Events that Occurred During the Paraguayan War which Involved Pará-class Monitors
Napoleão João Baptista Level, who was assisted by Carlos Braconnot and Henrique Antonio Baptista, oversaw the construction of six monitors of the Pará-class during the Paraguayan War. Pará, Rio Grande, Alagoas, Piauby, Ceará and Santa Catharina were built at the Arsenal do Marinha de Rio de Janeiro. Level designed the monitors, which were constructed between the December of 1866 and the March of 1868, to operate on the system of waterways that connected with the Río de la Plata. Pará, Rio Grande and Alagoas were the first members of their class to join the Brazilian Squadron on the Paraguay River. The trio, which arrived at Curuzú between the December of 1867 and the February of 1868, joined the ironclad division at Port Elizario after they forced the battery of Curupayty. Commodore Francisco Cordeiro Torres Alvim commanded the First Division at Curuzú while the Second Division at Port Elizario, which was supplied by a tramway that ran through the Chaco, was commanded by Rear-admiral Joaquin José Ignacio. A Third Division, which was under the command of Commodore Delphim Carlos de Carvalho, was formed when six ironclads passed the batteries of Humaitá and arrived at Tayí. Pará, Rio Grande and Alagoas joined the Third Division and Rio Grande participated in the expedition against Asunción. Piauby, Ceará and Santa Catharina arrived at the theatre of war after the Passage of Humaitá but were involved in the expeditions along the tributaries of the Paraguay River. Some confusion may arise over the name of the fourth monitor of the Pará-class, which is named after a state in the North East of Brazil, due to the different ways it is spelled in the source materials. Piauby is also known as Piaby, Pianhy or Piauí and the spelling depends on the author of the document. Monitors of the Pará-class spent the remainder of the war engaging Paraguayan forces along the Tebicuary River, Pikysyry River and Manduvirá River.
Brazil Requires Ironclads to Gain Control of the Paraguay River and its Tributaries.
Asunción, the capitol of Paraguay, was protected by a network of shore batteries and riverine defenses that were centered around Humaitá. The Paraguay River, after which the republic was named, was the principle inland waterway in the country while tributaries such as the Tebicuary River and Manduvirá River were also important navigation channels. Underwater obstructions, which included nets and sunken vessels, hindered navigation of the rivers. Chain booms, such as the one at Humaitá, could detain vessels beneath the river batteries while torpedoes were able to damage vessels beneath the waterline. Itapirú, Curuzú and Curupayty lay downriver of Humaitá while Timbó as well as Tacombú were situated upriver of the Paraguayan stronghold. Unprotected wooden vessels of the Brazilian Navy, such as those that had defeated the Paraguayan Navy at the Battle of Riachuelo, would have been destroyed if they had attempted to pass these river batteries and this persuaded the government of Brazil to procure ironclads for the purpose of gaining control of the internal waterways. Brazil purchased ironclads from abroad, some of which had their guns arranged in a broadside arrangement and others of which carried their ordnance in turrets, while the construction of protected vessels commenced in Rio de Janeiro after the commencement of hostilities between Paraguay and the Triple Alliance. The Brazilian Navy, at the beginning of 1868, was unable to ascend the river beyond Humaitá and had developed a reputation for inertia. A division of ironclads, under the command of Admiral Ignacio, had been situated between Curupayty and Humaitá since the August of 1867 and was either unwilling or unable to force the batteries that prevented it from gaining access to the upper reaches of the Paraguay River. Curupayty was passed by the ironclads on the 15th of August, 1867, and the ninety-third volume of The Westminster Review mentions this event in an article about the conflict.
Reinforcements to the Brazilian Ironclad Division are Required the Ascend the Paraguay River and Enter its Tributaries.
Théodore Fix, on page 133 of La Guerre du Paraguay, claims that Marshal Caxias asked the Brazilian government to send additional monitors to reinforce the ironclads that were detained on the lower stretches of the Paraguay River. Pará, Alagoas and Rio Grande are named as the first of this new batch of monitors but the time in which they are reported to have arrived in the theater of war as well as the military situation that they faced differs from other sources. George Thompson, on page 246 of The War in Paraguay, implies that the Brazilian Navy refused to ascend the Paraguay River beyond Humaitá. It may be inferred that it was Admiral Ignacio, who was in command of the ironclad division between the Paraguayan stronghold and its outwork, who refused to force that stretch of the river unless he received reinforcements. Alberto Amerlan, on page 107 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, claims that it was Admiral Tamandaré who declared that the Passage of Humaitá could only be achieved with a force of sixteen ironclads. Andrew James Kennedy blames the drop in the river level for the inactivity of the Brazilian ironclads in La Plata, Brazil, and Paraguay, During the Present War as well as the physical dimensions of the fighting ships. It is explained, on pages 149 and 150, that larger ironclads such as Brazil were unable to ascend the river beyond Humaitá. The drop in the river, which is dictated by the seasons, was severe after the action of the 15th of August and there were not enough light-draught ironclads in the Brazilian squadron to be able to navigate the shallow channels that ran alongside the Paraguayan stronghold. Admiral Ignacio, therefore, was aware that the batteries of Humaitá could not be forced until he had a greater number of shallow-draught ironclads under his command. The six Pará-class monitors, which were under construction in Rio de Janeiro, possessed a lightness of draught that would enable them to navigate the shallow waters of Paraguay.
Brazil Chooses to Build Monitors Instead of Broadside Ironclads.
Recent events on the North American continent, which saw the first use of protected turret ships, had persuaded the navies of the world that monitors would be a worthwhile addition to their inventory of fighting vessels. Brazil, along with its Argentinian and Uruguayan allies, sought to invade Paraguay along the course of its rivers and required a powerful navy to gain possession of the internal waterways. Ironclads, which had proven their worth in the American Civil War, would act in cooperation with the land forces of the Triple Alliance. Cowper Phipps Coles, who advocated for the use of monitors in The Turret Versus the Broadside System, had invented the turret in which Bahia housed its guns. Bahia, which had been constructed at Birkenhead by John Laird, would serve alongside monitors of the Pará class during the Passage of Humaitá and the Bombardment of Asunción. The success of Bahia at Itapirú, in which it silenced a Paraguayan gun, may have persuaded Brazil to construct its own monitors at Rio de Janeiro. Richard Burton, on page 344 of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, attributes the invention of the revolving gun turret to Coles when describing a Pará-class monitor that he was able to inspect up close. John Ericsson, who designed the ten Passaic-class monitors that served in the United States Navy during the War of Southern Secession, helped to raise the profile of turret ships after the ironclads which he had designed proved to be effective at combating hostile vessels and capable of withstanding the blows of enemy projectiles. Chapter XV of the first volume of The Life of John Ericsson, which was written by William Conant Church, is dedicated to the inception of USS Monitor while Chapter XVI focuses on the construction of the first turret ship. It may be said that monitors of the Pará-class, although equipped with a different type of turret to that which was designed by Ericsson, are descended from the ironclad that was invented by the Swedish engineer.
