Silvado, a Monitor of Brazil, and its Role in the Paraguayan War
Arman Sells Nemesis, Intended for Paraguayan Service, to Brazil.
The first installation of Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, providing a listing of naval vessels that were built between the years 1860 and 1905, sheds light on the circumstances in which Silvado entered Brazilian service. The first volume of this international history of naval vessels, which was edited by Robert Gardiner, states that the ironclad was built in France and completed in either 1865 or 1866. It is stated, on page 406, that Paraguay placed the original order for the monitor before it was bought by Brazil. It is possible, therefore, that the ship was built for Paraguay in 1865 and sold to Brazil in 1866. Francisco Solano López, who ruled Paraguay as a dictator, had sought to purchase ironclads from private shipyards in Europe and placed such an order with Lucien Arman. The French industrialist, who owned a shipyard in Bordeaux and had built CSS Stonewall for the Confederacy, constructed the armoured ram for Paraguay but did not receive full payment for the vessel. The War of the Triple Alliance made it difficult for Paraguay, which was under naval blockade, to pay for the military hardware that it had ordered before the war. Nemesis, as the ship was known while it awaited purchase by López, had to be sold to another buyer or Arman would suffer financial losses. Brazil, seeking to enlarge its navy and to deprive its adversary of fighting ships, was able to buy the vessel from Arman and and renamed it in honour of the late Américo Brasilio Silvado. Naming ships after military commanders or state dignitaries, whether living or dead, was a common practice in Brazil at the time. Artur Jaceguai, a Brazilian naval officer who shares his experiences of the Paraguayan War in Reminiscências da Guerra do Paraguai, explains that Silvado had been the commanding officer of Rio de Janeiro at the time in which it struck a torpedo near Curuzú and sank as a result. The torpedo, Jaceguai recalls, exploded near the stern of the ironclad and half the crew perished along with its commanding officer.
Dimensions of Silvado and other Technical Details.
Silvado, on page 215 of the seventh volume of Johnson's (Revised) Universal Cyclopaedia, is described as a turret-ship that was 190-feet in length and 36-feet in beam. Bahia and Lima Barros, which are reported to have been shorter than Silvado, are among the other turret-ships that are claimed to have served in the Imperial Brazilian Navy. It is reported that Silvado, which is claimed to have had a deeper draught than Bahia as well as a shallower draught than Lima Barros, drew ten-feet and six-inches of water. Silvado, whose engines are claimed to have generated an indicated horse-power of 947, is reported to have travelled at a speed 10.7-knots. It is claimed that the monitor displaced 1,150-tons of water. Sir Thomas Brassey, on page 157 of the first volume of The British Navy, claims that Silvado was propelled by twin screws while its armament is reported to have been mounted in two turrets. Each turret, in a similar manner to how the turrets of Passaic-class monitors shielded a battery of two guns, is clamed to have contained a pair of 70-pounder Whitworth rifles. It is reported, on page 566, that Silvado was protected by iron plates that ranged from four and three-eighths of an inch to three-inches in thickness. Wood, like a buff-coat that was worn beneath a suit of armour, is claimed to have supported the iron case of the monitor. It is reported that eight and a quarter-inches of timber, the variety of which is not mentioned, formed the backing of the iron plates of the fighting vessel. Brassey, while providing more detailed information, concurs with the dimensions of the monitor that are included in the seventh volume of the encyclopedia. Robert Gardiner, on page 407 of the volume of Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships that covers the years from 1860 until 1905, describes Silvado as a coast defense battleship. It is reported that the bore of Whitworth rifles, which are claimed to have been muzzle-loading weapons, was 5.8-inches. Nemesis, on page 418, is referred to as an armoured turret-ship.
Joseph Whitworth Designed and Manufactured and Naval Ordnance.
Captain Francis Sadlier Stoney, whose article about heavy ordnance appears in the fourteenth volume of Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, describes 70-pounder guns as the best examples of heavy artillery that were available in the sixth decade of the nineteenth-century. It is reported, on page 234, that the Whitworth 70-pounder was famous for its hexagonal rifling and its six-sided projectiles. George Thompson, on page 196 of The War in Paraguay, is complementary about Whitworth rifles but claims that they required skilled gunners to put them to effective use. It is reported that Whitworth guns fired bolts, which are claimed to have been capable of perforating solid surfaces, and shells that lacked percussion-fuses. Alexander Lyman Holley, on page 27 of A Treatise on Ordinance and Armour, describes Joseph Whitworth as a distinguished mechanical engineer who invented a system of rifling. Whitworth is reported to have specialised in the construction of built up, or composite, steel guns. It is claimed that the 70-pounder gun, which is reported to have fired projectiles that had a diameter of five and a half-inches, was the largest of the Whitworth rifles to be put into regular use. Holley, who published his treatise in the year before Nemesis was launched, claims that more than thirty 70-pounder Whitworth rifles had been produced. It is reported, on page 28, that 120-pounder Whitworth rifles were assembled via the application of hydro-static pressure and it is possible that the guns which were placed onboard Silvado were assembled in this fashion. It is reported, on page 31, that the 70-pounder Whitworth gun had a single hoop that was fabricated from steel. A higher grade of steel, which is claimed to have been harder than the metal which was used to construct the barrel, is reported to have been used in the manufacture of the hoops. Hammering or rolling hollow castings of steel, according to Holley, represented the means by which the hoops were manufactured for the guns.
Whitworth Rifles were Reputed to be Ductile Guns.
