Slidell, who had been sent to Europe to procure war materials for the Southern Confederacy, are claimed to have entered into a business arrangement with Arman. It is reported that Arman built Sphynx, which is described as an ironclad ram, for the Confederate States Navy. CSS Stonewall, as Sphynx became known after it had been purchased by the Royal Danish Navy and resold to the Confederate States Navy, is claimed to have been sold to the Imperial Japanese Navy at a later date. Arman, who was able to draw upon his experience of building ironclads for foreign navies, may have attracted the custom of the developing nations of South America. It stands to reason, therefore, that Arman would have been awarded the contract to build Nemesis for Brazil or for Paraguay. López, if he had been aware of the sale of Sphynx to Southern Confederacy, may have expected to have procured a similar vessel from the same shipyard.

A Short Biography of Dom Pedro II.

USS Monadnock, on page 153 of the tenth volume of Harper's Weekly, is reported to have visited Rio de Janeiro in the aftermath of the American Civil War. On the 9th of January, 1866, Don Pedro II is claimed to have received a tour of the monitor. Don Pedro, who is identified as the the Emperor of Brazil, may have been inspired to increase the number of ironclads in his own navy. USS Monadnock, like Silvado, appears to have mounted its guns in a pair of turrets. James C. Fletcher, on page 602 of Brazil and the Brazilians Portrayed in Historical and Descriptive Sketches, claims that Pedro II was born in the same year that Portugal recognized the independence of Brazil. Pedro II is reported to have been born on the 2nd of December, 1825, and is claimed to have held the title of Imperial Prince. It is reported that Pedro I, in 1831, abdicated from the Imperial Throne while Diogo Antonio Feijo is claimed to have been elected as Regent. Pedro Aruaca Lima, in 1837 and 1838, is reported to have been elected as the second Regent during the minority of the Imperial Prince. It is claimed that the Regency, under circumstances that are not explained, was ended when Pedro II was fifteen years of age. Pedro II, therefore, became the Emperor of Brazil during his teenaged years. On the 18th of July, 1841, the Imperial Coronation was held while the Emperor of Brazil was sixteen years of age. Highlights of the early reign of Pedro II are claimed to have included the introduction of steam-navigation on the Amazon River, the construction of the the first railway in Brazil and the establishment of stream-communication with Europe. Nemesis, as it crossed from Bordeaux to Rio de Janeiro, owed much to the steam-vessels that made the first transatlantic voyages from Europe to Brazil. Rosas, who is described as the dictator of Buenos Ayres, is reported to have been overthrown in the eleventh or the twelfth year of the reign of Pedro II and is claimed to have been deposed with the assistance of the Imperial Brazilian Army.

Nemesis was the Daughter of Night and the Personification of the Human Conscience.

Arthur Jaceguai, on page 115 of Quatro Seculos de Actividade Maritima, suggests that Francisco Solano López had succeeded in ordering four ironclads from foreign shipyards. Lima Barros, Cabral, Colombo and Silvado are identified as the iron-plated fighting vessels that had been ordered by the adversaries of the Empire of Brazil. It is reported that the Imperial government, after the Paraguayan War had commenced, had been able to purchase the ironclads from their European owners. Laws that prohibited shipyards from supplying belligerent nations with ships-of-war, in this instance, appear to have been circumvented and the iron-cased fighting vessels are claimed to have been delivered to the Imperial Brazilian Navy. It is reported that López, after failing to procure the ironclads for the Paraguayan Navy, was defeated by Brazilian diplomacy. López, therefore, may have given Nemesis its name while Pedro II appears to have believed that another name was more appropriate for the iron-cased fighting vessel. Nemesis, on page 435 of the seventh volume of the new edition of Chambers' Encyclopaedia: A Dictionary of Universal Knowledge, is described as the daughter of night and is reported to have been a personification of the human conscience. It is claimed that Nemesis, as Greco-Roman religion evolved, was believed to have restored the moral equilibrium of human affairs. Nemesis, in her final form, is described as the executor of strict retributive providence and an an avenger of wrong. Evil-doers, for example, are reported to have been punished by Nemesis while the haughty are claimed to have been humbled by her divine wrath. Nemesis, as Silvado had been known as it rested on the stocks at Bordeaux, may have been expected to avenge the perceived slights that Argentina and Brazil had directed against Paraguay. López may have believed that the ironclad, if it had been delivered to the Paraguayan Navy, would have altered the balance of power that existed between the nations of South America.

Vital de Oliveira Departs for France of the 8th of February.

It is explained, on page 336 of the first part of the thirtieth volume of Revista Trimensal do Historico Geographico e Ethnographico do Brasil, that Vital de Oliveira was entrusted to collect Nemesis from the private firm that had constructed it. On the 8th of February, 1866, Oliveira is reported to have embarked upon his transatlantic voyage. No information is given, however, about the name of the ship that conveyed Oliveira from the territories of Pedro II to the domain of Napoleon III. It is claimed that de Oliveira, upon his arrival at Bordeaux, received Nemesis from the contractor. Joaquim Manoel de Macedo, on page 145 of the first volume of Brazilian Biographical Annual, describes the circumstances in which Jean-Lucien Arman delivered Nemesis to the Imperial Brazilian Navy. Commander Vital de Oliveira, who is reported to have been an officer of the Imperial Order of the Rose, is named as the first commander of the ironclad. On the 2nd of December, 1862, the Emperor of Brazil is claimed to have promoted de Oliveira to the rank of Commander. Manoel Antonio Vital de Oliveira, on page 573 of the fourth volume of Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, is identified as the naval officer who was sent to France to collect Nemesis from its builders. It is reported that de Oliveira was born on the 28th of September, 1829, and it is claimed that he joined the Armada Nacional at the age of fourteen. On the 2nd of February, 1849, de Olivera is reported to have been onboard Don Affonso as it endeavoured to suppress an insurgency that had broken out in Recife. It is claimed that de Oliveira, after he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant in 1854, had enjoyed a successful career as a surveyor and as a cartographer. A series of reports are reported to have been made of the coast of Brazil, as well as its lakes and rivers, by the naval officer. It is reported, however, that the war between Francisco Solano López and the Triple Alliance meant that de Oliveira had to abandon his scientific pursuits.

Nemesis Undertakes its Maiden Voyage. 

Joaquim Manoel de Macedo, on page 145 of the first volume of Brazilian Biographical Annual, describes the challenges that Nemesis faced as it crossed the Atlantic Ocean. Rough weather is claimed to have endangered the monitor, whose commander is reported to have been a chevalier of the Legion of Honour, during its maiden voyage. It is claimed that the monitor encountered a violent storm, which Macedo describes as a terrible tempest, after it entered the latitude of Pernambuco. Manoel Antonio Vital de Oliveira, however, is reported to have drawn upon his leadership abilities and his navigation skills during the storm. It is suggested that the crew of the ironclad, who are claimed to have been discouraged and terrified by the tempest, drew inspiration from the example of their commander. Macedo, who attributes the survival of to the monitor to the energy and to the navigational skills of its captain, claims that the iron-cased fighting vessel was able to reach Rio de Janeiro. A description of the maiden voyage of Nemesis, which can be found on page 336 of the thirtieth volume of Revista Trimensal do Historico Geographico e Ethnographico do Brasil, reveals details about the adverse weather conditions that the man-of-war experienced as it crossed the Atlantic Ocean. It is reported that the monitor, rather than being built for oceanic voyages, had been designed for river navigation. A terrible storm, in which the light of the sun is claimed to have been blocked for a duration of three days, is reported to have endangered the ironclad and its crew. It is claimed that the monitor, on at least one occasion, was in danger of foundering in the tempestuous seas. An order to launch the boats, during an hour of despair, is reported to have been given when it appeared that the ironclad would sink beneath the waves. It is implied that the wife of de Oliveira, who is reported to have knelt on the deck of the iron-plated fighting vessel and offered prayers during the height of the storm, accompanied her husband on the voyage. 

Pernambuco was the Third Most Important City in the Empire of Brazil.

Our Ocean Highways, which was edited by J. Maurice Dempsey and William Hughes, contains information about Pernambuco. It is reported, on page clxvii, that a line a of communication existed between Bordeaux and Permanduco while Lisbon is named as an intermediate port. Southampton and Pernambuco, also via Lisbon, are claimed to have been placed in communication by the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. It is reported that the British India Steam Navigation Company, in 1871, operated the passenger service that existed between Bordeaux and Pernambuco.  Nemesis, as it travelled from Bordeaux to Pernambuco, may have followed a similar route to the ocean-liners that were owned by the British India Steam Navigation Company. Pernambuco, on page 343, is described as a sea-port of Brazil. It is reported that the city, which is claimed to have been situated on the Atlantic Coast, had been established at the mouth of the of the Capibariba River. Olinda, Recife, Boa Vista and Saint Antonio are identified as the four towns that formed the city of Pernambuco. It appears that Recife, which is described as Pernambuco proper, formed the commercial district of the city. A dockyard, where merchantmen could unload their cargoes, is claimed to have been situated in Recife while warehouses are reported to have been available to house the commercial items that were shipped to the port. It is explained that ships which drew 17-feet of water or less, which would have included Nemesis, were able to cross the bar of the harbour. Lieutenant-commander Henry Honeychurch Gorringe, on page 158 and the first volume of The Coast of Brazil, describes Pernambuco as the third most important city in Brazil. Pernambuco is reported to have been situated at the confluence of the Biberibe River and the Capibaribe River, which is also known as the Capibariba River, while merchant-ships are claimed to have visited the city before they discharged their cargoes at their ports of destination. 