Napoleão João Baptista Level is Chosen to Design the Pará-class Monitors.
Arthur Jaceguay, on page 175 of Quatro Seculos de Actividade Maritima: Portugal e Brasil, identifies Napoleão Level as the naval architect who designed the Pará-class monitors. It is reported that Level was chosen to oversee, or direct, the construction of the monitors at Rio de Janeiro. Carlos Braconnot and Captain-lieutenant H. A. Baptista, the former person being a mechanical engineer and the second individual being a director of artillery, are reported to have assisted Level with the construction of the Pará-class monitors. It is claimed that the monitors were built to overcome the defenses of Humaitá, which were preventing the Brazilian Squadron from gaining access to the upper reaches of the Paraguay River, as well as the natural impediments that were present in the water. Adolfo Tiberghien, on page 4 of Vocabulario Nautico em Portuguez-Francez e Francez-Portuguez, claims that Captain-lieutenant Carlos Braconnot directed the machine shops at the Arsenal while Captain-lieutenant Napoleão Level is named as the director of construction at the same naval shipyard. Frigate-captain Henrique Antonio Baptista, on page 11 of Collecção das Decisões do Governo do Imperio do Brazil de 1871, is identified as the Director of Artillery at the Arsenal de Côrte in the January of 1871 and proves that the naval officer remained at the shipyard after the Paraguayan War had ended. A report on the Pará-class monitors by M. A. Marmiesse, which is included on page 771 of the twenty-third volume of La Revue Maritime, claims that Braconnot and Level were of French decent. Henrique Antonio Baptista, on page 112 of the second volume of Relatorio da 2 Exposição Nacional de 1866, is reported to have been present in Rio de Janeiro when Whitworth rifles were being tested on the 24th of November. Napoleão João Baptista Level, on page viii of the seventeenth volume of Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects, is revealed to have been an honorary member of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects.
Six Monitors of the Pará Class are Built at Rio de Janeiro.
Rio de Janeiro, which served as the capital city of the Empire of Brazil, possessed the necessary shipbuilding facilities to build a fleet of broadside ironclads and monitors that could navigate the internal waterways which connected with the Rio de la Plata. The first monitors that were ordered by the Brazilian government, such as the French-built and twin-turreted Silvado as well as the single-turreted and British-built Bahia, were procured from overseas contractors. Tamandaré, which was one of the first ironclads to be built in Brazil, kept its guns in a central battery and utilized the broadside system. Cowper Phipps Coles, in The Turret Versus the Broadside System, claims that Bahia outperformed Tamandaré at the Battle of Itapirú and attributes the success of the former vessel to its use of the turret that he had designed. The perceived superiority of turreted vessels, therefore, may have influenced the decision of the Imperial Brazilian Navy to focus its future ship building efforts on the construction of monitors of the Pará-class. Afonso Celso de Assis Figueiredo, on Chapter IV of A Marinha D'Outr'Ora, claims that all six of the Pará-class monitors were built at Rio de Janeiro. The Arsenal de Marinha do Rio de Janeiro, on page 47, is identified as the location in which the ironclads were built. Figueredo, who was made Viscount of Ouro Preto by Emperor Pedro II and who published his book in 1894, claims that five of the six vessels had their keels laid down on the same day. The names, as well as the dates on which construction began and was completed, can be found on page 48 while similar information about other fighting ships of the Imperial Brazilian Navy can also be found on the same page. It is reported that work began on the initial five monitors on the 8th of December, 1866, while the dates of completion were different for each vessel. Santa Catharina had its keel laid down on the 2nd of March, 1867, and represents the final monitor of the Pará-class to be constructed.Curuzú Serves as an Allied Naval Base on the Paraguay River.
The Paraguayan War, which is the third article that appears in the ninety-third volume of The Foreign Quarterly Review, describes the circumstances in which Curuzú was captured by the Allies. It is explained, on page 397, that Curuzú was situated 3,000 yards from Curupayty. Curuzú, if it fell into Allied hands, would be used as a military base. A four day bombardment of Curuzú, which lay on the Paraguay River, by the Brazilian fleet is reported to have preceded a landwards assault by the Allied armies. Curuzú was taken on the 5th of September, 1866, and the Allies were free to use it as a staging ground for an attack on Curupayty. Captain-lieutenant Friedrich von Ehrenkrook, on page 64 of History of Submarine Mining and Torpedoes, provides a different account of the capture of Curuzú to that which is found in the ninety-third volume of The Foreign Quarterly Review but agrees that it was necessary for the Allies to capture that fort in order to attack Curupayty. It is stated, on page 65, that the Allies stormed Curuzú on the 3rd of September while a naval bombardment of the fort is reported to have preceded this event. Richard Burton, on Letter XIII of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, concurs with Ehrenkrook that Curuzú fell to the Allies on the 3rd of September. Théodore Fix dedicates the third section of the fifth chapter of La Guerre du Paraguay, which was published in 1870, to the Passage of Humaitá and the events that preceded it. Marshal Caxias is reported, on page 133, to have asked for more monitors to be sent to reinforce the ironclad squadron on the Paraguay River. The three monitors are claimed to have arrived at Tres Bocas on the 13th of February, 1868, and passed Curuzú before they joined the ironclads at Curupayty. Pará, Alagoas and Rio Grande are named as the three monitors that reinforced the river squadron. George Thompson, on page 246 of The War in Paraguay, claims that three Pará-class monitors stopped at Curuzú before they passed Curupayty.
Monitors of the Pará-class Arrive at Curuzú.
It is revealed, on page 343 of A Marinha D'Outr'Ora by the Viscount of Our Preto, that three monitors of the Pará-class were stationed at Curuzú at the beginning of February. Arthur Jaceguay describes the arrival of the first Pará-class monitors at Curuzú in Quatro Seculos de Actividade Maritima: Portugal e Brasil and claims, on page 175, that they arrived at the Allied naval base on separate days. Pará is reported to have joined the Brazilian Squadron at Curuzú on the 21st of December, 1867, while Rio Grande and Alagoas are claimed to have arrived at the naval base in the first days of February. It can be claimed, therefore, that Pará was the only vessel of its class to arrive in the theatre of war in 1867 and the first of the monitors that were built at Rio de Janeiro to be integrated with the Brazilian Squadron. Francisco Félix Pereira da Costa, on page 476 of the third volume of Historia da Guerra do Brasil Contra as Republicas Uruguay e Paraguay, claims that the monitors which were built at the Arsenal de Côrte appeared at Curuzú at the same time in which Allied reinforcements were arriving in the Chaco and at Passo da Patria. It is claimed, on page 512, that Francisco Cordeiro Torres Alvim commanded the division of gunboats that were stationed at Curuzú and that he provided fire support to the ironclad column as it passed Curupayty on Assumption Day. Alvim, on page 526, remained as the commander of the division of the Brazilian Squadron that was stationed at Curuzú after the ironclads had passed Humaitá. Captain Alvim is reported, on page 471 of the twenty-first volume of The Engineer, to have commanded Bahia during the Battle of Itapirú. Richard Burton, on Letter XVII of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, claims that Alvim was fluent in English and that he had learned to speak that language in the United States of America. Alagoas, Pará and Rio Grande would have been under the command of Alvim during the short duration of time that they were anchored at Curuzú.