Sir Thomas Brassey, on page 566 of the first volume of The British Navy, claims that the initial four monitors of the Pará-class mounted one Whitworth rifle in their turrets. Silvado, therefore, had the fire-power of four Pará-class monitors. Alexander Lyman Holley, on page 31 of A Treatise on Ordnance and Armour, claims that Whitworth guns were renowned for their ductility. It is reported that the larger calibres of Whitworth guns, which may have included the 70-pounder rifle, was fashioned from a single ingot of low-carbon steel. Bars of Swedish iron and small quantities of carboniferous material, which are claimed to have been melted in a crucible, are reported to have been used to manufacture the steel. Is possible, therefore, that the guns which were installed onboard Silvado were manufactured in this manner. Joseph Whitworth, in order to increase the elasticity of the metal that was used in the manufacture of his guns, is claimed to have annealed the steel for a duration of three or four weeks. Whitworth, who is quoted as saying that he had created musket-barrels which were so ductile that they would stretch rather than crack under the pressure of the explosive gasses in the chamber, is reported to have used the built-up method to fabricate the heavier guns that he had designed. Hydrostatic pressure, on page 32, is reported to have been applied during the manufacture of Whitworth guns. It is reported that the 70-pounder Whitworth rifle, in addition to being employed by the Empire of Brazil, was used by the Confederate States of America. A diagram, which appears of page 33, reveals that some 70-pounder Whitworth rifles received three hoops during the manufacturing process. Edward H. Knight, on page 110 of Knight's American Mechanical Dictionary, describes annealing as a manufacturing process by which glass or iron are rendered less brittle. It is reported, on page 111, that steel is annealed by heating the metal to a bright cherry-red hue and allowing it to cool on a bed of charcoal.
Silvado was Powered by a Mazaline Engine.
François-Edmond Pâris, on page 214 of the first volume of L'Art Naval L'Exposition Universelle de Paris en 1867: Augmenté des Derniers Perfectionnements et Inventions Maritimes Jusqu'en 1869, claims that the propellers which provided Silvado with its means of locomotion were powered by machines that were constructed by Monsieur Mazeline. Zerah Colburn, on page 592 of the fifth volume of Engineering, identifies Messieurs Mazaline as the proprietor of a marine engine works that was situated at Havre. Mazaline, alongside three other manufacturing firms, is claimed to have fabricated some of the largest marine engines in France. It is claimed that Mazaline engines were capable of generating up to 1,000 horse-power. Silvado, whose marine power-plant is known to have generated an indicated horse-power of 947, appears to have been fitted with one of the larger Mazaline engines. Three-cylinder Mazaline engines, on page 593, are reported to have been procured by the French Imperial Navy while Monsieur Dupuy de Lome is claimed to have designed some of the marine power-plants that were manufactured by the private firm. Monsieur Mazeline is mentioned on page 490 of the first volume of Bordeaux: Aperçu Historique Sol, Population, Industrie, Commerce, Administration while Monsieur Arman is named as a business associate. Arman and Mazeline, which is an alternative spelling of Mazaline, are reported to have been business associates since the fourth year of the sixth decade of the nineteenth-century. Jean-Lucien Arman, on page 1198 of document number 972 of Bulletin des lois de la République, is reported to have built ships at Bordeaux while Jean Baptiste François Mazeline is claimed to have constructed machinery at Havre. It is reported that Arman and Mazeline were officers of the Légion d'honneur, or the Legion of Honour, during the reign of Napoleon III. Le Silvado, on page 956 of the ninth volume of Annuaire encyclopédique, is claimed to have been equipped with a Mazeline machine.
Silvado, Joining the Brazilian Reserve Squadron in Montevideo, Draws the Attention of American Diplomats.
On the 15th of December, 1866, a letter was sent to William H. Seward that informed him of a reserve squadron of the Brazilian Navy forming in Montevideo. William H. Seward was, at that time, the Secretary of State of the United States of America. The letter appears in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Part 2 and states that Silvado joined the reserve squadron that included two frigates, a man-of-war as well as another ironclad. It is speculated, on page 112 of the document, that the purpose of this reserve squadron was to protect and control Venancio Flores. Flores, who ascended to the presidency of Uruguay with Argentinian and Brazilian assistance, was one of the three heads of state of the Triple Alliance and ruled his country as a dictator. A November decree, reported in the diplomatic papers, had suspended the constitutional elections of the legislative branch of government for a year and this would have been a source of political unrest within the country. The presence of the Brazilian reserve squadron, therefore, could be interpreted as a type of gunboat diplomacy. Political instability in Uruguay would detract from the Allied war effort and it may have been necessary to remind Flores, as he conducted the business of government, of the coercive power of the Brazilian state. It is suggested, also, in the letter that the reserve squadron may have been awaiting an opportunity to occupy the Argentinian island of Martin Garcia. This island, the document claims, would have allowed the Brazilian Navy to control the Río de la Plata and the River Uruguay. Control of the Río de la Plata, formed by the confluence of the Paraná and Uruguay rivers, enabled the Triple Alliance to prevent maritime trade between Paraguay and the rest of the world. Silvado, after its brief stay in Montevideo, entered the Paraguay River via the Paraná River. Most of the fighting, after the March of 1866, occurred on the Paraguay River and its tributaries.
Manoel Antônio Vital de Oliveira, Commanding Officer of Silvado, Dies Near Curupayty.