Arrival of Nemesis at Rio de Janeiro.

Joaquim Manoel de Macedo, on page 145 of the first volume of Brazilian Biographical Annual, describes the reception that Nemesis received after it arrived at Rio de Janeiro. It is reported that an admiral of the United States Navy, whose name is not revealed, complimented Commander Vital de Oliveira on his navigation skills. Roteiro da Costa do Brasil do Rio Mossoro Ao Rio de S. Francisco do Norte, which was composed by Manuel Antonio Vital de Oliveira, was written before Nemesis embarked upon its maiden voyage. On the 15th of April, 1869, the widow of de Oliveira composed an introduction to the scientific work that included information about the arrival of Nemesis at Rio de Janeiro. It is claimed that de Oliveira, before he departed for Bordeaux, had transported volunteers from the northern provinces of Brazil to the front-lines of the conflict with Paraguay. San Francisco, which de Oliveira is reported to have commanded, is identified as the ship that conveyed the recruits to the battle-fields. Nemesis, in the September of 1866, is claimed to have arrived at Rio de Janeiro. Mucio Scoevola Lopes Teixeira, who dedicates the first installment of Galeria do Brasil Marcial to Marechal João Nepomuceno de Medeiros Mallet, describes the series of events that occurred after Nemesis arrived on the coast of Brazil. Nemesis, on page 322, is reported to have sojourned at Pernambuco for a duration of eight days. It is claimed that the monitor, having survived the Atlantic storm, required repairs before it proceeded towards Rio de Janeiro. Manuel Antonio Vital de Oliveira, who is reported to have originated from Pernambuco, is claimed to have visited his family and his friends while the ironclad underwent repairs. On the 11th of September, 1866, Nemesis is reported to have arrived at Rio de Janeiro. An American admiral, who was residing in Rio de Janeiro, is claimed to have complimented de Oliveira for navigating the ironclad through the tempestuous seas that lay off the coast of Pernambuco.

Rio de Janeiro was the capital city of the Empire of Brazil.

Alexander Mackay, on page 582 of the second part of the new edition of Manual of Modern Geography, describes Rio de Janeiro as the capital of Brazil as well as the largest and most commercial city in South America. It is reported that Rio de Janeiro lay on the western side of an indentation of the Atlantic Ocean, which is described as a noble bay, that was deep enough to accommodate the largest ships and wide enough to allow the passage of entire fleets. Nemesis, for as long as it had competent pilots to guide it, would have been able to have entered the Bay of Rio de Janeiro without encountering any difficulties. Richard Brookes, on page 706 of the new edition of A General Gazetteer, describes Rio de Janeiro as one of the richest provinces in the Empire of Brazil. It is claimed that the province of Rio de Janeiro, which is reported to have been situated within the vicinity of the Tropic of Capricorn, was named after a port that had been established on a magnificent inlet of the sea. Several of the finest harbours in the world are claimed to have resided within the province of Rio de Janeiro, which is reported to have been bounded to the south and to the east by the Atlantic Ocean, while it is explained that the rivers which drained into the inlet were inconsequential. Charles Ames Washburn, on page 556 as well as 557 of the first volume of The History of Paraguay, claims that Francisco Solano López had intended to send a fleet ironclads to Rio de Janeiro and dictate the terms of surrender to the government of Brazil. López, however, had been unable to procure iron-cased fighting vessels for the Paraguayan Navy and Rio de Janeiro was protected by the ships-of-war that had been intended for its destruction. Nemesis, now that it had entered the service of the Armada Nacional, would lend its guns to the defense of the Imperial capital. Paraguay, in its turn, was vulnerable to the depredations of the ironclads which had been intended to protect its territorial integrity or to expand its national borders.

Sylvanus William Godon may have been the Admiral who Congratulated Manuel Antonio Vital de Oliveira.

Lewis Randolph Hamersley, on page 26 as well as page 27 of The Records of Living Officers of the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps, claims that Sylvanus William Godon was promoted to rank of Rear-admiral in the year that followed the cessation of the American Civil War. On the 25th of July, 1866, Godon is reported to have been promoted to the rank of Rear-admiral. Godon, therefore, attained the rank of Rear-admiral at the time in which Jean-Lucien Arman delivered Nemesis to Commander Manuel Antonio de Oliveira. Correspondence and Other Documents Concerning the Relations of the United States with Paraguay, the Argentine Republic, Uruguay and Brazil during the Paraguayan War contains information about the diplomatic efforts of the United States Navy during the War of the Triple Alliance. Evidence that Rear-admiral Sylvanus William Godon was present at Rio de Janeiro in September is included in Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in answer to A Resolution of the House of the 2nd Instant, transmitting correspondence relative to the Paraguay difficulties while the circumstances under which he was present in the Brazilian capital are also explained. A series of letters, which are included in the seventy-ninth document of the third session of the thirtieth Congress of the United States of America, confirm that Godon was situated at the Brazilian capital in the same month in which Nemesis arrived at its destination. Godon, on page 10 as well as page 11, is described as the commander of the United States Brazil Squadron. On the 16th of September, 1866, Godon composed a letter to Charles Ames Washburn that described the relations which existed between the United States of America and Paraguay. USS Brooklyn, which is identified as the flagship of the South Atlantic Squadron, is revealed to have been docked at Rio de Janeiro during the third week of September. Godon, who is named as the commanding officer of USS Brooklyn, may have had an opportunity to speak with de Oliveira at this time.

Nemesis Receives a New Name from the Emperor of Brazil.

Captain-lieutenant Vital de Oliveira on page 188 as well as 189 of the second volume of Revista do Instituto Archeologico e Geographico Pernambucano, is reported to have visited the Imperial Court after he arrived at Rio de Janeiro. It is claimed that the Emperor of Brazil decided that Nemesis, after its arrival at the Imperial capital, would receive a new name. Silvado, as Nemesis would now be known, is reported to have been named after a Lieutenant of the Imperial Brazilian Navy who lost his life when Rio de Janeiro struck a torpedo. It is claimed that the naval officer, whose surname is revealed to have been Silvado, had been onboard the ironclad at the time in which the submarine mine blew it to pieces. Infernal machines, which lay below the surface of the water, posed a hidden threat to the fighting vessels that navigated the Paraguay River. Silvado, like Rio de Janeiro, would have been vulnerable to submarine mines. It would have been be necessary, therefore, for de Oliveira to navigate the inland waterways of Paraguay with caution. Joaquim Manuel de Macedo, on page 145 of the first volume of Brazilian Biographical Annual, echoes the claim that Silvado was named after a fallen war hero. Nemesis, after it arrived at Rio de Janeiro, is reported to have been given the name of Silvado by the Emperor of Brazil. It should be noted that the middle name of the commander of Rio de Janeiro, who is mentioned in multiple volumes of Annaes do Senado do Imperio do Brasil Primeira Sessão em 1867, is spelled in different ways throughout the legislative documents. Americo Brasilico Silvado, on page 126 of the transcript of the session of the 25th of June, is identified as the late husband of Urania Adelaide de Argolo Silvado. It is claimed, on page 74 of the transcript of the session of the 10th of July, that Americo Brazilico Silvado fell in a combat. America Brasilio Silvado, on page 166 of the transcript of the 17th of July, is identified as a First Lieutenant of the Brazilian Armada who lost his life in the line of duty.

Americo Brasilio Silvado.

Artur Jaceguai, on pages 126 and 127 of Quatro Seculos de Actividade Maritima, describes an engagement that occurred between six ironclads and the batteries that defended Curuzú. On the 1st of September, 1866, the iron-cased fighting ships are claimed to have advanced on Curuzú while the unprotected gunboats are reported to have remained at the lower reaches of the Paraguay River. It is reported that Rio de Janeiro struck a torpedo on the 2nd of September, 1866, while First-lieutenant Americo Brasil Silvado was in command of the ironclad. One-hundred and twenty mariners, most of who are reported to have been situated in the engine-room or the casemate, are claimed to have been onboard the ironclad when the explosion occurred. It is alleged that the gunners, as they watched the ironclad disappear beneath the water, fired upon the survivors and Silvado is reported to have been among the fifty-five mariners who perished during the incident. Alfred de Lostalot, on page 321 of the forty-eighth volume of L'Illustration, claims that Americo Brasilio Silvado was a Captain of Frigates at the time in which Rio de Janeiro struck the torpedo. Nathaniel Théodore Fix, on page 132 of Historia da Guerre do Paraguay, claims that Silvado drowned as he attempted to save the papers that were onboard the sinking ironclad. Urania Adelaide de Argolo Silvado, on page 166 of the third volume of Annaes do Senado do Imperio do Brasil Primeira Sessão em 1867 da 13a Legislatura de 1 a 31 de Junho, is reported to have received a pension for the loss of her husband during the Paraguayan War. On the 17th of October, 1866, the widow of Americo Brasilio Silvado is claimed to have been granted a pension by the Senate of the Empire of Brazil. Urania Adelaide de Argolo Silvado, in addition to the pension that she received, may have had a ship named after her late husband. It is possible, therefore, that Silvado was named after a hero of the Imperial Brazilian Navy who fell during the bombardment of Curuzú.

Dimensions of Silvado and other Technical Details.