Alagoas Collides with Ypiranga on the 12th of February.
An article about the Passage of Humaitá, which appears in the fifth volume of The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette of the Regular and Volunteer Forces, provides insight into the events that let up to the formation of a third division of ironclads that were ordered to force the shore batteries on the Paraguay River as well as threaten Asunción. The article, which was first published in an unnamed Brazilian newspaper, contains the official report of Admiral Ignácio. A collision is claimed to have occurred between one of the Pará-class monitors, which had arrived at Curuzú in the February of 1868, and an unprotected gunboat. On the 12th of February, 1868, three monitors of the Pará-class are reported to have made an attempt to force their way past the batteries of Curupayty but their efforts were frustrated by an adversarial river current that caused the ironclads to yaw. Weak engines as well as poor steerage, the article contends, were responsible for the failure and attempts were made to rectify these deficiencies. It is reported that Alagoas, returning from Curupayty, struck Ypiranga and that a smokestack fell on its deck. It is not made clear, however, whether it was Alagoas or Ypiranga that suffered the loss of its chimney. Andrew James Kennedy claims that Ypiranga possessed six guns in La Plata, Brazil, and Paraguay, During the Present War while providing insight into its service history on the sixth chapter. It is revealed, on page 42, that Ypiranga was powered by an engine that generated 100 horse-power and possessed a crew of eighty-six sailors and seventeen marines. Half of these crew are reported, on page 110, to have been lost at the Battle of Riachuelo. The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1865, which is the fifth volume in the series, agrees with Kennedy about the number of guns that were carried on board Ypiranga and identifies it as one of nine Brazilian fighting ships that participated in the aforementioned naval engagement.
Second Passage of Curupayty.
On the 13th of February, 1868, a contingent of monitors forced their way past the guns of Curupayty and reinforced the ironclad squadron that lay downriver of Humaitá. George Thompson, on Chapter XIX of The War in Paraguay, claims that the vessels proceeded past the river batteries under the cover of darkness and that they suffered minimal damage from enemy projectiles. Nighttime brought visibility problems and the Paraguayans, who would have struggled to see the ironclads as they slipped past the batteries, struggled to strike their targets. Vessels with a low profile were also difficult to hit and it is claimed, on page 246, that the monitors displayed as little as a foot of hull above the waterline. Advocates of the low freeboard, such as Cowper Phipps Coles who explores the issue in The Turret versus the Broadside System, believed that vessels with a smaller surface area above the water provided more difficult targets for their opponents. Thompson explains, on pages 246 as well as 247, that the hull was protected by 4 inches of iron and the turret was shielded by 6 inches of iron. It is stated, on page 246, that the monitors were built at Rio de Janeiro and that they stopped at Curuzú before they moved upriver of Curupayty. Alberto Amerlan, author of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, claims that four monitors reinforced the ironclad squadron that lay between Curupayty and Humaitá while Thompson maintains that three of the new fighting vessels appeared on that day. Each of the monitors, according to Amerlan, was powered by an engine that generated 30 units of horsepower while Thompson claims that the fighting vessels were propelled by twin screws. Amerlan names the new arrivals as Pará, Alagoas, Rio Grande as well as Pianhy and identifies Commodore Delphim Carlos de Carvalho as the commander of this division. Both Amerlan and Thompson, in their respective histories, agree that each of the monitors that passed Curupayty was armed with a 70-pounder Whitworth rifle.
Preparation for the Passage of Humaitá.
An article that was published in the American and Commercial Advisor on the 22nd of April, 1868, provides some insight into the activities of the Brazilian ironclads in the days that led up to the Passage of Humaitá. The date on which the monitors reinforced the ironclad squadron that lay between Curupayty and Humaitá is given as the 14th of February, 1868, which is the Feast Day of Saint Valentine. Pará, which the article refers to as Paras, as well as Alagoas and Rio Grande are identified as the three monitors that reinforced the ironclad division. The article, in concurrence with the accounts of George Thompson and Alberto Amerlan that can be found in The War in Paraguay as well as Nights on the Rio Paraguay, states that the monitors passed Curupayty on the 13th of February. The ironclads, moving under the shadow of rain clouds, approached Curupayty at half-past eight in the evening and all involved had moved past the batteries within an hour and a half. Curupayty is reported to have possessed a battery of twenty guns, of which four were 68-pounders, and it is claimed that the monitors kept their distance from the artillery pieces by clinging to the Chaco side of the river. Rio Grande, which continued to experience problems with its steering and which ran into a grass island, is reported to have been struck on the tower and on the side by 68-pounder projectiles. It is stated that efforts, which were conducted between the 14th and the 18th of February, were made to prepare the monitors for the coming Passage of Humaitá. These preparatory works, it can be deduced from the description of previous efforts that were made to improve the performance of the fighting vessels, may have involved attempts to rectify the problems with the steerage system and power supply. Admiral Ignacio, on the morning of the 19th of February, would have been conscious of the technical deficiencies of the Pará-class monitors when he ordered each of them to be tethered to a larger ironclad.
Reconnaissance Mission to the Chain Boom.
It is revealed, in a letter that was written by Mr. Gould to Lord Stanley in the February of 1868, that a monitor of the Pará-class reconnoitered the chain boom that threatened to detain the Brazilian fleet at Humaitá. The letter forms the ninth document of the second installation of Correspondence Respecting Hostilities in the River Plate, which is found in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, that reports on events in the Paraguayan War as well as in the Rio de la Plata region. Gould composed the letter on the 26th of February, 1868, while Lord Stanley is reported to have received it on the 6th of April. The reinforcement, on the 13th of February, of the ironclad division that was anchored at Port Elizario and the subsequent Passage of Humaitá are the main focuses of the letter while the reconnaissance mission is reported to have occurred in the days between the two events. Gould claims that ten ironclads, under the command of Admiral Ignacio, were reinforced by three monitors from Rio de Janeiro. It is implied that one of these monitors performed a reconnaissance mission on the 16th of February, 1868, as far as the chain boom that threatened to detain the Brazilian fighting vessels beneath the guns of Humaitá. Gould, who does not mention the name of the vessel, explains that the reconnaissance mission discovered that fifteen feet of water lay above the chain. Ironclads with a draught of fifteen-feet or less, therefore, would have been able to pass over the chain boom and ascend the Paraguay River. Andrew James Kennedy claims that Pará-class monitors had a draught of five-feet on page 158 of La Plata, Brazil, and Paraguay, During the Present War while Bahia, Barroso as well as Tamandaré are reported to have possessed between eight or nine-feet of draught. Ironclads that possessed a shallower depth of draught, therefore, could move over the chain boom while the river was flooded and pass the batteries that were lined along the shore.