Thompson, on Chapter XIV of The War in Paraguay, claims that the commanding officer of Silvado was killed in the February of 1867 while the warship was in range of the batteries at Curupayty. The officer in question is not named, however, and neither is the specific date of his demise. Herbal, the author explains on page 185, also lost its commanding officer during this engagement while the sides of Cabral were pierced by a Paraguayan shot. Francisco Felix Pereira da Costa, author of Historia Da Guerra Do Brasil Contra as Republicas Do Uruguay E Paraguay, claims that Manoel Antônio Vital de Oliveira died while he was in command of Silvado during an engagement at Curupayty. Oliveira, da Costa explains on page 191, was killed by a piece of shrapnel as he stood on the deck of his ship. The shrapnel, da Costa continues, had ricocheted off a turret. Thompson, a British engineer who placed himself in the service of López and oversaw the construction of Paraguayan fortifications, explains that there was a rotating vanguard of ironclads that were within range of Curupayty but hidden from view of the batteries by a projecting spit of land that was shrouded by trees. The vanguard, Thompson continues, was changed every fortnight and the ironclads became visible to the gunners during these procedures. Papers Relating to the Diplomatic Relations of the United States, Part 2 names Bahia, Mariz y Barros, Tamandaré and Columbus as the ships in the vanguard while Silvado is identified as the flagship of a separate detachment of ironclads that included Herval, Barroso as well as Cabral. The diplomatic papers state that the army and the navy bombarded Curupayty on the 2nd of February, 1867, in a combined operation. This date is confirmed by da Costa on page 291 of his memoir and, on page 190, it is explained that a mass was said for Oliveira. Da Costa states that the slain commander was taken aboard Onze de Junho, a hospital ship, and buried at the Cemitério da Cruz.
The First Passage of Curupayty, Which Exposes Humaitá, Occurs on Assumption Day.
On the 15th of August, 1867, Silvado was one of ten ironclads to pass the batteries of Curupayty in an operation that began in the early morning. Thompson, on page 213 of The War in Paraguay, states that the monitor had to tow Tamandaré to safety after the ironclad suffered from mechanical failure and lay helpless before the Paraguayan batteries. A shot, entering an open porthole, damaged the engine and the French-built monitor was compelled to rescue the stricken vessel. Thompson explains that Herbal, which was also known as Herval, assisted Silvado in towing Tamandaré away from the hostile batteries while a wooden dispatch boat followed the iron-plated vessels from behind. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Part 2 reports that Silvado was present for the engagement and names Brazil, Mariz e Barros, Tamandaré, Colombo, Cabral, Barroso, Herval as well as Lima Barros as among the ironclads that participated in the operation. The papers state, on pages 238 and 239, that the protected warships received the fire of thirty-three cannons during the passage and that they moved upstream to bombard the London battery. London, or Londres as it was known to the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking participants of the conflict, was the first of seven batteries that greeted any vessel that proceeded towards Humaitá from the lower river. Richard Burton, on page 316 of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, states that London mounted sixteen guns and possessed a bomb-proof roof. George Frederick Masterman, on page 121 of Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay, claims that these guns were housed within a brick casemate. Jeronymo Francisco Gonçalves, da Costa relates on page 380 of Historia Da Guerra Do Brasil Contra as Republicas Do Uruguay E Paraguay, commanded Silvado during the action of the 15th and was included in the letter of thanks that was given to the commanding officers of the squadron by Vice-Admiral Inhauma.
Humaitá is Bombarded by the Second Division on the 18th of February.
George Thompson, on page 247 of The War in Paraguay, claims that the Brazilian Squadron bombarded Humaitá on the day before the ironclads were due to force their way past the river batteries. On the morning of the 18th of February, 1868, the wooden gunboats at Curuzú and the ironclads at Port Elizario are reported to have commenced the bombardment of the Paraguayan fortifications. Tuyucué, which had fallen into Allied hands, joined in with the barrage and directed its fire against Espinillo. Silvado, which had participated in the Passage of Curupayty in the previous August, was situated at Port Elizario with the Second Division and would have participated in the bombardment. Alberto Amerlan, on page 95 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, states that the ironclads began to bombard Humaitá soon after they had passed Curupayty. Certain conditions needed to be met before the ironclads, that were anchored between Curupayty and Humaitá, were able to ascend the Paraguay River beyond the shore batteries. General Menna Barreto, on pages 95 and 96, is reported to have led an army of 3,000 men against Tayí. The expedition began on the 27th of October, 1867, and concluded with the capture Tayí on the 1st of November. Barreto, by capturing Tayí, provided the Brazilian Navy with a supply base that lay upriver of Humaitá. It would be necessary, however, for the ironclads to pass the formidable batteries of Humaitá before they were able to derive their provisions from this supply base. Arthur Jaceguay, on page 157 and 158 of Quatro Seculos de Actividade Maritima: Portugal e Brasil, claims that Silvado was unsuitable for the task of passing the river batteries. Silvado, which was 190-feet in length, is claimed to have been too long to navigate the sharp bends in the Paraguay River while its engines are reported to have been unreliable. It was decided, therefore, that the monitor should remain with Admiral Inhauma at Port Elizario and provide fire support to the Advanced Division on the 19th of February.
Silvado Engages the Londres Battery on the 19th of February.