Silvado, on page 215 of the seventh volume of Johnson's (Revised) Universal Cyclopaedia, is described as a turret-ship that was 190-feet in length and 36-feet in beam. Bahia and Lima Barros, which are reported to have been shorter than Silvado, are among the other turret-ships that are claimed to have served in the Imperial Brazilian Navy. It is reported that Silvado, which is claimed to have had a deeper draught than Bahia as well as a shallower draught than Lima Barros, drew ten-feet and six-inches of water. Silvado, whose engines are claimed to have generated an indicated horse-power of 947, is reported to have travelled at a speed 10.7-knots. It is claimed that the monitor displaced 1,150-tons of water. Sir Thomas Brassey, on page 157 of the first volume of The British Navy, claims that Silvado was propelled by twin screws while its armament is reported to have been mounted in two turrets. Each turret, in a similar manner to how the turrets of Passaic-class monitors shielded a battery of two guns, is clamed to have contained a pair of 70-pounder Whitworth rifles. It is reported, on page 566, that Silvado was protected by iron plates that ranged from four and three-eighths of an inch to three-inches in thickness. Wood, like a buff-coat that was worn beneath a suit of armour, is claimed to have supported the iron case of the monitor. It is reported that eight and a quarter-inches of timber, the variety of which is not mentioned, formed the backing of the iron plates of the fighting vessel. Brassey, while providing more detailed information, concurs with the dimensions of the monitor that are included in the seventh volume of the encyclopedia. Robert Gardiner, on page 407 of the volume of Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships that covers the years from 1860 until 1905, describes Silvado as a coast defense battleship. It is reported that the bore of Whitworth rifles, which are claimed to have been muzzle-loading weapons, was 5.8-inches. Nemesis, on page 418, is referred to as an armoured turret-ship.

Joseph Whitworth Designed and Manufactured and Naval Ordnance.

Captain Francis Sadlier Stoney, whose article about heavy ordnance appears in the fourteenth volume of Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, describes 70-pounder guns as the best examples of heavy artillery that were available in the sixth decade of the nineteenth-century. It is reported, on page 234, that the Whitworth 70-pounder was famous for its hexagonal rifling and its six-sided projectiles. George Thompson, on page 196 of The War in Paraguay, is complementary about Whitworth rifles but claims that they required skilled gunners to put them to effective use. It is reported that Whitworth guns fired bolts, which are claimed to have been capable of perforating solid surfaces, and shells that lacked percussion-fuses. Alexander Lyman Holley, on page 27 of A Treatise on Ordinance and Armour, describes Joseph Whitworth as a distinguished mechanical engineer who invented a system of rifling. Whitworth is reported to have specialised in the construction of built up, or composite, steel guns. It is claimed that the 70-pounder gun, which is reported to have fired projectiles that had a diameter of five and a half-inches, was the largest of the Whitworth rifles to be put into regular use. Holley, who published his treatise in the year before Nemesis was launched, claims that more than thirty 70-pounder Whitworth rifles had been produced. It is reported, on page 28, that 120-pounder Whitworth rifles were assembled via the application of hydro-static pressure and it is possible that the guns which were placed onboard Silvado were assembled in this fashion. It is reported, on page 31, that the 70-pounder Whitworth gun had a single hoop that was fabricated from steel. A higher grade of steel, which is claimed to have been harder than the metal which was used to construct the barrel, is reported to have been used in the manufacture of the hoops. Hammering or rolling hollow castings of steel, according to Holley, represented the means by which the hoops were manufactured for the guns.

Whitworth Rifles were Reputed to be Ductile Guns.

Sir Thomas Brassey, on page 566 of the first volume of The British Navy, claims that the initial four monitors of the Pará-class mounted one Whitworth rifle in their turrets. Silvado, therefore, had the fire-power of four Pará-class monitors. Alexander Lyman Holley, on page 31 of A Treatise on Ordnance and Armour, claims that Whitworth guns were renowned for their ductility. It is reported that the larger calibres of Whitworth guns, which may have included the 70-pounder rifle, was fashioned from a single ingot of low-carbon steel. Bars of Swedish iron and small quantities of carboniferous material, which are claimed to have been melted in a crucible, are reported to have been used to manufacture the steel. Is possible, therefore, that the guns which were installed onboard Silvado were manufactured in this manner. Joseph Whitworth, in order to increase the elasticity of the metal that was used in the manufacture of his guns, is claimed to have annealed the steel for a duration of three or four weeks. Whitworth, who is quoted as saying that he had created musket-barrels which were so ductile that they would stretch rather than crack under the pressure of the explosive gasses in the chamber, is reported to have used the built-up method to fabricate the heavier guns that he had designed. Hydrostatic pressure, on page 32, is reported to have been applied during the manufacture of Whitworth guns. It is reported that the 70-pounder Whitworth rifle, in addition to being employed by the Empire of Brazil, was used by the Confederate States of America. A diagram, which appears of page 33, reveals that some 70-pounder Whitworth rifles received three hoops during the manufacturing process. Edward H. Knight, on page 110 of Knight's American Mechanical Dictionary, describes annealing as a manufacturing process by which glass or iron are rendered less brittle. It is reported, on page 111, that steel is annealed by heating the metal to a bright cherry-red hue and allowing it to cool on a bed of charcoal.

Silvado was Powered by a Mazaline Engine. 

François-Edmond Pâris, on page 214 of the first volume of L'Art Naval L'Exposition Universelle de Paris en 1867: Augmenté des Derniers Perfectionnements et Inventions Maritimes Jusqu'en 1869, claims that the propellers which provided Silvado with its means of locomotion were powered by machines that were constructed by Monsieur Mazeline. Zerah Colburn, on page 592 of the fifth volume of Engineering, identifies Messieurs Mazaline as the proprietor of a marine engine works that was situated at Havre. Mazaline, alongside three other manufacturing firms, is claimed to have fabricated some of the largest marine engines in France. It is claimed that Mazaline engines were capable of generating up to 1,000 horse-power. Silvado, whose marine power-plant is known to have generated an indicated horse-power of 947, appears to have been fitted with one of the larger Mazaline engines. Three-cylinder Mazaline engines, on page 593, are reported to have been procured by the French Imperial Navy while Monsieur Dupuy de Lome is claimed to have designed some of the marine power-plants that were manufactured by the private firm. Monsieur Mazeline is mentioned on page 490 of the first volume of Bordeaux: Aperçu Historique Sol, Population, Industrie, Commerce, Administration while Monsieur Arman is named as a business associate. Arman and Mazeline, which is an alternative spelling of Mazaline, are reported to have been business associates since the fourth year of the sixth decade of the nineteenth-century. Jean-Lucien Arman, on page 1198 of document number 972 of Bulletin des lois de la République, is reported to have built ships at Bordeaux while Jean Baptiste François Mazeline is claimed to have constructed machinery at Havre. It is reported that Arman and Mazeline were officers of the Légion d'honneur, or the Legion of Honour, during the reign of Napoleon III. Le Silvado, on page 956 of the ninth volume of Annuaire encyclopédique, is claimed to have been equipped with a Mazeline machine.

Silvado Joins the Brazilian Reserve Squadron that was based at Montevideo and Draws the Attention of American Diplomats. 

Alexander Asboth, on page 110 of the second part of Papers Relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States, informs William Henry Seward about the military situation in the Republic of Paraguay. It is reported that Asboth, who composed the document in Buenos Ayres, was attached to Legation of the United States of America. On the 15th of December, 1866, Asboth claimed that the Allies were separated from the Paraguayans by the swamps of the Estero Bellaco. It is reported that military situation in Paraguay, after the opposing armies had fortified their positions, had stagnated. An armed insurgency, which is claimed to have been caused by the unpopularity of the Paraguayan War, is reported to have broken out in four provinces of the Argentine Republic. It is claimed, on page 111, that the War of the Triple Alliance was also unpopular in the Republic of Uruguay. General Venancio Flores, who is described as the dictator of Uruguay, is reported to have been under pressure to withdraw troops from Paraguay. Admiral Joaquin José Ignacio, on page 112, is claimed to have replaced Admiral Viscount Tamandaré as the commander of the Imperial Brazilian Navy. It is reported that a reserve squadron, which is claimed to have included Silvado, was forming at Montevideo. Two ironclads, two frigates and an undisclosed number of smaller fighting vessels are reported to have formed the reserve squadron. Asboth, with a note of skepticism, claims that the purpose of the reserve squadron was to protect the regime in Uruguay. Flores, in the November of 1866, is reported to have suspended the constitutional elections of the legislative branch of the government and it is claimed that elections would not be renewed until the following year. It is suggested that the Empire of Brazil, while placing Flores under its protection, wished to control the leader of Uruguay. Silvado, if Asboth was correct in his assessment, was helping to maintain the alliance that existed between the two countries. 

Venancio Flores was Supported by the Empire of Brazil.

It is explained, on page 806 of the fourth volume of The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events for the Year 1864, that the Oriental Republic of Uruguay experienced a civil war during the sixth decade of the nineteenth-century. On the 19th of April, 1860, General Venancio Flores is reported to led an insurrection against the government of Uruguay. Flores, who is described as the former President of Uruguay, is reported to have been the leader of the Coloradoes Party. It is claimed that the Blancos Party, at the time in which Flores initiated his act of rebellion, were the rulers of Uruguay. Flores, from an early stage of the insurrection, is reported to have been supported by the Brazilian inhabitants of Uruguay as well as the denizens of the province of Rio Grande do Sul. It is claimed that the Empire of Brazil, in response to hostile actions that were levelled against Brazilians, demanded indemnities and future guarantees from Uruguay. Vice-admiral Baron de Tamadaré, who is described as the commander of the Brazilian Squadron in the Rio de la Plata, is is reported to have threatened military action if the demands were not met. On the 11th of October, 1864, Brazil is claimed to have intervened in the civil war between the Blancos and the Coloradoes. General Lopez, who is identified as the President of Paraguay, is reported to have issued a formal protest against Brazil and is claimed to have threatened to offer military support to the Blancos. Paysandú, which is described as a Uruguayan fortress, is reported to have been captured by Flores and by the Imperial Brazilian Army. Paraguay, in the December of 1864, is claimed to have invaded Brazil. A state of war, therefore, existed between Brazil and Paraguay. Flores, by instigating the Uruguayan Civil War, had laid the foundations of the Paraguayan War. Montevideo, which Silvado is known to have visited in the December of 1866, is identified as the capital of Uruguay and appears to have been the ultimate prize in the civil war.