Torpedo Attack on the Ironclads at Puerto Elizario.
It is revealed, in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, that the Paraguayans attempted to destroy the ironclad division at Puerto Elizario with floating torpedoes. None of the infernal devices detonated, however, despite the fact that they struck some of the vessels. The torpedo attack, which may have failed due to problems with the fuses or because of damp powder, is reported to have occurred three days before the ironclads forced the batteries that lay upriver. It can be stated with certainty that the torpedo assault occurred on the 16th of February, 1868, which is the same day that a reconnaissance mission was made to the chain boom. No mention is given of the name, or the class, of the vessels that were struck by the torpedoes but it is known that three or four Pará-class monitors had arrived at Puerto Elizario in the days prior to this. Account of the Passage of Humaitá by the Brazilian Squadron is enclosed in the sixteenth document of Correspondence Respecting Hostilities in the River Plate (In continuation of Papers presented to Parliament, February 1868.) and contains additional information about the order of battle on the 19th of February. Floating torpedoes, as opposed to their static cousins that were anchored in place, relied on river currents to convey them to their targets. It is explained, on page 69 of the third volume of Journal of the Society of Telegraph Engineers, that the Paraguayan torpedoes were detonated by chemical fuses. George Thompson, on page 161 of The War in Paraguay, reports that torpedoes were floated down the river every night by the armed forces who were loyal to Francisco Solano López. It is revealed, on page 165, that the typical weight of powder that was used in the torpedoes that were floated down the river was 1,000-lbs while charges of 1,500-lbs were also used. Guard boats, in search of torpedoes, were obliged to patrol the river at night and protect the vessels of the Brazilian Squadron.
Bombardment on the Day of the Flood.
The ironclad squadron that was situated between Curupayty and Humaitá, which was reinforced by the Pará-class monitors from Rio de Janeiro, had to wait for the water level of the river to rise before it could pass the batteries that lay upriver. On the 18th of February, which was less than a week after the monitors had arrived, the river began to flood and the ironclads were spurred to action. Sir Richard Burton, author of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, claims that the river level rose by nine-feet during the flood of the 18th of February and the increased depth of the water made it possible for the protected vessels to pass over the chain boom. Burton, on page 332, describes the boom as consisting of several lines of intertwined chain of different thickness that was floated on barges and tightened by a windlass. It is claimed that the Brazilians, who feared that the obstructions in the river would hinder their navigation of the waterway while they were in range of the Paraguayan batteries, had failed to destroy the chain-house or to sink the barges that floated the boom. No time could be wasted, therefore, in forcing the batteries of Humaitá while the chain was rendered ineffective by the flood. A preliminary bombardment of Humaitá, which was conducted by the Brazilian Navy, attempted to damage the river batteries and to provide a distraction for the actions that were planned for the following day. George Thompson, on page 247 of The War in Paraguay, claims that the bombardment on the 18th began at half-past three in the morning and involved three detachments of fighting vessels. The ironclad squadron, which included the new monitors from Rio de Janeiro, was joined by the squadron of unprotected gunboats at Curuzú and a detachment of bomb vessels in the Laguna Piris in bombarding the Paraguayan positions. On the following day, which was a Wednesday, the ironclad squadron would split in two and one of the divisions would attempt to pass the batteries of Humaitá as well as Timbó.
Delphim Carlos de Carvalho is Given Command of the Third Division of the Paraguay River Squadron.
Alberto Amerlan, on page 104 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, claims that Commodore Delphim Carlos de Carvalho commanded the monitors that passed Curupayty on the 13th of February. It would be possible, with the arrival of reinforcements from Rio de Janeiro, to create a detachment of ironclads that could pass the batteries of Humaitá and establish communications with the Allies at Tayí. Carvalho, having reinforced the ironclad division at Port Elizario, was given command of a new division of protected vessels that were capable of withstanding the blows of the heavy guns that lay upriver of Curupayty. The ironclad division at Port Elizario, therefore, would be split in two. Admiral Ignacio, who had been made Baron of Inhauma by Emperor Pedro II, remained in command of the division that lay between Curupayty and Humaitá. Inhauma, in his Official Report of the Passage of Humaitá that appears in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, explains his decision to appoint Carvalho as the commander of the Third Division of the Brazilian Squadron on the Paraguay River. It is explained that Bahia, Barroso and Tamandaré were assigned to the Third Division because they drew less water compared to the other large ironclads while Alagoas, Rio Grande as well as Pará would join the new division as consorts of the larger vessels. Emilio Carlos Jourdan, on page 63 of Guerra do Paraguay, claims that Carvalho was appointed chief of the new division of protected vessels that was ordered to force its way past the batteries of Humaitá. Theotonio Meirelles de Silva makes several references to Carvalho in A Marinha de Guerra Brasileira em Paysandú e Durante a Campanha do Paraguay, which was published in 1876, that includes his prominent role in the Passage of Humaitá. Carvalho, on page 196, is named as the commander of the division of three ironclads and three monitors that passed the batteries of Humaitá on the 19th of February.
A Potential Fourth Pará-class Monitor Remains Under the Command of Admiral Inhauma.
Pianhy, as stated by Alberto Amerlan on page 104 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, participated in the Second Passage of Curupayty on the 13th of February and remained below Humaitá during the action of the 19th of February. Admiral Inhauma, according to Amerlan, presided over a division of fourteen ironclads between the 13th of February and the 19th of February that included four monitors of the Pará-class. It is reported that all fourteen ironclads, acting in unison, approached the lower batteries of Humaitá on the morning of the 19th of February and split into two separate groups. Commodore Carvalho led a division of six protected vessels past the Paraguayan batteries while the eight remaining ironclads, which were under the command of Inhauma, anchored within range of the batteries and provided fire support to the Vanguard Division. Chapter IX of La Plata, Brazil and Paraguay by Andrew James Kennedy supports the claim that there were four monitors of the Pará class on the Paraguay River before the Passage of Humaitá. Kennedy asserts, on page 157, that there were fourteen ironclads on the Paraguay River before the engagement of the 19th of February. It is claimed that the main body of the Brazilian squadron, which was commanded by Admiral Inhauma, was based at Curupayty while Commodore Delphim presided over a vanguard of light-draught vessels that lay between that fortress and Humaitá. A table that lists the ironclads of the Brazilian Navy at this stage of the conflict, which can be found on page 158, names Piaby as one of the fourteen ironclads that were present in the Brazilian river squadron at this time. It may be that Piaby, also known as Pianhy or Piauí, was ignored by historians due to the fact that it did not participate in the Passage of Humaitá. Piauby, on page 48 of A Marinha D'Outr'Ora by the Viscount of Ouro Preto, is claimed to have been launched on the 8th of January and may have been present in the theatre of war during the Second Passage of Curupayty.