Silvado, on page 569 of the fifteenth volume of La Revue Maritime et Coloniale, is reported to have remained at Port Elizario during the Passage of Humaitá. Brazil, Cabral, Columbo, Herval, Lima Barros and Silvado are claimed to have provided fire support to the Advanced Division of ironclads as they forced their way past the batteries that lay further up the river. Correspondence respecting Hostilities in the River Plate. (In continuation of Papers presented to Parliament, February 1868.) includes a number of diplomatic correspondences that provide contemporary accounts of the Passage of Humaitá as well as the events that led up to it as well as its aftermath. Silvado is mentioned in the documents, which can be found in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, on several occasions. On the 27th of February, 1868, Mr. Gould sent a dispatch to Lord Stanley that describes the recent successes of the Allies. Marshal Caxias is reported to have stormed Establecimiento on the 19th of February, 1868, while a detachment of ironclads is claimed to have passed Humaitá on the same day. The official account of the Passage of Humaitá, which was made by the Brazilian Squadron, is enclosed in the dispatch. Lima Barros and Silvado are reported to have remained at Punto de las Piedras, which is claimed to have been 450-metres from the shore of the Chaco, while the division of six ironclads ascended the Paraguay River. Admiral Inhauma composed the Official Report of the Passage of Humaitá on the 28th of February, 1868, in the vicinity of Port Elizario. Barroso, Rio Grande, Bahia, Alagoas, Tamandaré and Pará formed the Third Division of the Brazilian Squadron while Silvado was ordered to remain with the ironclad division at Port Elizario. Inhauma, who composed his official report onboard Brazil, ordered Lima Barros and Silvado to engage the Londres battery at grapeshot distance from the chain boom that had been submerged by a rise in the river level.
George Thompson Describes a Raid on the 1st of March, 1868, in which Ironclads are Attacked by Canoes.
Thompson, on pages 253 and 254 of The War in Paraguay, describes a canoe attack on a squadron of seven ironclads that lay between Curupayty and Humaitá. A different squadron of six ironclads had moved upriver of Humaitá on the 19th of February, 1868, in an attempt to blockade the fortress while the protected vessels that remained continued to perform operations on the stretch of river between the two fortresses. The attack is reported to have occurred on the 1st of March, 1868, while Herbal and Cabral are identified as the targets of the raiding party. Silvado, while not mentioned in the source, was attached to the squadron that lay between Curupayty and Humaitá. The squadron in question had not passed the batteries of Humaitá on the 19th of February, after all, and Silvado was among the vessels that had forced the batteries of Curupayty in the August of the previous year. Twenty-four canoes, all of which were bound together in pairs by 20 yards of rope, are reported to have participated in the raid. It is claimed that each canoe contained twelve men, armed with grenades and rockets, who had undertaken special training in preparation for the event. Canoes, since the early stages of the war, had been used by the Paraguayans to ferry troops along the inland waterways and now they would be used in a form of asymmetric warfare against the modern vessels of the Imperial armada. The purpose of the canoe attacks, Thompson continues, was to capture an ironclad. If the Paraguayan Navy possessed an ironclad, the theory went, it would drive the Allied fleet from the river. Seizing such a prize, however, was no easy task.. The crews of the boarded vessels, retreating below the decks of their ships, battened the hatches when the raiders climbed onboard. Two unnamed ironclads fired murderous volleys of grapeshot at the Paraguayans, who are reported to have been commanded by Captain Xenes, as they stood on the decks of the besieged ships.
A Canoe Attack Occurs on the 2nd of March, 1868, According to Andrew James Kennedy.
Andrew James Kennedy mentions a similar canoe attack on an ironclad squadron in La Plata, Brazil and Paraguay that occurred near Curupayty. The book, published in 1869, narrates this course of events on pages 165 and 166. Kennedy, a Royal Navy officer who served on the South America squadron during the Paraguayan War, states that the Brazilian squadron possessed eight ships instead of the seven that Thompson mentions. Brasil, Colombo, Silvado, Mariz Barros, Herval, Lima Barros, Cabral and Piaby are identified as the eight vessels in the squadron. Admiral Inhauma, Kennedy claims, commanded this unit while Commodore Delphim controlled the squadron that had passed the batteries of Humaitá in the previous February. The assault is reported to have occurred on the 2nd of March, 1868, and it is claimed that forty-eight canoes were involved in the attack. López, in this version of events, sent twice the number of boats than the amount that Thompson describes. A similarity between the accounts of Kennedy and Thompson, however, is that the canoes were tied together in pairs. It is claimed that the assailants, who covered their canoes with the branches of trees in order to give them the appearance of floating islands, were separated into eight divisions. Cabral and Lima Barros, who were caught unprepared, are identified as the intended victims of the raiding party. Kennedy and Thompson, therefore, agree that Cabral was attacked by the canoes but contradict one another in regards to the identity of the second ship. Other ironclads in the squadron, having kept their boilers in steam, are reported to have come to the assistance of the boarded vessels and Silvado may have been among their number. Kennedy states that the Paraguayans suffered 200 casualties, both killed and wounded, while thirteen of the invaders were taken prisoner. Brazilian casualties, in comparison, are reported to have numbered thirty-two killed and wounded.
Thomas Joseph Hutchinson, Quoting a Report by Admiral Inhauma, Describes a Canoe Attack on the 7th of March.