Gunboat Diplomacy.

Charles Ames Washburn, on page 505 of the first volume of The History of Paraguay, claims that Bartolome Mitre had assisted Venancio Flores in his rebellion against the previous government of the Banda Oriental. Flores is reported to have assisted Mitre, who is identified as the President of the Republic of Argentina, at the Battle of Pavon. Mitre, whose victory at the Battle of Pavon is claimed to have enabled him to overthrow the government of Argentina, is reported to have been indebted to Flores. It is claimed, on page 507, that Flores used Argentina as a staging ground for his invasion of Uruguay. Washburn, on page 510, accuses Flores of being an asset of Argentina and of the Empire of Brazil. It is suggested that Argentina and Brazil, who are alleged to have sought to annex Uruguay, used Flores as a vehicle to gain control of the Banda Oriental. Alexander Asboth, on page 112 of the second part of Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs of the United States, claims that Mitre was expected to return to Argentina at a similar time to which Silvado arrived at Montevideo. Horace Ockerby, on page 111 of The Book of Dignities, claims that Flores had been appointed as a provisional governor of Uruguay in 1865 while Francisco Antonio Vidal is reported to have become the president in the following year. It is reported, on page 486 of the second volume of Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, that Flores was awarded the Cross of Cruceiro for his role in defeating the Paraguayan Army. Flores, in 1866, is claimed to have returned to the Banda Oriental. It is reported that Flores upon his return to Uruguay, forced Vidal to transfer the presidency to himself. Silvado, therefore, arrived at Montevideo at a time of political instability in Argentina and Uruguay. It may have been necessary to remind Flores, after the November decree and the removal of Vidal from the presidency, of the coercive power of the Brazilian state. Silvado, therefore, was participating in a show of power or in a subtle form of gunboat diplomacy.

Alexander Asboth Claims that the Empire of Brazil Covets the Island of Martin Garcia.

Alexander Asboth, on page 112 of the second part of Papers Relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States, informs William Henry Seward that the reserve squadron of the Imperial Brazilian Navy was awaiting an opportunity to occupy the Island of Martin Garcia. It is reported that Martin Garcia, which is described as the key to the navigation of the Rio de le Plata and the Uruguay River, belonged to the Republic of Argentina. Silvado, if Asboth was justified in his suspicions, would have participated in the seizure of Martin Garcia. Asboth, on page 113, accuses the Empire of Brazil of wanting to end its alliance with Argentina. It is suggested that Brazil, which is claimed to have been confident in its own military capabilities, wished to fight the Republic of Paraguay by itself. Thirty war-steamers, which included eight ironclads, are reported to have occupied the navigable waterways of Paraguay. It appears that Silvado, once it had departed from Montevideo, would join the Paraguay Squadron and engage the forces of Francisco Solano López. Martin Garcia Island, on page 186 of the first part of The South American Pilot, is described as a mass of granite that is almost circular and which takes the form of a flattened cone. It is reported that the island was 82-feet in height and two-miles in circuit while a landing place, wherein ships may have discharged their cargoes, is claimed to have been situated at the north-western corner of the island. A battery, which is reported to have been established at the south-west point of the island is claimed to have received its garrison from Buenos Ayres. Silvado, if the Imperial Brazilian Navy had attempted to capture the island, may have been compelled to engage the battery. No information, however, is provided about the number of guns that were mounted on the island or the weight of their projectiles. It is reported that the entrances to the Parana River and the Uruguay River, which are reported to have been accessed by two narrow channels, were commanded by Martin Garcia. 

Río de la Plata was the Estuary of the Parana River and the Uruguay River.

Lancelot Molyneaux Dalrymple Spence, on page 109 of The Civil Service Geography, describes the Rio de Plata as an estuary of the South Atlantic Ocean that is formed by the confluence of the Parana River and the Uruguay River. Charles Ames Washburn, on page 8 of the first volume of The History of Paraguay, claims that the Rio de Plata was named by John Cabot. It is reported that the Rio de la Plata, when translated into English, means the River of Silver. Alexander George Findlay, on page 479 of the ninth edition of A Sailing Directory for Ethiopic or South Atlantic Ocean, claims that vessels of large draught are able to navigate the Rio de la Plata as far as Monte Video while vessels that drew seventeen-feet of water are reported to have been able to navigate the estuary as far as Buenos Ayres. Silvado, with its draught of ten and a half-foot, would have been able to have reached Buenos Ayres as well as Montevideo. Claude-Marie Gattel, on page 352 of the second volume of The New Pocket Dictionary of the English and Spanish Languages, claims that plata is the Spanish word for silver. Wilfrid Latham, on page 3 of the second edition of The States of the River Plate, claims that the Rio de Plata divided the Banda Oriental and the Argentine Republic. It is reported that the Republic of Uruguay was situated to the north of the River Plate, as the Rio de la Plata is known in English, while the Republic of Argentina is claimed to been located on the southern bank of the estuary. Entre Rios, which is described as a province of Argentina, is reported to have been separated from the Banda Oriental by the Uruguay River. Uruguay, which is claimed to have been an alternative term for the Banda Oriental, is reported to have been situated to the south of the Empire of Brazil. Montevideo, on page 5, is claimed to have been located at the mouth of the Rio de la Plata. Silvado, in order to travel from Rio de Janeiro to Montevideo, would have been compelled to descend the South Atlantic Coast as far as the mouth of the estuary. 

Distance from Rio de Janeiro to Montevideo. 

Francisco Torromé, on page 33 of Emigration to the Argentine Republic, claims that the ports of South America were placed in communication by steam-ships. It is reported that a distance of 1,040-miles existed between Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo. Steam-vessels, when travelling from the capital of Brazil to the capital of Uruguay, are reported to have taken four days and eight-hours to complete the journey. Silvado, as it descended the coast of the South Atlantic Ocean, would have travelled the same distance and may have taken a similar amount of time to reach its destination. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States Transmitted to Congress with the Annual Message of the President, December 5, 1870 contains information about the sea lines of communication that existed between Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo. On the 3rd of November, 1870, John L. Stevens informed Mr. Fish that there were opportunities for trade between the nations of the Rio de la Plata and the United States of America. Montevideo, on page 279, is described as a developing city that was situated at mouth of a vast network of rivers. It is implied, therefore, that Montevideo was a city of strategic importance. New York and Rio de Janeiro, on page 280, are reported to have been placed in communication by a steam-liner that arrived once a month. A distance of 1,030-miles is claimed to have existed between Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo. Silvado would have been required to have travelled between 1,030-miles and 1,040-miles as it proceeded from Rio de Janeiro to Montevideo. Admiral William Henry Smyth, on page 426 of The Sailor's Word-book, claims that knots and miles are synonymous in nautical parlance. It is explained, for example, that eight-knots per hour is the equivalent of eight-miles per hour. Silvado, if its engines had permitted it to travel from Rio de Janeiro to Montevideo at a speed of 10.7-knots per hour, would have arrived at its destination within the space of ninety-six to ninety-seven hours.

Two Channels of Martin Garcia.

Staff Commander James Penn, on page 186 of the first part of The South American Pilot, claims that the Island of Martin Garcia was bounded by two navigable channels. Martin Garcia Island is reported to have divided the Rio de la Plata into two channels, one of which was named the Canal del Infierno and the other of which was known as the Martin Garcia channel, that were located to the south-west as well as to the north-east of the island. It is claimed that the Martin Garcia channel, which is reported to have been the only passage that was navigable by ships, was half a mile in width. Playa Honda, which is also described as the Palmas Flat, is claimed to have formed the western boundary of the Martin Garcia channel while Saint Anna is reported to have constituted the eastern margin of the navigable waterway. It is claimed that the Martin Garcia channel, depending on the environmental conditions, was between 20-feet and 40-feet in depth. A series of beacons, on page 187, are reported to have led ships to the entrance of the north-eastern channel of the Rio de la Plata. Silvado, with its draught of ten and a half feet, would have been able to have navigated the Martin Garcia channel when the level of the water was high or low. It is claimed, on page 188, that the Royal Navy and the United States Navy had sounded the Canal del Infierno in the decade that preceded the outbreak of the Paraguayan War. Lieutenant Page and Lieutenant Sidney, in 1855, are reported to have sounded the north-eastern channel of the Rio de la Plata. It was advised that ships, whose pilots would have been required to observe the portions of the estuary that lay ahead of them, should refrain from entering the Canal del Infierno or the Marin Garcia channel under a fog or during the hours of darkness. Commander Manuel Antonio Vital de Oliveira, when the time arrived for Silvado to pass Martin Garcia Island, may have chosen to enter the navigable channels of the Rio de la Plata in the daytime and when the air was clear of fog. 

Silvado would have ascended the Parana River as far as its Confluence with the Paraguay River.