The Passage of Humaitá.
Several accounts of the Passage of Humaitá can be found in Correspondence Respecting Hostilities in the River Plate (In continuation of Papers presented to Parliament, February 1868.) and the official reports of Admiral Inhauma, Commodore Delfin Carlos Carvalho as well as the Marquis of Caxias are among the most valuable authors of these documents. Commodore Carvalho, who was given command of the Third Division by Admiral Inhauma, led six ironclads past the most powerful fortress on the Paraguay River and placed Asunción under the direct threat of naval incursions. A rise in the water level, submerging the chain boom that prevented enemy vessels from ascending the river, removed a major impediment to the Allied vessels that were stationed further down the river. The arrival of the Pará-class monitors, reinforcing the ironclad division, meant that Admiral Inhauma possessed enough fighting vessels to force the passage of the river. Admiral Inhauma explains that the Passage of Humaitá commenced on the 19th of February, 1868, at half-past three in the morning. Barroso was tethered to Rio Grande, Bahia was bound to Alagoas while Tamandaré and Pará followed in third place. Alagoas, which is reported to have been separated from Bahia at the Londres battery, is claimed to have been attacked by canoes in the account of the Brazilian river squadron as well as the official report of Admiral Inhauma. Many of these documents, which can be found in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, can be considered as primary sources. George Thompson, who describes the Passage of Humaitá on Chapter XIX of the War in Paraguay, states that three ironclads had to be repaired at Tayí due to the damage that they had sustained from the river batteries. Rio Grande was the only monitor of the Pará-class that was able to participate in the expedition to Asunción while its classmates, Alagoas and Pará, remained with Tamandaré at Tayí.
Discrepancies in the Reports of the Order of Battle on the 19th of February.
Most historians agree that six ironclads, divided into three pairs that were tethered together, passed the batteries of Humaitá on the morning of the 19th of February. Authors disagree, however, on the order in which the ironclads forced the river batteries on that date. The official report of the Passage of Humaitá, which was composed on the 28th of February and that was included in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, does not state in which order the ironclads passed Humaitá but implies that Barroso experienced the least difficulty in navigating the Paraguay River. Bahia, the flagship of the Third Division, is reported to have lost its rudder while Tamandaré is claimed to have moved at a sluggish pace. Admiral Inhauma, the author of the report, claims that he ordered Barroso to wait for the other ironclads. It may be inferred from this report, therefore, that Barroso and Rio Grande led the procession of protected gunboats past the river batteries. La Plata, Brazil, and Paraguay, During the Present War by Andrew James Kennedy includes a second hand account of the Passage of Humaitá. It is claimed, from pages 161 to 162, that Bahia and Alagoas were the first pair of ironclads to force the river batteries on the morning of the 19th while Barroso and Rio Grande are claimed to have come second in the procession. Tamandaré and Pará, maybe due to the lack of speed that was mentioned by the Baron of Inhauma, are reported to have been the third pair of ironclads to pass the Paraguayan stronghold. Alberto Amerlan, on page 104 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, claims that Barroso and Rio Grande were the first pair of ironclads to pass Humaitá. Bahia and Alagoas, which were separated at the Londres battery, are reported to have been second in the order of battle. Tamandaré and Pará, by most accounts, are claimed to have taken third place in the column.
Barroso and Rio Grande Lead the Advance Division Past the River Batteries.
Arthur Jaceguay, on page 190 of Quatro Seculos de Actividade Maritima: Portugal e Brasil, reveals that Barroso and Rio Grande led the column of ironclads past the batteries of Humaitá. It is worth noting that the author, who is also known as Artur Silveira da Mota, commanded Barroso during the engagement. Barroso and Rio Grande, on page 569 of the fifteenth volume of La Revue Maritime et Coloniale, are also identified as the first pair of ironclads to undertake the Passage of Humaitá. An acoustic devise is reported, on page 570, to have allowed the commanders of the two vessels to communicate with one another during the operation. It is revealed that the first pair of ironclads, which had passed the river batteries by twenty-past four in the morning, took forty-five minutes to complete their assignment. Alberto Amerlan, who is the author of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, shares the opinion that Barroso and Rio Grande were the first pair of ironclads to force the batteries of Humaitá. On the 8th of April, 1868, The Glasgow Daily Herald published an article that names Barroso as the leading vessel during the Passage of Humaitá and identifies Rio Grande as its consort. The original article was published in The Anglo-Brazilian Times on the 10th of March, 1868, and contains an excerpt from the official report of Admiral Inhauma. Lieutenant Etchborne is revealed, on page 6000 of the fifth volume of The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette of the Regular and Volunteer Forces, to have piloted Barroso during the Passage of Humaitá while Arthur Silveira da Motta is named as the commander of the vessel. The article from which this information is derived, which was published on the 9th of May, is the same article that was reproduced in the Glasgow Daily Herald in April. Antonio José Victorino de Barros, on 248 of Guerra do Paraguay o Almirante Visconde de Inhaúma, states that Antonio Joaquim commanded Rio Grande during the engagement.
Bahia and Alagoas Take Centre Place in the Line of Procession.
Alberto Amerlan, on page 106 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, reports that Alagoas and Bahia were the second pair of ironclads to force the batteries of Humaitá. It is reported that a rocket, fired by the previous pair of protected vessels that ran the gauntlet of Paraguayan guns, provided a signal for Bahia and Alagoas to proceed. A powerful river current, arising from the flood, and problems with the steering apparatus onboard Bahia made it difficult to control the monitors as they came within range of the batteries. Alagoas, having become separated from Bahia at the Londres battery and lacking the engine power to overcome the river current, is reported to have drifted back down the river. A description of the Londres battery is provided on page 105 of La Plata, Brazil, and Paraguay, During the Present War by Andrew James Kennedy. Londres, being the Spanish word for London, was a fitting name for a battery that was constructed by British engineers and which was equipped with guns from the United Kingdom. It is claimed, on page 162, that Bahia and Alagoas were the first pair of ironclads to pass the guns of Humaitá while the consorts are reported to have become untethered by a projectile that was fired from the Londres battery. Kennedy and Amerlan disagree, therefore, on the order of battle on the morning of the 19th of February. George Thompson, on Chapter XIX of The War in Paraguay, claims that Alagoas became separated from its consort after they had passed the procession of batteries. Baron de Inhauma, in his official report of the Passage of Humaitá that is dated to the 28th of February, states that Joaquim Antônio Cordovil Maurity ignored an order to return Alagoas to its previous anchorage after it became untethered from its consort. Burton, on pages 345 and 346 of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, states that Captain Maurity stood on the quarterdeck of Alagoas as it struggled to ascend the river while sustaining the fire of the batteries.