Thomas Joseph Hutchinson, on Chapter XXXIX of The Paraná; With Incidents from the Paraguayan War, claims that Silvado and Herval thwarted an attack on three ironclads by a fleet of forty-eight canoes. Herval, therefore, is reported to have come to the rescue of its comrades while Thompson claims that the ship was one of the targets of the canoe raid. Lima, Barrios and Cabal are named as the three ships that were boarded by the canoeists. Hutchinson, therefore, concurs with Thompson and Kennedy that Cabral was invaded by the canoeists but disagrees with them on the number of ships that were attacked. Lima and Barrios, instead of being the two separate vessels, may have been the same Lima Barros that Kennedy claims was assaulted during the raid. It is also possible, however, that Lima Barros and Mariz Barros were the ships that Hutchinson was referring to. The canoes, the author explains, were tied together in pairs and this is the same practice that Thompson and Kennedy describe. Each boat, in contrast to the complement of twelve that Thompson describes, contained twenty-five men. This would mean, if Hutchinson was accurate in his reporting, that 1,200 canoeists participated in the raid. The crews of the Brazilian ships, which the author describes as being of the monitor type, went below decks and bolted the hatches while Silvado and Herval came to the assistance of their besieged compatriots. Hutchinson states that grapeshot, which Thompson claims was used in combination with canister shot, was fired at the attackers who were gathered on the decks of the ships. Hutchinson derives his information from the Baron of Inhauma, whose report serves as a primary source, and repeats the claim that the invaders refused to surrender after the attack had failed. The date of the report is given as the 7th of March, 1868, but it is probable that the document refers to the earlier attack that Thompson and Kennedy describe in their works of history.
Alberto Amerlan, Corroborating Certain Details that are Found in other Sources, States that the Canoe Assault Occurred on the 1st and 2nd of March.
Alberto Amerlan, writing on pages 109 to 112 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, describes how Silvado thwarted a raid upon Cabral and Lima Barros by the bogabantes. The bogabantes, handpicked by López, were an elite unit of 300 fighting men that were tasked with capturing an ironclad. Captain Cespedes, an officer of the Paraguayan Navy, was placed in command of these specialist troops and tasked with training them for the coming raid. Amerlan, whose account of the war was translated by Henry Ferdinand Suksdorf, states that Cabral and Lima Barros were anchored near Humaitá at the time of the attack. The raid occurred between the 1st and 2nd of March, 1868, during the hours of darkness. Picket boats, situated a hundred feet upstream of the ironclads, were on the lookout for any lurking threats on the water or along the riverbank. Visibility would have been low, however, on that black and starless night. Jose da Silva, on sentry duty in one of the guard boats, noticed a large number of camelotes drifting towards the ironclads at two 'o clock in the morning. Camelotes, which are described as floating islands, are natural rafts that are formed by vegetation that has become entangled with driftwood and heaped with earth. It became apparent, upon closer inspection, that the camelotes were a disguise concocted by the Paraguayans. Twenty-four canoes, shrouded by darkness and disguised by tree branches, were approaching the squadron and were bound together in pairs. The ropes, measuring sixty feet in length, enabled the bogabantes to attach their canoes to the bows of the ironclads and climb onboard. Grenades and rockets were thrown into the smokestacks of the ships while the crews, having barred themselves inside the vessels, fired at the boarding parties on the decks. Captain-Lieutenant Jeronima Golcalvez, commander of Silvado, steered his monitor between the besieged ironclads and swept the attackers from their decks with grapeshot.
Were Thompson, Kennedy, Hutchinson and Amerlan Providing Different Accounts of the Same Canoe Attack on the Brazilian Ironclads?
The canoe raid of the 1st and 2nd of March, 1868, is well-documented but the source materials raise as many questions as they provide answers. There is disagreement, for example, on the number of canoes that participated in the attack and how many ironclads were assaulted while the names of the ships that the Paraguayans attempted to seize remains uncertain. Thompson and Amerlan, who disagree over the name of the commanding officer, claim that there were twenty-four canoes while Kennedy and Hutchinson state that there were forty-eight. Hutchinson claims that three ironclads were boarded during the assault while Thompson, Kennedy and Amerlan maintain that there was two. Thompson, Kennedy, Hutchinson and Amerlan all agree that Cabral was targeted by the canoeists but disagree on the identity of the other vessels. Thompson states that Herbal, which other sources refer to as Herval, was the second victim of the canoes while Amerlan and Kennedy agree that Lima Barros was the second target. Hutchinson regards Lima Barros as being two ships, which he refers to as Lima and Barrios, and implies that only a fraction of the canoes managed to reach their intended targets. Fourteen canoes, for example, are said to have attacked Lima and Barrios while Cabral was assaulted by fourteen vessels. Hutchinson is claiming, therefore, that a total number of twenty-six canoes attacked the ironclads and this is a similar number to that reported by Thompson and Amerlan. Silvado is named as the rescuing ship in the accounts of Thompson, Hutchinson and Amerlan while Thompson provides no name. It is probable that the canoe attack of 7th, as reported by Admiral Inhauma and quoted by Hutchinson, was the same event that was described in the other sources. It may have been that Admiral Inhauma did not report the raid, occurring on the 1st and 2nd, until the 7th. In conclusion, then, the four sources all provide different accounts of the same event.
Three Ironclads, Forcing the Batteries of Humaitá, Fail to Notice that the Fortress is Being Evacuated.