Thomas Joseph Hutchinson, on page 11 of Up the Rivers and Through Some Territories of the Rio de la Plata Districts, claims that the Parana Delta is fifty-miles in breadth as well as ninety-miles in length. It is reported that waters of the Parana Delta, which is claimed to have been located at a distance of twenty-miles from Buenos Ayres, discharged its waters into the basin of the La Plata. Silvado, after it had ascended the Rio de la Plata, would have entered the Parana Delta. Staff Commander James Penn, on page 173 of the third edition of the first part of The South America Pilot, claims that the Rio de la Plata is 150-miles in length. It is explained, on page 233, that the source of the Parana River is situated in Brazil. A distance of 2,100-miles its reported to have existed between the source of the Parana River and its confluence with the Rio de la Plata. Penn, who identifies the stream that stretches from the mouth of the Rio Grande until its union with the Rio de la Plata as the Parana River, contends that the watercourse was formed by affluents. A distance of 600-miles, which followed the line of the Parana River, is reported to have existed between the mouth of the Paraguay River and the Rio de la Plata. It is claimed, on page 234, that the low season of the Parana River lasted from June until December. Vessels that drew seven-feet of water, which would have excluded Silvado, are reported to have been able to navigate the watercourse as far as Corrientes. Alexander George Findlay, on page 478 of the ninth edition of A Sailing Directory for Ethiopic or South Atlantic Ocean, claims that the Rio de la Plata terminates at its junction with the Uruguay River. It is reported that the stream, beyond the confluence of the Rio de la Plata and the Uruguay River, is known as the Parana River. Findlay, on page 495, claims the Parana River flows southwards from its source. Silvado, in order to enter the Paraguay River, would have navigated the inland waterways for an approximate distance of 750-miles.

Brazil and its Allies Occupied the Lower Reaches of the Paraguay River.

Isaac Hays, on page 75 of the sixty-sixth volume of the new series of The American Journal of the Medical Sciences, describes the Paraná River as a continuation of the Paraguay River. It is explained that Paraguay was surrounded by Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Montevideo, Buenos Ayres and Corrientes are reported to have been strategic bases during the War of the Triple Alliance. Corrientes, after the Allies had entered the confluence of the Paraguay River and the Paraná River in 1866, is reported to have become a supply depot for the invading forces. A water line of communication appears to have followed the course of the Rio de la Plata, the Paraná River and the Paraguay River. Military supplies and reinforcements, therefore, were able to be shipped to the front-lines via the inland waterways while the wounded could be ferried away from the battle-fields. A thorough blockade of the Paraguay River, which is reported to have been maintained by the Allied forces that were stationed above Corrientes, is claimed to have isolated Paraguay from the rest of the world. Francisco Solano López, therefore, would have struggled to import war materials for his beleaguered armies or to export goods to the foreign markets. It is reported that the voyage from Montevideo to Corrientes lasted for a duration of eight days and it stands to reason that Silvado, when the conditions on the rivers would have allowed it to enter the tributaries of the Rio de la Plata, may have taken a similar amount of time to reach the supply depot. Control of the Río de la Plata and its tributaries, therefore, enabled the Triple Alliance to disrupt the river as well as the sea lines of communication that allowed Paraguay to engage in commercial activity with the rest of the world. Preventing maritime trade between Paraguay and the rest of the world, via the implementation of a naval blockade, would disrupt any attempts that López made to raise funds for the prosecution of the war or to purchase military supplies for his armed forces.

Paraguay was Invaded by the Triple Alliance.

Richard Francis Burton, on pages 76 and 77 of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, describes the circumstances under which the armed forces of Paraguay were repulsed by the combined forces of the Triple Alliance. Francisco Solano López, in the December of 1864, is reported to have ordered the invasion of the Brazilian province of Matto-Grosso. On the 13th of April, 1865, the Republic of Paraguay is claimed to have attacked the Argentine Republic. Corrientes, through which López had intended to invade Brazilian territory, is claimed to have been occupied by the Paraguayan Army. Two warships of the Argentinian Navy, in addition to the capture of Corrientes, are claimed to have been seized. On the 1st of May, 1865, the Empire of Brazil is reported to have entered into an alliance with the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Uruguay. Paraguay, in the same month that the Triple Alliance was formed against it, is claimed to have invaded the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul. It is reported that the offensive phase of the campaign ended from the 1st until the 3rd of November, 1865, and it appears that Paraguay was compelled to adopt a defensive stance after those dates. Paraguay, on pages 286 and 287 of the second volume of Old and New, is claimed to have been driven out of the territories of Argentina as well as Brazil. Rio Grande do Sul and Corrientes, by the end of 1865, are reported to have been liberated while the Paraguayan Navy is claimed to have been defeated by the Allied fleet at the Battle of Riachuelo. It is reported that the Triple Alliance, in the April of 1866, crossed the Parana River and invaded Paraguay. Nemesis, therefore, had arrived at Rio de Janeiro after the initial phase of the Paraguayan War had reached its conclusion. Commander Manuel Antonio Vital de Oliveira, therefore, would command Silvado at the time in which the Imperial Brazilian Navy was attempting to gain control of the navigable waterways of Paraguay via the use of iron-plated fighting vessels.

Manoel Antônio Vital de Oliveira, Commanding Officer of Silvado, Dies Near Curupayty.

Thompson, on Chapter XIV of The War in Paraguay, claims that the commanding officer of Silvado was killed in the February of 1867 while the warship was in range of the batteries at Curupayty. The officer in question is not named, however, and neither is the specific date of his demise. Herbal, the author explains on page 185, also lost its commanding officer during this engagement while the sides of Cabral were pierced by a Paraguayan shot. Francisco Felix Pereira da Costa, author of Historia Da Guerra Do Brasil Contra as Republicas Do Uruguay E Paraguay, claims that Manoel Antônio Vital de Oliveira died while he was in command of Silvado during an engagement at Curupayty. Oliveira, da Costa explains on page 191, was killed by a piece of shrapnel as he stood on the deck of his ship. The shrapnel, da Costa continues, had ricocheted off a turret. Thompson, a British engineer who placed himself in the service of López and oversaw the construction of Paraguayan fortifications, explains that there was a rotating vanguard of ironclads that were within range of Curupayty but hidden from view of the batteries by a projecting spit of land that was shrouded by trees. The vanguard, Thompson continues, was changed every fortnight and the ironclads became visible to the gunners during these procedures. Papers Relating to the Diplomatic Relations of the United States, Part 2 names Bahia, Mariz y Barros, Tamandaré and Columbus as the ships in the vanguard while Silvado is identified as the flagship of a separate detachment of ironclads that included Herval, Barroso as well as Cabral. The diplomatic papers state that the army and the navy bombarded Curupayty on the 2nd of February, 1867, in a combined operation. This date is confirmed by da Costa on page 291 of his memoir and, on page 190, it is explained that a mass was said for Oliveira. Da Costa states that the slain commander was taken aboard Onze de Junho, a hospital ship, and buried at the Cemitério da Cruz. 

The First Passage of Curupayty, Which Exposes Humaitá, Occurs on Assumption Day.

On the 15th of August, 1867, Silvado was one of ten ironclads to pass the batteries of Curupayty in an operation that began in the early morning. Thompson, on page 213 of The War in Paraguay, states that the monitor had to tow Tamandaré to safety after the ironclad suffered from mechanical failure and lay helpless before the Paraguayan batteries. A shot, entering an open porthole, damaged the engine and the French-built monitor was compelled to rescue the stricken vessel. Thompson explains that Herbal, which was also known as Herval, assisted Silvado in towing Tamandaré away from the hostile batteries while a wooden dispatch boat followed the iron-plated vessels from behind. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Part 2 reports that Silvado was present for the engagement and names Brazil, Mariz e Barros, Tamandaré, Colombo, Cabral, Barroso, Herval as well as Lima Barros as among the ironclads that participated in the operation. The papers state, on pages 238 and 239, that the protected warships received the fire of thirty-three cannons during the passage and that they moved upstream to bombard the London battery. London, or Londres as it was known to the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking participants of the conflict, was the first of seven batteries that greeted any vessel that proceeded towards Humaitá from the lower river. Richard Burton, on page 316 of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, states that London mounted sixteen guns and possessed a bomb-proof roof. George Frederick Masterman, on page 121 of Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay, claims that these guns were housed within a brick casemate. Jeronymo Francisco Gonçalves, da Costa relates on page 380 of Historia Da Guerra Do Brasil Contra as Republicas Do Uruguay E Paraguay, commanded Silvado during the action of the 15th and was included in the letter of thanks that was given to the commanding officers of the squadron by Vice-Admiral Inhauma.

Humaitá is Bombarded by the Second Division on the 18th of February.

George Thompson, on page 247 of The War in Paraguay, claims that the Brazilian Squadron bombarded Humaitá on the day before the ironclads were due to force their way past the river batteries. On the morning of the 18th of February, 1868, the wooden gunboats at Curuzú and the ironclads at Port Elizario are reported to have commenced the bombardment of the Paraguayan fortifications. Tuyucué, which had fallen into Allied hands, joined in with the barrage and directed its fire against Espinillo. Silvado, which had participated in the Passage of Curupayty in the previous August, was situated at Port Elizario with the Second Division and would have participated in the bombardment. Alberto Amerlan, on page 95 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, states that the ironclads began to bombard Humaitá soon after they had passed Curupayty. Certain conditions needed to be met before the ironclads, that were anchored between Curupayty and Humaitá, were able to ascend the Paraguay River beyond the shore batteries. General Menna Barreto, on pages 95 and 96, is reported to have led an army of 3,000 men against Tayí. The expedition began on the 27th of October, 1867, and concluded with the capture Tayí on the 1st of November. Barreto, by capturing Tayí, provided the Brazilian Navy with a supply base that lay upriver of Humaitá. It would be necessary, however, for the ironclads to pass the formidable batteries of Humaitá before they were able to derive their provisions from this supply base. Arthur Jaceguay, on page 157 and 158 of Quatro Seculos de Actividade Maritima: Portugal e Brasil, claims that Silvado was unsuitable for the task of passing the river batteries. Silvado, which was 190-feet in length, is claimed to have been too long to navigate the sharp bends in the Paraguay River while its engines are reported to have been unreliable. It was decided, therefore, that the monitor should remain with Admiral Inhauma at Port Elizario and provide fire support to the Advanced Division on the 19th of February. 