Pará and Tamandaré are the Third Pair to Force the Batteries.
Admiral Inhauma, in the Official Report of the Passage of Humaitá that is dated to the 28th of February, identifies Pará and Tamandaré as one of three pairs of ironclads that he selected for the Third Division of the Brazilian Squadron that forced its way past the river batteries on the morning of the 19th of February. Tamandaré, with Pará tethered to its port side, is reported to have moved slowly as the division advanced on the fortification. Alberto Amerlan, on page 106 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, states that Pará and Tamandaré formed the rearguard of the Advance Division while Alagoas continued to struggle against the river current. Antonio Da Cruz Cordeiro, on page 27 of Episodio da Esquadra Brasileira em Operação nas Aguas do Paraguay, claims that Pará was commanded by Custódio Jose de Mello during the Passage of Humaitá while identifying Augusto Cesar Pires de Miranda as the commander of Tamandaré during the same engagement. Paul Dislère, on page 116 of Die Panzerschiffe, claims that a projectile struck Pará on its spur while another missile hit Tamandaré on the bow and perforated the iron plates. A spur, in the nautical sense of the word, may refer to a naval ram or to an inverted bow. Pará, therefore, was deprived of the use of its melee weapon while it passed the river batteries and may have struggled to engage hostile vessels in close combat if it had been required to do so. It is claimed, on page 436 of Unsure Zeit Deutsche Revue der Gegenwart, that Pará and Tamandaré were the only ironclads that were placed out of action due to the damage that they received during the Passage of Humaitá. Pará and Tamandaré, while being the last pair of ironclads to attempt the passage of the river batteries, reached Tayí before Alagoas was able to reach the Allied base at nine 'o clock in the morning. Marshal Caxias, who had achieved victory at the Battle of Establecimiento on the same day, is reported to have greeted the ironclads after they arrived at Tayí.
An Unpleasant Surprise Awaits the Ironclad Squadron at Timbó.
George Buckley Mathew wrote a letter to Lord Stanley on the 8th of March, 1868, that compares the effectiveness of the batteries at Humaitá to the battery at Timbó. The letter, which appears in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, claims that the guns of Humaitá struggled to hit their targets while the guns of Timbó enjoyed a greater degree of success. It revealed that Bahia, Barroso, Rio Grande, Tamandaré and Pará passed the river batteries before the break of dawn while the sun is reported to have risen by the time that Alagoas rejoined the ironclad division. A lack of visibility, therefore, may explain the difficulties that the Paraguayan gunners had in striking their targets. Blue lights, bonfires and incendiary devises are reported to have illuminated the river but may not have improved visibility to a significant extent. The height at which the batteries were positioned at Humaitá , rather than the darkness of night, is blamed for the inaccuracy of its gunnery. It is claimed that the elevation of the guns was too high and that the majority of the projectiles flew above the ironclads while the battery of Timbó, which is reported to have consisted of two 68-pounder guns as well as two 32-pounder Whitworth rifles, were positioned at a lower elevation. The battery of Timbó, which is stated to have been situated on the other side of the Paraguay River to Humaitá, was able to strike the ironclads with a greater degree of accuracy than the batteries that were situated further down the river. George Thompson, who describes the event on page 247 as well as 248 of The War in Paraguay, agrees that the Timbó battery was positioned at a lower elevation than the Humaitá batteries and was able to strike the ironclads with a greater degree of accuracy. It is claimed, on page 440 of the one-hundred-and-sixth volume of Blackwood's Magazine, that George Thompson constructed the battery at Timbó and that it contained six 8-inch guns as well as eight 32-pounder guns.
Reports of a Canoe Attack on Alagoas on the 19th of February.
Francisco Felix Pereira da Costa, in the tenth chapter of the third volume of Historia da Guerra do Paraguay contra as Republicas do Paraguay e Paraguay, includes a report of the Passage of Humaitá by the commander of Alagoas while it was anchored at Tayí. It is revealed, on page 520, that a force of more than twenty boats attacked Alagoas on the port and starboard side of its bow. It is claimed that the assailants that tried to board the monitor were were armed with axes, knives, spears, swords as well as bows and arrows. Six of the boats are reported to have been destroyed, three of which were sunk by ramming and three of which were destroyed by grapeshot, and heavy casualties were inflicted on the boarding parties by rifle fire. The Combats on the Min River, written by Captain Chabaud-Arnault of the French Navy and translated into English by Lieutenant E.B. Barry, describes an altercation between Alagoas and a flotilla of rowing-boats on the 19th of February. The article appears in the eleventh volume of Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, which covers the year 1885, and appeared in Revue Maritime et Coloniale before it was reproduced in English. It is claimed, on page 316, that Alagoas was assaulted by twenty flat-boats but managed to sink three of them with grapeshot and destroy another three by ramming. Alberto Amerlan mentions the raid of the bogabantes, or paddlers, in Nights on the Rio Paraguay and describes the manner in which Alagoas repulsed the attack. It is explained, on page 110 that the bogabantes were a special unit of the Paraguayan Navy and that they were led by Captain Cespedes. Andrew James Kennedy describes the canoe attack on Alagoas in the ninth chapter of La Plata, Brazil, and Paraguay, During the Present War as well as the manner in which the raid was thwarted. It is claimed, on page 163, that the crew of the monitor retreated inside the turret and repelled the invaders with musket fire as well as grapeshot.
Tacuari and Ygurei are Ordered to capture Alagoas as it Approaches Timbó.