Three ironclads passed Humaitá on the 21st of July, 1868, at a time in which the fortress was in the process of being evacuated. Thompson, on page 274 of The War in Paraguay, explains that Silvado joined Cabral and Pianhy in forcing the batteries. The ironclads, Thompson continues, failed to detect the withdrawal of Paraguayan forces. Thompson explains, on pages 253 through to 255, that López had made a decision to leave the fortress as early as March. The failed attempt to capture an ironclad, during the actions of the 1st and 2nd of March, meant that the Paraguayan Navy could not lift the blockade of the rivers. Thompson explains that a pair of ironclads forced the batteries of Timbó on the 22nd of March, 1868, and sank a Paraguayan supply vessel. Amerlan, on page 113 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, explains that Timbó was a vital supply base for Humaitá. Closing the river between Humaitá and Timbó, therefore, severed the line of communication between the two forts. By the middle of July, Thompson explains on page 273 and 274 of his memoir, supplies within the fortress became so low that a decision was made to abandon it. The evacuation of Humaitá, Thompson continues, was achieved by means of canoes that ferried the inhabitants of the fortress to an escape route that ran through the Chaco. These procedures lasted for several days and, Thompson contends, were completed by the 24th of July. Kennedy writes on page 164 of La Plata, Brazil, and Paraguay that the Paraguayan lines of communication moved further inland after the ironclads forced the Timbó batteries. General Rivas, Amerlan states on page 113 of his account of the war, was sent to the Gran Chaco with 4,000 Argentine soldiers to break the remaining line of communications on land. Silvado, Amerlan reports on page 114, moved upriver of Humaitá with Cabral and Pianhy on the day after the Paraguayans tried to capture Rio Grande at Tayí.
The Island of Fortín, Fortified Against the Brazilian fleet, is Bombarded by Four Ironclads.
Masterman, on Chapter XVI of Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay, explains that López withdrew to the Tebicuary River on the 21st of March and set up camp at the village of San Fernando. Thompson, on Chapter XX of The War in Paraguay, describes how a series of batteries were installed at the mouth of the Tebicuary River. The Island of Fortín, situated at the confluence of the Tebicuary River and the Paraguay River, was chosen as the site of this new defensive position. Burton, who writes about the Tebicuary River in Letter XXI of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, describes the fortifications on the island after they had been abandoned. Da Costa, on page 610 of Historia Da Guerra Do Brasil Contra as Republicas Do Uruguay E Paraguay, mentions the that the defensive works at the mouth of the Tebicuary River were intended to hinder the progress of the Brazilian fleet. Thompson recalls, on pages 259 through to 261 of his memoir, that López ordered him to move the batteries at Monte Lindo to the Island of Fortín. The construction of defensive works on the island was hidden by fox tail, a type of grass, that was six feet tall and flowering. Gun platforms, constructed from timber that was sourced from nearby forests, were raised three feet in anticipation of the rivers flooding. A telegraph cable, allowing electronic communication with San Fernando, was installed on the island. Seven 8-inch and two 32-pounder guns were installed at the mouth of the Tebicuary River, another battery of two eight-inch and three 32-pounder pieces were deployed on the banks of the Paraguay River while a third battery of two 32-pounder rifled howitzers was established near a potential landing place on the Tebicuary River. Silvado may have been among four ironclads, which Thompson does not name, that bombarded and reconnoitered the Paraguayan positions after the batteries were established. It is certain, however, that Silvado was one of three monitors to force the batteries on the 24th of July.
Three Monitors Pass the Island of Fortín and Ascend the Tebicuary River.
George Thompson, on page 263 of The War in Paraguay, claims that three monitors passed the Island of Fortín on the birthday of Francisco Solano López. On the 24th of July, 1868, the ironclads are reported to have forced the batteries that were installed on the Island of Fortín. It is claimed that the iron-cased fighting vessels, on the previous evening, had arrived within the vicinity of the defensive works. Bahia, which is reported to have had another monitor tethered to its side, is claimed to have been first in the procession of ironclads. Silvado, which appears to have lacked a consort during this particular engagement, is reported to have been the third vessel to pass the batteries. All three ironclads, which are claimed to have navigated a channel which was narrow and deep, are reported to have received the fire of the batteries at long range as well as at close range. Thompson, who is revealed to have commanded the batteries during the engagement, claims that he ordered the gunners to reserve their fire until the monitors had closed the distance with the cannons. Each gun in the battery, according to Thompson, would direct its fire at such a time that the projectile would strike the iron plates of the monitors at a perpendicular angle. All of the guns that were mounted on the Island of Fortín, so that each of the weapons could launch a projectile when an ironclad passed in front of it, is reported to have been trained to the front. It is claimed that the monitors, as they proceeded towards the mouth of the Tebicuary River, diverted their course towards the side of the Paraguay River that bordered the Chaco. Thompson, upon witnessing the diversion, claims that he ordered the elevation of the guns to be raised. It is reported that the guns, once the ironclads had returned to the channel that ran beside the batteries, were fired at a distance of eighteen-yards from their targets. Most of the projectiles, to paraphrase Thompson, split into a thousand pieces against the sides of the monitors.
Luciano Recalde.
Alberto Amerlan, on page 121 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, names Rio Grande as the monitor that was bound to the side of the larger monitor. Amerlan, echoing the first hand account of George Thompson, claims that the solid projectiles which were fired from the batteries broke into a multitude of fragments against the iron plates that protected the sides of the monitors. A member of the Paraguayan Legion, who Amerlan identifies as Lieutenant Luciano Recalde, is reported to have waved a handkerchief from the turret of Bahia and shouted a shouted a message at the garrison. George Thompson, on pages 263 and 264 of The War in Paraguay, describes a similar incident that occurred as the ironclads passed the batteries that had been installed on the Island of Fortín. It is reported that three people, one of who is claimed to have waved a handkerchief in an ironic greeting, raised their heads from the turret of Bahia and shouted at the garrison of the island fortifications. Uncertainty remains about why the dissidents, rather than travelling onboard Rio Grande or Silvado, were passengers onboard Bahia but it is possible that the monitor was the flagship of the naval detachment that had been ordered to ascend the Tebicuary River. Thompson, in his own words, informed Francisco Solano López of the number of ironclads that had passed the batteries via the electrical telegraph. López, in reply, is reported to have asked Thomson what signal the first monitor had made as it passed the batteries. It is claimed that the telegraph clerk, who would have served under Thompson, had informed López of the incident. Thompson identifies Recalde as the individual who conveyed the signal while López, whose paranoia appears to have increased with each military setback, is reported to have asked Thompson if the defectors had been allowed to pass the batteries in silence. It claimed that Thompson informed López that the garrison, in addition to their hail of projectiles, had hurled invective at Recalde.