Silvado Engages the Londres Battery on the 19th of February.

Silvado, on page 569 of the fifteenth volume of La Revue Maritime et Coloniale, is reported to have remained at Port Elizario during the Passage of Humaitá. Brazil, Cabral, Columbo, Herval, Lima Barros and Silvado are claimed to have provided fire support to the Advanced Division of ironclads as they forced their way past the batteries that lay further up the river. Correspondence respecting Hostilities in the River Plate. (In continuation of Papers presented to Parliament, February 1868.) includes a number of diplomatic correspondences that provide contemporary accounts of the Passage of Humaitá as well as the events that led up to it as well as its aftermath. Silvado is mentioned in the documents, which can be found in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, on several occasions. On the 27th of February, 1868, Mr. Gould sent a dispatch to Lord Stanley that describes the recent successes of the Allies. Marshal Caxias is reported to have stormed Establecimiento on the 19th of February, 1868, while a detachment of ironclads is claimed to have passed Humaitá on the same day. The official account of the Passage of Humaitá, which was made by the Brazilian Squadron, is enclosed in the dispatch. Lima Barros and Silvado are reported to have remained at Punto de las Piedras, which is claimed to have been 450-metres from the shore of the Chaco, while the division of six ironclads ascended the Paraguay River. Admiral Inhauma composed the Official Report of the Passage of Humaitá on the 28th of February, 1868, in the vicinity of Port Elizario. Barroso, Rio Grande, Bahia, Alagoas, Tamandaré and Pará formed the Third Division of the Brazilian Squadron while Silvado was ordered to remain with the ironclad division at Port Elizario. Inhauma, who composed his official report onboard Brazil, ordered Lima Barros and Silvado to engage the Londres battery at grapeshot distance from the chain boom that had been submerged by a rise in the river level. 

George Thompson Describes a Raid on the 1st of March, 1868, in which Ironclads are Attacked by Canoes.

Thompson, on pages 253 and 254 of The War in Paraguay, describes a canoe attack on a squadron of seven ironclads that lay between Curupayty and Humaitá. A different squadron of six ironclads had moved upriver of Humaitá on the 19th of February, 1868, in an attempt to blockade the fortress while the protected vessels that remained continued to perform operations on the stretch of river between the two fortresses. The attack is reported to have occurred on the 1st of March, 1868, while Herbal and Cabral are identified as the targets of the raiding party. Silvado, while not mentioned in the source, was attached to the squadron that lay between Curupayty and Humaitá. The squadron in question had not passed the batteries of Humaitá on the 19th of February, after all, and Silvado was among the vessels that had forced the batteries of Curupayty in the August of the previous year. Twenty-four canoes, all of which were bound together in pairs by 20 yards of rope, are reported to have participated in the raid. It is claimed that each canoe contained twelve men, armed with grenades and rockets, who had undertaken special training in preparation for the event. Canoes, since the early stages of the war, had been used by the Paraguayans to ferry troops along the inland waterways and now they would be used in a form of asymmetric warfare against the modern vessels of the Imperial armada. The purpose of the canoe attacks, Thompson continues, was to capture an ironclad. If the Paraguayan Navy possessed an ironclad, the theory went, it would drive the Allied fleet from the river. Seizing such a prize, however, was no easy task.. The crews of the boarded vessels, retreating below the decks of their ships, battened the hatches when the raiders climbed onboard. Two unnamed ironclads fired murderous volleys of grapeshot at the Paraguayans, who are reported to have been commanded by Captain Xenes, as they stood on the decks of the besieged ships.

A Canoe Attack Occurs on the 2nd of March, 1868, According to Andrew James Kennedy.

Andrew James Kennedy mentions a similar canoe attack on an ironclad squadron in La Plata, Brazil and Paraguay that occurred near Curupayty. The book, published in 1869, narrates this course of events on pages 165 and 166. Kennedy, a Royal Navy officer who served on the South America squadron during the Paraguayan War, states that the Brazilian squadron possessed eight ships instead of the seven that Thompson mentions. Brasil, Colombo, Silvado, Mariz Barros, Herval, Lima Barros, Cabral and Piaby are identified as the eight vessels in the squadron. Admiral Inhauma, Kennedy claims, commanded this unit while Commodore Delphim controlled the squadron that had passed the batteries of Humaitá in the previous February. The assault is reported to have occurred on the 2nd of March, 1868, and it is claimed that forty-eight canoes were involved in the attack. López, in this version of events, sent twice the number of boats than the amount that Thompson describes. A similarity between the accounts of Kennedy and Thompson, however, is that the canoes were tied together in pairs. It is claimed that the assailants, who covered their canoes with the branches of trees in order to give them the appearance of floating islands, were separated into eight divisions. Cabral and Lima Barros, who were caught unprepared, are identified as the intended victims of the raiding party. Kennedy and Thompson, therefore, agree that Cabral was attacked by the canoes but contradict one another in regards to the identity of the second ship. Other ironclads in the squadron, having kept their boilers in steam, are reported to have come to the assistance of the boarded vessels and Silvado may have been among their number. Kennedy states that the Paraguayans suffered 200 casualties, both killed and wounded, while thirteen of the invaders were taken prisoner. Brazilian casualties, in comparison, are reported to have numbered thirty-two killed and wounded.

Thomas Joseph Hutchinson, Quoting a Report by Admiral Inhauma, Describes a Canoe Attack on the 7th of March.

Thomas Joseph Hutchinson, on Chapter XXXIX of The Paraná; With Incidents from the Paraguayan War, claims that Silvado and Herval thwarted an attack on three ironclads by a fleet of forty-eight canoes. Herval, therefore, is reported to have come to the rescue of its comrades while Thompson claims that the ship was one of the targets of the canoe raid. Lima, Barrios and Cabal are named as the three ships that were boarded by the canoeists. Hutchinson, therefore, concurs with Thompson and Kennedy that Cabral was invaded by the canoeists but disagrees with them on the number of ships that were attacked. Lima and Barrios, instead of being the two separate vessels, may have been the same Lima Barros that Kennedy claims was assaulted during the raid. It is also possible, however, that Lima Barros and Mariz Barros were the ships that Hutchinson was referring to. The canoes, the author explains, were tied together in pairs and this is the same practice that Thompson and Kennedy describe. Each boat, in contrast to the complement of twelve that Thompson describes, contained twenty-five men. This would mean, if Hutchinson was accurate in his reporting, that 1,200 canoeists participated in the raid. The crews of the Brazilian ships, which the author describes as being of the monitor type, went below decks and bolted the hatches while Silvado and Herval came to the assistance of their besieged compatriots. Hutchinson states that grapeshot, which Thompson claims was used in combination with canister shot, was fired at the attackers who were gathered on the decks of the ships. Hutchinson derives his information from the Baron of Inhauma, whose report serves as a primary source, and repeats the claim that the invaders refused to surrender after the attack had failed. The date of the report is given as the 7th of March, 1868, but it is probable that the document refers to the earlier attack that Thompson and Kennedy describe in their works of history.

Alberto Amerlan, Corroborating Certain Details that are Found in other Sources, States that the Canoe Assault Occurred on the 1st and 2nd of March.

Alberto Amerlan, writing on pages 109 to 112 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, describes how Silvado thwarted a raid upon Cabral and Lima Barros by the bogabantes. The bogabantes, handpicked by López, were an elite unit of 300 fighting men that were tasked with capturing an ironclad. Captain Cespedes, an officer of the Paraguayan Navy, was placed in command of these specialist troops and tasked with training them for the coming raid. Amerlan, whose account of the war was translated by Henry Ferdinand Suksdorf, states that Cabral and Lima Barros were anchored near Humaitá at the time of the attack. The raid occurred between the 1st and 2nd of March, 1868, during the hours of darkness. Picket boats, situated a hundred feet upstream of the ironclads, were on the lookout for any lurking threats on the water or along the riverbank. Visibility would have been low, however, on that black and starless night. Jose da Silva, on sentry duty in one of the guard boats, noticed a large number of camelotes drifting towards the ironclads at two 'o clock in the morning. Camelotes, which are described as floating islands, are natural rafts that are formed by vegetation that has become entangled with driftwood and heaped with earth. It became apparent, upon closer inspection, that the camelotes were a disguise concocted by the Paraguayans. Twenty-four canoes, shrouded by darkness and disguised by tree branches, were approaching the squadron and were bound together in pairs. The ropes, measuring sixty feet in length, enabled the bogabantes to attach their canoes to the bows of the ironclads and climb onboard. Grenades and rockets were thrown into the smokestacks of the ships while the crews, having barred themselves inside the vessels, fired at the boarding parties on the decks. Captain-Lieutenant Jeronima Golcalvez, commander of Silvado, steered his monitor between the besieged ironclads and swept the attackers from their decks with grapeshot.