George Thompson, on page 248 of The War in Paraguay, claims that Tacuari and Ygurei hid from the ironclads in the Arroyo Hondo during the Passage of Humaitá. Tacuari and Ygurei are reported, on page 251, to have provided support to the garrison of the Cierva redoubt while it was under assault by the forces of Marshal Caxias. The assault on the Cierva redoubt, which occurred on the same day as the Battle of Establecimiento and the Passage of Humaitá, resulted in an Allied victory. The garrison, which was under the command of Major Olabarrieta, was ferried to Humaitá by the Paraguayan gunboats. It is reported, on page 251, that Tacuari and Ygurei were ordered to capture Alagoas after it had discharged the garrison of the Cierva redoubt at Humaitá. The monitor, according to Thompson, had left the stretch of the Paraguay River between Humaitá and Timbó while preparations to attack the monitor were still underway. No mention is made of the canoe attack on Alagoas that occurred on the same day that Tacuari and Ygurei were ordered, by Francisco Solano López, to capture the ironclad as it moved towards Timbó. It is impossible to know, for certain, if Tacuari and Ygurei would have been able to capture Alagoas but it is probable that the boarding parties who were onboard the gunboats would have suffered a similar fate to that which was experienced by the bogabantes during their canoe attack. The monitor, however, was in a vulnerable state due to its malfunctioning and underpowered engines while the blows it had received from the batteries may have weakened its armour. Herbert Wrigley Wilson, on page 258 of volume one of Ironclads in Action, claims that Tacuari possessed six guns while Ygurei is stated to have possessed five guns. The iron plates of the monitor would have absorbed the blows of the Paraguayan projectiles while the 70-pounder rifle, which was protected by the turret, would have inflicted severe damage on the unprotected gunboats.
Damage Inflicted on Ironclads of the Advance Division by the Batteries of Humaitá and Timbó.
Half of the Advance Division, which was also known as the Third Division, of the Brazilian Squadron that was stationed on the Paraguay River had to undergo weeks of repairs at Tayí after the Passage of Humaitá. Alagoas, Pará and Tamandaré were unable to participate in the expedition to Asunción as a result of the damage that they sustained during the naval engagement. Not all sources, however, agree on the amount of damage that was sustained by the ironclads or about which of the vessels were the most injured. Richard Burton, on page 332 of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, expresses the opinion that the ironclads received no material damage from the batteries of Humaitá and Timbó. George Buckley Mathew, in his report of the 8th of March that appears in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, provides information about the number of projectiles that struck the ironclads on the morning of the 19th of February. Rio Grande, which is reported to have passed Humaitá unscathed, is claimed to have been struck six times at Timbó. Pará, however, is reported to have been hit thirty-eight times at Humaitá and twenty-five at Timbó. Alagoas, contrary to what is claimed in other sources, is reported to have received no damage as it passed the batteries of Humaitá but is claimed to have been struck four times by the battery at Timbó. Alberto Amerlan, on page 107 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, claims that Alagoas was struck 187 times as it passed the river batteries. George Thompson, on page 247 of The War in Paraguay, states that Alagoas was hit on 180 occasions. Alagoas, on page 571 of the fifteenth volume of La Revue Maritime et Coloniale, is reported to have been struck by forty projectiles as it passed Timbó. Alagoas, having became untethered from its consort at the begging of the engagement and being the last of the ironclads pass the river batteries, received the most damage of all the monitors.
Tayí Serves as a Naval Base for the Ironclads Above Humaitá.
Alagoas, Pará and Rio Grande arrived at Tayí with Bahia, Barroso as well as Tamandaré on the 19th of February. Tayí, for the remainder of the War of the Triple Alliance, would prove to be an important strategic asset for the Allies. A report, composed by the Marquis de Caxias, describes how the Brazilian army charged Paraguayan positions at Tayí and took them by storm. The report dates to the 2nd of November, 1867, and was composed at Tuyu Cué. It is claimed that three parallel columns of Brazilian infantry captured the Paraguayan trenches, which were garrisoned by eight-hundred men that were divided into two battalions, with their bayonets fixed. One Paraguayan steamer, the report continues, received damage to its paddle wheel while a second was sunk and a third burned. It is claimed that five-hundred Paraguayans were killed in the attack, in which the Brazilians did not fire a single shot, while another sixty were taken prisoner. The report, which was reproduced in the Standard and which appears in Official Documents Relating to Paraguay. 1858-1869, explains how the Allies first came into the possession of the military base that made it possible for the ironclads to pass Humaitá. Alberto Amerlan, on page 95 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, states that General Menna Barreto led the Brazilian army that captured Tayí and that the army consisted of 3,000 men. George Thompson, on Chapter XVII of The War in Paraguay, states that Tayí was situated on a cliff and located fifteen miles above Humaitá. Tayí, Thompson explains, was connected by road to the inland highroads. The ironclad squadron, therefore, could establish communications with the supply base at Tayí. Charles Ames Washburn, on page 249 of the second volume of The History of Paraguay, claims that the ironclads of the Brazilian Navy remained idle at Tayí while Francisco Solano López conveyed supplies to Humaitá via the lines of communication that ran through the Chaco and across the Paraguay River.
A Land Line of Communication Enables the Ironclads to be Supplied at Tayí .
Alagoas, Bahia, Barroso, Pará, Tamandaré as well as Rio Grande were supplied by a land line of communication that between Itapirú and Tayí. The supply route, which was established after the capture of Itapirú in the April of 1866, was built in increments. Charles Ames Washburn composed a letter on the 4th of May, 1866, that informs William Henry Seward of the Allied advance on Curupayty and Humaitá. Allied troops, who awaited the arrival of supplies via the water lines of communication, are reported to have been engaged in the arduous task of building roads through the marshland that lined the right bank of the Paraguay River. Bridges are claimed to have been built across the lagunas, or ponds, that dotted the marshland. The dispatch, which appears in the second volume of Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, documents the inception of the land line of communication that would reach Tayí in the following year. George Thompson claims, on page 250 of The War in Paraguay, that it cost 2l. 10s. to transport a 150-pounder shot to Tayí while the coal that was burned as fuel onboard the ironclads cost 33l. for each ton that was conveyed along the land line of communication. Coal and other materials were cheaper to transport via the water than they were by land but the Allies, for as long as Humaitá and Timbó remained in Paraguayan hands, could not rely on the Paraguay River to supply the gunboats at Tayí. It is explained, on page 441 of the one-hundred-and-sixth volume of Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, that the stretch of the Paraguay River that lay between Timbó and Tayí remained in the hands of Francisco Solano López. The Brazilian ironclads, therefore, had no water line of communication between the Allied supply bases and themselves. It is revealed, on page 436 of the one-hundred-and-sixth volume of Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, that the road that communicated with Tayí followed a circuitous route that ran to the north of the marshes.
No Ironclads Are Left on the Stretch of River Between Humaitá and Timbó.