The Monitors Return from their Expedition along the Tebicuary River.
It is reported, on page 1016 of the twelfth volume of Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York, that the ironclads which passed Fortines Bluff ascended the watercourse and bombarded the works of the Paraguayans for a duration of four-hours. It is claimed that the monitors, which included Silvado, were subjected to a heavy fire when they descended the stream. George Thompson, on page 264 of The War in Paraguay, claims that Francisco Solano López expressed contentment about the damage that had been inflicted on the ironclads that had passed the Island of Fortín on the 24th of July. It is reported, however, that López criticized Thompson for allowing the ironclads to pass the batteries. Thompson, furthermore, claims that López blamed him for the actions of Lieutenant Luciano Recalde. One of the monitors, the identity of which is not revealed, is reported to have required extensive repairs while the other two ironclads are claimed to have bombarded the Paraguayan steamers that were afloat on the Riacho Recodo. It is claimed that the steam-vessels, during this stage of the Paraguayan War, were engaged in the conveyance of war materials. Military supplies, which were transported by the steamers, are reported to have been loaded and discharged at the Riacho Recodo. It is claimed, however, that no damage was inflicted upon the supply vessels and it is reported that the monitors did not venture into the Riacho Recodo to bombard them at close range. A band, which had assembled to celebrate the birthday of López, is claimed to have played music while the ironclads bombarded the steamers at Riacho Recodo and the garrison of the Island of Fortín are reported to have danced. It is claimed that Alagoas, Bahia and Silvado returned while the garrison celebrated the feast-day. Each gun in the battery, which is reported to have been caught unprepared, is claimed to have fired at the monitors and the projectiles are stated to have struck the iron plates at a perpendicular angle.
Silvado is Struck on Twenty-Nine Occasions as it Passes the Batteries of Fortines Bluff for the Second Time.
It is reported, on pages 1016 and 1017 of the twelfth volume of Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York, that Silvado was was struck by twenty-nine projectiles as it passed Fortines Bluff for the second time. Confusion may arise, however, about the number of guns that were positioned on Fortines Bluff. Fifteen cannons, four of which are claimed to have been rifled guns, are reported to have been mounted in redoubts. Seven of the guns, which may have been smoothbores, are claimed to have been 68-pounders while another is reported to have been a 32-pounder. An additional four guns, which may have belonged to a different battery, are claimed to have been of an uncertain calibre. It would appear that sixteen guns, rather than fifteen pieces, were integrated with the defensive works of Fortines Bluff. Two projectiles, the calibre of which are not revealed, are claimed to have struck Silvado below the line of the water. One of the the shots, in a scene that is reminiscent of the time in which USS Keokuk was pierced below the water-line by nineteen rifle bolts, is reported to have struck the ironclad at a depth of one-feet below the surface of the water. A second projectile, which is claimed to have landed at the junction of the iron plates, is reported to have struck the monitor at a depth of two-feet below the line of the water. It is claimed that the extent of the damage that was inflicted upon the ironclad, which is reported to have sustained injuries to its iron plates and its timber backing, was so severe that the division to which it belonged lacked the means to repair it. No other details are provided, however, about the extent of the damage that was inflicted on the monitor. It is possible, however, that the shots which struck the ironclad below the water-line had caused leaks to occur within the fighting vessel. An ingress of water, if it was not stopped, would have caused the monitor to founder. It may have been necessary, in order to prevent further leaking, to run the ironclad aground.
Decoding the Mystery of Fortines Bluff.
New lines of defense, on page 400 of the thirty-seventh volume of the new series of The Westminster Review, are reported to have been established after the abandonment of Curupaity and the loss of Humaitá. Curupaity, as Curupayty was also known, had been passed by ironclads in the third and fourth years of the Paraguayan War. It is claimed that the Tebiquari River, which was an alternative spelling of the Tebicuary River, formed the new line of defense of the armed forces of Paraguay. Two navigable branches of the Tebiquari River, which is reported to have been a tributary of the Paraguay River, are claimed to have stretched into the interior of the country. Fortin, which is reported to have been endowed with some of the characteristics of an island, is claimed to have been situated at the confluence of the Paraguay River and the Tebicuary River. Francisco Solano López, before he withdrew to San Fernando, is reported to have ordered Fortin to be fortified. Telegraphic communication is claimed to have been established between Timbó, Fortin and the Tebiquari Pass. It is reported that the ironclads of the Imperial Brazilian Navy, which may have included Silvado, bombarded Fortin while the remainder of the Paraguayan Navy is claimed to have been concentrated on the Tebiquari River. José Maria da Silva Paranhos, on page 207 of the first volume of Ephemerides Brazileiras pelo Barão do Rio Branco, identifies the Barão da Passagem as the naval officer who commanded the division of ironclads that forced the batteries of Fortin. It is claimed the Barão da Passagem, or the Baron of the Passage, led six ironclads as they ascended the Paraguay River. Alagoas, Bahia and Silvado are reported to have passed the batteries of Fortin while Barroso, Piauhy as well as Rio Grande are claimed to have bombarded the defensive positions from an anchorage on the Paraguay River. Colonel George Thompson, during the time in which the ironclads passed Fortin, is revealed to have commanded the batteries.