Were Thompson, Kennedy, Hutchinson and Amerlan Providing Different Accounts of the Same Canoe Attack on the Brazilian Ironclads?

The canoe raid of the 1st and 2nd of March, 1868, is well-documented but the source materials raise as many questions as they provide answers. There is disagreement, for example, on the number of canoes that participated in the attack and how many ironclads were assaulted while the names of the ships that the Paraguayans attempted to seize remains uncertain. Thompson and Amerlan, who disagree over the name of the commanding officer, claim that there were twenty-four canoes while Kennedy and Hutchinson state that there were forty-eight. Hutchinson claims that three ironclads were boarded during the assault while Thompson, Kennedy and Amerlan maintain that there was two. Thompson, Kennedy, Hutchinson and Amerlan all agree that Cabral was targeted by the canoeists but disagree on the identity of the other vessels. Thompson states that Herbal, which other sources refer to as Herval, was the second victim of the canoes while Amerlan and Kennedy agree that Lima Barros was the second  target. Hutchinson regards Lima Barros as being two ships, which he refers to as Lima and Barrios, and implies that only a fraction of the canoes managed to reach their intended targets. Fourteen canoes, for example, are said to have attacked Lima and Barrios while Cabral was assaulted by fourteen vessels. Hutchinson is claiming, therefore, that a total number of twenty-six canoes attacked the ironclads and this is a similar number to that reported by Thompson and Amerlan. Silvado is named as the rescuing ship in the accounts of Thompson, Hutchinson and Amerlan while Thompson provides no name. It is probable that the canoe attack of 7th, as reported by Admiral Inhauma and quoted by Hutchinson, was the same event that was described in the other sources. It may have been that Admiral Inhauma did not report the raid, occurring on the 1st and 2nd, until the 7th. In conclusion, then, the four sources all provide different accounts of the same event.

Three Ironclads, Forcing the Batteries of Humaitá, Fail to Notice that the Fortress is Being Evacuated. 

Three ironclads passed Humaitá on the 21st of July, 1868, at a time in which the fortress was in the process of being evacuated. Thompson, on page 274 of The War in Paraguay, explains that Silvado joined Cabral and Pianhy in forcing the batteries. The ironclads, Thompson continues, failed to detect the withdrawal of Paraguayan forces. Thompson explains, on pages 253 through to 255, that López had made a decision to leave the fortress as early as March. The failed attempt to capture an ironclad, during the actions of the 1st and 2nd of March, meant that the Paraguayan Navy could not lift the blockade of the rivers. Thompson explains that a pair of ironclads forced the batteries of Timbó on the 22nd of March, 1868, and sank a Paraguayan supply vessel. Amerlan, on page 113 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, explains that Timbó was a vital supply base for Humaitá. Closing the river between Humaitá and Timbó, therefore, severed the line of communication between the two forts. By the middle of July, Thompson explains on page 273 and 274 of his memoir, supplies within the fortress became so low that a decision was made to abandon it. The evacuation of Humaitá, Thompson continues, was achieved by means of canoes that ferried the inhabitants of the fortress to an escape route that ran through the Chaco. These procedures lasted for several days and, Thompson contends, were completed by the 24th of July. Kennedy writes on page 164 of La Plata, Brazil, and Paraguay that the Paraguayan lines of communication moved further inland after the ironclads forced the Timbó batteries. General Rivas, Amerlan states on page 113 of his account of the war, was sent to the Gran Chaco with 4,000 Argentine soldiers to break the remaining line of communications on land. Silvado, Amerlan reports on page 114, moved upriver of Humaitá with Cabral and Pianhy on the day after the Paraguayans tried to capture Rio Grande at Tayí.

The Island of Fortín, Fortified Against the Brazilian fleet, is Bombarded by Four Ironclads.

Masterman, on Chapter XVI of Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay, explains that López withdrew to the Tebicuary River on the 21st of March and set up camp at the village of San Fernando. Thompson, on Chapter XX of The War in Paraguay, describes how a series of batteries were installed at the mouth of the Tebicuary River. The Island of Fortín, situated at the confluence of the Tebicuary River and the Paraguay River, was chosen as the site of this new defensive position. Burton, who writes about the Tebicuary River in Letter XXI of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, describes the fortifications on the island after they had been abandoned. Da Costa, on page 610 of Historia Da Guerra Do Brasil Contra as Republicas Do Uruguay E Paraguay, mentions the that the defensive works at the mouth of the Tebicuary River were intended to hinder the progress of the Brazilian fleet. Thompson recalls, on pages 259 through to 261 of his memoir, that López ordered him to move the batteries at Monte Lindo to the Island of Fortín. The construction of defensive works on the island was hidden by fox tail, a type of grass, that was six feet tall and flowering. Gun platforms, constructed from timber that was sourced from nearby forests, were raised three feet in anticipation of the rivers flooding. A telegraph cable, allowing electronic communication with San Fernando, was installed on the island. Seven 8-inch and two 32-pounder guns were installed at the mouth of the Tebicuary River, another battery of two eight-inch and three 32-pounder pieces were deployed on the banks of the Paraguay River while a third battery of two 32-pounder rifled howitzers was established near a potential landing place on the Tebicuary River. Silvado may have been among four ironclads, which Thompson does not name, that bombarded and reconnoitered the Paraguayan positions after the batteries were established. It is certain, however, that Silvado was one of three monitors to force the batteries on the 24th of July. 

Three Monitors Pass the Island of Fortín and Ascend the Tebicuary River.

George Thompson, on page 263 of The War in Paraguay, claims that three monitors passed the Island of Fortín on the birthday of Francisco Solano López. On the 24th of July, 1868, the ironclads are reported to have forced the batteries that were installed on the Island of Fortín. It is claimed that the iron-cased fighting vessels, on the previous evening, had arrived within the vicinity of the defensive works. Bahia, which is reported to have had another monitor tethered to its side, is claimed to have been first in the procession of ironclads. Silvado, which appears to have lacked a consort during this particular engagement, is reported to have been the third vessel to pass the batteries. All three ironclads, which are claimed to have navigated a channel which was narrow and deep, are reported to have received the fire of the batteries at long range as well as at close range. Thompson, who is revealed to have commanded the batteries during the engagement, claims that he ordered the gunners to reserve their fire until the monitors had closed the distance with the cannons. Each gun in the battery, according to Thompson, would direct its fire at such a time that the projectile would strike the iron plates of the monitors at a perpendicular angle. All of the guns that were mounted on the Island of Fortín, so that each of the weapons could launch a projectile when an ironclad passed in front of it, is reported to have been trained to the front. It is claimed that the monitors, as they proceeded towards the mouth of the Tebicuary River, diverted their course towards the side of the Paraguay River that bordered the Chaco. Thompson, upon witnessing the diversion, claims that he ordered the elevation of the guns to be raised. It is reported that the guns, once the ironclads had returned to the channel that ran beside the batteries, were fired at a distance of eighteen-yards from their targets. Most of the projectiles, to paraphrase Thompson, split into a thousand pieces against the sides of the monitors.

Luciano Recalde.

Alberto Amerlan, on page 121 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, names Rio Grande as the monitor that was bound to the side of the larger monitor. Amerlan, echoing the first hand account of George Thompson, claims that the solid projectiles which were fired from the batteries broke into a multitude of fragments against the iron plates that protected the sides of the monitors. A member of the Paraguayan Legion, who Amerlan identifies as Lieutenant Luciano Recalde, is reported to have waved a handkerchief from the turret of Bahia and shouted a shouted a message at the garrison. George Thompson, on pages 263 and 264 of The War in Paraguay, describes a similar incident that occurred as the ironclads passed the batteries that had been installed on the Island of Fortín. It is reported that three people, one of who is claimed to have waved a handkerchief in an ironic greeting, raised their heads from the turret of Bahia and shouted at the garrison of the island fortifications. Uncertainty remains about why the dissidents, rather than travelling onboard Rio Grande or Silvado, were passengers onboard Bahia but it is possible that the monitor was the flagship of the naval detachment that had been ordered to ascend the Tebicuary River. Thompson, in his own words, informed Francisco Solano López of the number of ironclads that had passed the batteries via the electrical telegraph. López, in reply, is reported to have asked Thomson what signal the first monitor had made as it passed the batteries. It is claimed that the telegraph clerk, who would have served under Thompson, had informed López of the incident. Thompson identifies Recalde as the individual who conveyed the signal while López, whose paranoia appears to have increased with each military setback, is reported to have asked Thompson if the defectors had been allowed to pass the batteries in silence. It claimed that Thompson informed López that the garrison, in addition to their hail of projectiles, had hurled invective at Recalde.

The Monitors Return from their Expedition along the Tebicuary River.

It is reported, on page 1016 of the twelfth volume of Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York, that the ironclads which passed Fortines Bluff ascended the watercourse and bombarded the works of the Paraguayans for a duration of four-hours. It is claimed that the monitors, which included Silvado, were subjected to a heavy fire when they descended the stream. George Thompson, on page 264 of The War in Paraguay, claims that Francisco Solano López expressed contentment about the damage that had been inflicted on the ironclads that had passed the Island of Fortín on the 24th of July. It is reported, however, that López criticized Thompson for allowing the ironclads to pass the batteries. Thompson, furthermore, claims that López blamed him for the actions of Lieutenant Luciano Recalde. One of the monitors, the identity of which is not revealed, is reported to have required extensive repairs while the other two ironclads are claimed to have bombarded the Paraguayan steamers that were afloat on the Riacho Recodo. It is claimed that the steam-vessels, during this stage of the Paraguayan War, were engaged in the conveyance of war materials. Military supplies, which were transported by the steamers, are reported to have been loaded and discharged at the Riacho Recodo. It is claimed, however, that no damage was inflicted upon the supply vessels and it is reported that the monitors did not venture into the Riacho Recodo to bombard them at close range. A band, which had assembled to celebrate the birthday of López, is claimed to have played music while the ironclads bombarded the steamers at Riacho Recodo and the garrison of the Island of Fortín are reported to have danced. It is claimed that Alagoas, Bahia and Silvado returned while the garrison celebrated the feast-day. Each gun in the battery, which is reported to have been caught unprepared, is claimed to have fired at the monitors and the projectiles are stated to have struck the iron plates at a perpendicular angle.

Silvado is Struck on Twenty-Nine Occasions as it Passes the Batteries of Fortines Bluff for the Second Time.

It is reported, on pages 1016 and 1017 of the twelfth volume of Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York, that Silvado was was struck by twenty-nine projectiles as it passed Fortines Bluff for the second time. Confusion may arise, however, about the number of guns that were positioned on Fortines Bluff. Fifteen cannons, four of which are claimed to have been rifled guns, are reported to have been mounted in redoubts. Seven of the guns, which may have been smoothbores, are claimed to have been 68-pounders while another is reported to have been a 32-pounder. An additional four guns, which may have belonged to a different battery, are claimed to have been of an uncertain calibre. It would appear that sixteen guns, rather than fifteen pieces, were integrated with the defensive works of Fortines Bluff. Two projectiles, the calibre of which are not revealed, are claimed to have struck Silvado below the line of the water. One of the the shots, in a scene that is reminiscent of the time in which USS Keokuk was pierced below the water-line by nineteen rifle bolts, is reported to have struck the ironclad at a depth of one-feet below the surface of the water. A second projectile, which is claimed to have landed at the junction of the iron plates, is reported to have struck the monitor at a depth of two-feet below the line of the water. It is claimed that the extent of the damage that was inflicted upon the ironclad, which is reported to have sustained injuries to its iron plates and its timber backing, was so severe that the division to which it belonged lacked the means to repair it. No other details are provided, however, about the extent of the damage that was inflicted on the monitor. It is possible, however, that the shots which struck the ironclad below the water-line had caused leaks to occur within the fighting vessel. An ingress of water, if it was not stopped, would have caused the monitor to founder. It may have been necessary, in order to prevent further leaking, to run the ironclad aground.

Decoding the Mystery of Fortines Bluff. 

New lines of defense, on page 400 of the thirty-seventh volume of the new series of The Westminster Review, are reported to have been established after the abandonment of Curupaity and the loss of Humaitá. Curupaity, as Curupayty was also known, had been passed by ironclads in the third and fourth years of the Paraguayan War. It is claimed that the Tebiquari River, which was an alternative spelling of the Tebicuary River, formed the new line of defense of the armed forces of Paraguay. Two navigable branches of the Tebiquari River, which is reported to have been a tributary of the Paraguay River, are claimed to have stretched into the interior of the country. Fortin, which is reported to have been endowed with some of the characteristics of an island, is claimed to have been situated at the confluence of the Paraguay River and the Tebicuary River. Francisco Solano López, before he withdrew to San Fernando, is reported to have ordered Fortin to be fortified. Telegraphic communication is claimed to have been established between Timbó, Fortin and the Tebiquari Pass. It is reported that the ironclads of the Imperial Brazilian Navy, which may have included Silvado, bombarded Fortin while the remainder of the Paraguayan Navy is claimed to have been concentrated on the Tebiquari River. José Maria da Silva Paranhos, on page 207 of the first volume of Ephemerides Brazileiras pelo Barão do Rio Branco, identifies the Barão da Passagem as the naval officer who commanded the division of ironclads that forced the batteries of Fortin. It is claimed the Barão da Passagem, or the Baron of the Passage, led six ironclads as they ascended the Paraguay River. Alagoas, Bahia and Silvado are reported to have passed the batteries of Fortin while Barroso, Piauhy as well as Rio Grande are claimed to have bombarded the defensive positions from an anchorage on the Paraguay River. Colonel George Thompson, during the time in which the ironclads passed Fortin, is revealed to have commanded the batteries.

Fortines Bluff was Alternative Name for Fortin Island.

It appears, due to the similarity of the accounts that are found in the twelfth volume of Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York as well as the first volume of Ephemerides Brazileiras pelo Barão do Rio Branco, that Fortines Bluff and Fortin Island referred to the same defensive position. Benjamin Humphrey Smart, on page 62 of A New Critical Dictionary of the English Language, describes a bluff as as a high or steep bank that projects into the sea. John Ogilvie, on page 295 of the first volume of The Imperial Dictionary of the English Language, defines a bluff as a high bank that presents a steep front and which projects into a body of water. It is claimed that a bluff can overlook the sea, a lake or a river. Mariano Velazquez de la Cadena, on page 219 of A Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages, describes a fortin as a small fort as well as a field defense. Murat Halstead, on page 181 of Full Official History of the War with Spain, suggests that fortines is the plural of fortin. Eighty forts, which are referred to as fortin, are reported to have been established in Cuba. Joseph E. Worcester, on page 1199 of A Dictionary of the English Language, claims that redoubt is a general term for field-works that are sometimes enclosed. Fortines Bluff, therefore, could be described as a series of small forts that had been established on a steep bank that projected into the confluence of the Paraguay River and the Tebicuary River. It is apparent that the stronghold, due to it location at the mouth of the Tebicuary River, represented the beginning of the new line of defense. Silvado, in a similar manner to which the Passaic-class monitors received the fire of the batteries that defended Charleston Harbor, was struck on twenty-nine occasions by the guns that defended the entrance of the Tebicuary River. Preventing the advance of the ironclads of the Imperial Brazilian Navy, which was a task that Curupayty and Humaitá had failed to achieve, would became the duty of the batteries that were situated on Fortines Bluff.

Criollo, a Ten-ton Gun that Fires 150-pound Projectiles, Strikes Silvado as it Passes the Angostura Batteries.

Thompson, on Chapter XXII of The War in Paraguay, states that the batteries on the Island of Fortín were sent to Angostura after the fall of Humaitá. It is explained that Angostura resides at the confluence of the Pikysyry River, which drains Lake Ypoá, and the Paraguay River. López, having ordered Thompson to survey the topographic and hydrographic features of the region during the middle of August, decided to withdraw from the Tebicuary River to the Pikysyry River. It was thought that the Pikysyry River, which ran through marshes and woods, would be an easier position to defend than the Tebicuary River. Angostura, which served as a river port, was protected by a series of batteries that were installed on a horseshoe bend in the river. The Brazilian Navy, no longer restrained by the guns of Humaitá, threatened the Paraguayan lines of communication that ran along the waterways. Criollo, Thompson explains, was transported from Asunción to Angostura and placed in the left-hand battery. Paraguay, which lacked guns of large caliber, had manufactured its own heavy artillery pieces at Asunción. Whitworth guns, firing 150-pound projectiles, are known to have been used by the Brazilian Navy and spent shells were collected by the Paraguayans and sent to Asunción. Criollo, Thompson explains on page 193 of his book, was made to fire appropriated 150-pound Whitworth projectiles. The brass gun, Thompson continues, had been cast from requisitioned metals at Asunción. It is explained that appropriated church bells, copper boilers and saucepans were smelted down to create the 10-ton weapon. Thompson, again on Chapter XXII of his memoir, claims that Criollo struck Silvado with a steel bolt as it passed the Angostura batteries. The blow, which landed at the waterline, is reported to have inflicted significant damage on the ship. Silvado, half an hour after it first passed Angostura, is reported to have received a second blow from Criollo as it returned from its position further up the river. 

The Manduvirá River Expedition and the Arrival of Silvado at Asunción.

On the 30th of August, 1869, Morning Advertiser published an article which states that Silvado arrived at Asunción after it had participated in an expedition along the Manduvirá River. A flotilla of canoes and small boats, which are claimed to have been towed to the city by the ironclad, are reported to have been captured during the riverine expedition. It is claimed that prisoners-of-war, who appear to have been onboard the captured vessels, were taken to the former capital. On the 4th of September, 1869, The Broad Arrow echoes the reports that were made in the Morning Advertiser about the canoes and the prisoners. It is unclear whether the captives, the number of which is not disclosed, had been captured on the land or on the water. Francisco Solano López, who had withdrawn to the Chaco, was fighting a guerrilla war against the armed forces of the Triumvirate at this stage of the conflict. George Frederick Masterman, on page 295 of Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay, states that the Manduvirá River expeditions involved two light-draught ironclads but does not name the fighting vessels. The Manduvirá River, Masterman explains, is a tributary of the Paraguay River that joins the main stem at Emboscada and drains the valleys that are situated to the north of the Cordillera. George Thompson, on page 316 of The War in Paraguay, claims that López had five small steamers on the Manduvirá River but does not mention the presence of ironclads on the watercourse. Masterman, in contrast, claims that López possessed three small steamers on the Manduvirá River. The Cordillera, according to Thompson, was a low range of hills that was situated at a distance of forty or fifty miles from Asunción. A battery of twelve small field guns and 6,000 wounded men are identified as the remnants of the Paraguayan Army. The absence of heavy batteries on the Paraguayan side, in addition to a lack of ammunition and muskets, is reported to have allowed the Brazilian ironclads to navigate the inland waterways with impunity.

On the 21st of March, 2026, the blogpost was updated.