Fortines Bluff was Alternative Name for Fortin Island.
It appears, due to the similarity of the accounts that are found in the twelfth volume of Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York as well as the first volume of Ephemerides Brazileiras pelo Barão do Rio Branco, that Fortines Bluff and Fortin Island referred to the same defensive position. Benjamin Humphrey Smart, on page 62 of A New Critical Dictionary of the English Language, describes a bluff as as a high or steep bank that projects into the sea. John Ogilvie, on page 295 of the first volume of The Imperial Dictionary of the English Language, defines a bluff as a high bank that presents a steep front and which projects into a body of water. It is claimed that a bluff can overlook the sea, a lake or a river. Mariano Velazquez de la Cadena, on page 219 of A Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages, describes a fortin as a small fort as well as a field defense. Murat Halstead, on page 181 of Full Official History of the War with Spain, suggests that fortines is the plural of fortin. Eighty forts, which are referred to as fortin, are reported to have been established in Cuba. Joseph E. Worcester, on page 1199 of A Dictionary of the English Language, claims that redoubt is a general term for field-works that are sometimes enclosed. Fortines Bluff, therefore, could be described as a series of small forts that had been established on a steep bank that projected into the confluence of the Paraguay River and the Tebicuary River. It is apparent that the stronghold, due to it location at the mouth of the Tebicuary River, represented the beginning of the new line of defense. Silvado, in a similar manner to which the Passaic-class monitors received the fire of the batteries that defended Charleston Harbor, was struck on twenty-nine occasions by the guns that defended the entrance of the Tebicuary River. Preventing the advance of the ironclads of the Imperial Brazilian Navy, which was a task that Curupayty and Humaitá had failed to achieve, would became the duty of the batteries that were situated on Fortines Bluff.
Criollo, a Ten-ton Gun that Fires 150-pound Projectiles, Strikes Silvado as it Passes the Angostura Batteries.
Thompson, on Chapter XXII of The War in Paraguay, states that the batteries on the Island of Fortín were sent to Angostura after the fall of Humaitá. It is explained that Angostura resides at the confluence of the Pikysyry River, which drains Lake Ypoá, and the Paraguay River. López, having ordered Thompson to survey the topographic and hydrographic features of the region during the middle of August, decided to withdraw from the Tebicuary River to the Pikysyry River. It was thought that the Pikysyry River, which ran through marshes and woods, would be an easier position to defend than the Tebicuary River. Angostura, which served as a river port, was protected by a series of batteries that were installed on a horseshoe bend in the river. The Brazilian Navy, no longer restrained by the guns of Humaitá, threatened the Paraguayan lines of communication that ran along the waterways. Criollo, Thompson explains, was transported from Asunción to Angostura and placed in the left-hand battery. Paraguay, which lacked guns of large caliber, had manufactured its own heavy artillery pieces at Asunción. Whitworth guns, firing 150-pound projectiles, are known to have been used by the Brazilian Navy and spent shells were collected by the Paraguayans and sent to Asunción. Criollo, Thompson explains on page 193 of his book, was made to fire appropriated 150-pound Whitworth projectiles. The brass gun, Thompson continues, had been cast from requisitioned metals at Asunción. It is explained that appropriated church bells, copper boilers and saucepans were smelted down to create the 10-ton weapon. Thompson, again on Chapter XXII of his memoir, claims that Criollo struck Silvado with a steel bolt as it passed the Angostura batteries. The blow, which landed at the waterline, is reported to have inflicted significant damage on the ship. Silvado, half an hour after it first passed Angostura, is reported to have received a second blow from Criollo as it returned from its position further up the river.
The Manduvirá River Expedition and the Arrival of Silvado at Asunción.
On the 30th of August, 1869, Morning Advertiser published an article which states that Silvado arrived at Asunción after it had participated in an expedition along the Manduvirá River. A flotilla of canoes and small boats, which are claimed to have been towed to the city by the ironclad, are reported to have been captured during the riverine expedition. It is claimed that prisoners-of-war, who appear to have been onboard the captured vessels, were taken to the former capital. On the 4th of September, 1869, The Broad Arrow echoes the reports that were made in the Morning Advertiser about the canoes and the prisoners. It is unclear whether the captives, the number of which is not disclosed, had been captured on the land or on the water. Francisco Solano López, who had withdrawn to the Chaco, was fighting a guerrilla war against the armed forces of the Triumvirate at this stage of the conflict. George Frederick Masterman, on page 295 of Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay, states that the Manduvirá River expeditions involved two light-draught ironclads but does not name the fighting vessels. The Manduvirá River, Masterman explains, is a tributary of the Paraguay River that joins the main stem at Emboscada and drains the valleys that are situated to the north of the Cordillera. George Thompson, on page 316 of The War in Paraguay, claims that López had five small steamers on the Manduvirá River but does not mention the presence of ironclads on the watercourse. Masterman, in contrast, claims that López possessed three small steamers on the Manduvirá River. The Cordillera, according to Thompson, was a low range of hills that was situated at a distance of forty or fifty miles from Asunción. A battery of twelve small field guns and 6,000 wounded men are identified as the remnants of the Paraguayan Army. The absence of heavy batteries on the Paraguayan side, in addition to a lack of ammunition and muskets, is reported to have allowed the Brazilian ironclads to navigate the inland waterways with impunity.
On the 7th of March, 2026, the blogpost was updated.
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