Major Da Cunha Mattos, who described his experiences as a prisoner-of-war in Official Declaration of a Brazilian Officer, reports that Francisco Solano López ordered a line of communication to be opened between Monte Lindo and Timbó. It is reported that the line of communication, which consisted of a road that ran through the Chaco, had not been completed at the time in which the Brazilian ironclads passed Humaitá on the 19th of February. Mattos, who claims to have seen the ironclads pass the river batteries while in Paraguayan captivity, provides a first-hand account of these events and his official declaration can be regarded as a primary source. It is revealed that a water line of communication, which was served by a Paraguayan steamer, existed between Humaitá and Timbó. The absence of Brazilian ironclads on this stretch of the Paraguay River meant that the steamer, which conveyed artillery and horses as well as other provisions, could operate without fear of being intercepted. The official declaration of Major Mattos is reproduced in The War in Paraguay, which was released in 1869, that is described as a collection of official documents which was translated and published by the Argentine government. George Thompson, on Chapter XV of The War in Paraguay, claims that the road between Timbó and Monte Lindo was fifty-four miles in length. It is claimed, on page 212, that Timbó was three leagues above Humaitá and the closest place that supplies that were intended for the garrison could be landed. The road, it is explained on page 213, ran through deep mud and crossed the Bermejo River as well as five streams. It is reported, on page 240, that Tacuari and Ygurei conveyed supplies from Timbó to Humaitá along the Paraguay River while the church was chosen as the location for the unloading of provisions. Positioning a couple of ironclads between Humaitá the two fortifications, it is claimed on page 248, would have severed the communications between Humaitá and Timbó.
Difficulties in Supplying a Potential Forth Ironclad Division.
Severing the water line of communication that stretched between Humaitá and Timbó, which lay on opposite sides of the Paraguay River, would have involved a fourth division of ironclads that was unable to communicate with the rest of the Allied forces. A line of communication, that ran through the Chaco and terminated at Port Elizario, supplied the ironclad division that was commanded by the Baron of Inhauma while the ironclads at Tayí drew their provisions from a supply route than was situated on the other side of the river. It is not clear from where a new division of ironclads, cut off from its communications with the Allied supply bases, would be able to receive its provisions. It is possible that a Forth Division, which could have relied on its protective plates to convey it past the guns of the enemy batteries, could have moved up the river to Tayí or down the river to Port Elizario and taken its supplies from those places. George Ames Washburn, on pages 164 and 165 of the second volume of The History of Paraguay, held the opinion that the Brazilians could have used their ironclads to interdict the river line of communication that connected Timbó with Humaitá. It is presumed that the protected vessels, which could use their steam engines to struggle against the river current, were able to move back and forth past the shore batteries while their iron plates would make them impervious to enemy projectiles. There would be no need, therefore, to establish a water line of communication for an additional ironclad division if the protected vessels could navigate the river with impunity. Running the gantlet of heavy river batteries, however, was not a risk free endeavor for the ironclads. George Thompson reports, on page 247 of The War in Paraguay, that the damage inflicted on the ironclads at Timbó almost exceeded that which was suffered at Humaitá. Iron plates were pitted and bent by projectiles, Thompson explains, while the bolts that attached the iron cladding to the hull were started.
Three Ironclads Navigate the Paraguay River as far as Asunción.
Delfin C. de Carvalho composed an official report of the expedition to Asunción on the 26th of February, 1868, and names Rio Grande as one of the three vessels that participated in the fluvial expedition. Bahia, Barroso and Rio Grande ascended the Paraguay River as far as the outskirts of Asunción between the 20th and the 24th of February. The report comprises the second enclosure in the nineteenth document of the continuation of Correspondence Respecting Hostilities in the River Plate, which features documents that were published after the February of 1868, and can be regarded as a primary source. A raid of this nature demonstrated to the Paraguayans that the Brazilian Navy could access the navigable waterways that lay above Humaitá and proved that Asunción, in which the government of Paraguay resided and where their main arsenal was located, was not safe from Allied depredations. Key events during the three day expedition to the capitol of Paraguay include the unsuccessful pursuit of Pirabebé, the burning of Angelica, the destruction of the electrical telegraph system that ran adjacent to the river and the bombardment of Tacombú. Livestock, including cattle and sheep, are also reported to have been seized as the expeditionary force moved its way up the river while buildings and canoes are said to have been destroyed along the way. The account given by George Thompson of the expedition of the Brazilian ironclads to Asunción, which is described on pages 249 and 250 of The War in Paraguay, can be considered as a secondary source. Thompson echoes Carvalho when he names Bahia, Barroso and Rio Grande as the three ironclads that participated in the expedition. Thompson states that Alagoas, Pará and Tamandaré were undergoing repairs at Tayí while the other three ironclads ascended the Paraguay River. It is interesting to note that Carvalho, who would have had a more intimate knowledge of these affairs than Thompson, does not mention this fact.
Destruction of the Supply Depot at the Mouth of the Tebicuary River.
The first target of the three ironclads, which had departed on the expedition to Asunción on the 20th of February, was a supply depot at the mouth of the Tebicuary River. A land line of communication ran from Monte Lindo, on the Manduvirá River, to Timbó and the supply route was exposed to the ironclads at the confluence of the Paraguay River and it's tributary. George Thompson, on page 249 of The War in Paraguay, claims that the supply sheds at Monte Lindo were relieved of their provisions and abandoned by the time that the ironclads arrived at that confluence of the two rivers. Corn, treacle and salt were taken into the nearby woods by the Paraguayan garrison while maggot-ridden beef was left for the crews of the Brazilian monitors. The Brazilians crew members, who found the sheds empty of supplies, set fire to the buildings before returning to the ironclads and continuing their ascent up the river. Juan Crisóstomo Centurión, on page 118 of the third volume of Memorias del coronel Crisóstomo Centurión, provides a similar account of the destruction of the supply sheds at Monte Lindo to Thompson. Cassava products, which include typyraty and almidón, are reported to have been among the supplies that were taken into the woods as is honey. It is claimed that the Brazilian ironclads bombed, or shelled, the Paraguayan positions before they sent their crews ashore. Centurión, in agreement with Thompson, states that the Paraguayan garrison feasted upon the provisions and that nothing was left for the crews of the Brazilian ironclads other than worm-infested beef. Francisco Felix Pereira da Costa, on page 543 of the third volume of Historia da Guerra do Brasil contra as Republicas do Uruguay e Paraguay, describes the burning of the supply sheds at the mouth of the Tebicuary River. Centurión, da Costa and Thompson agree that Bahia, Barroso and Rio Grande were the three ironclads that were involved in the raid on the supply deport at the confluence of the two rivers.
Pursuit of Pirabebé and the Destruction of Angélica by Fire.
Francisco Felix Pereira da Costa, on page 543 of the third volume of Historia da Guerre do Brasil Contra as Republicas do Uruguay e Paraguay, describes the pursuit of two Paraguayan vessels by three Brazilian ironclads. Pirabebé and Angélica are identified as the Paraguayan ships while Bahia, Barroso as well as Rio Grande are named as the Brazilian vessels. It is reported that Pirabebé escaped while Angélica, which was carrying ammunition, was abandoned and burned by its crew. Herbert Wrigley Wilson, on page 258 of the first volume of Ironclads in Action, describes Pirabebé as a screw-vessel that was equipped with a single smoothbore gun. The guns which armed the flotilla of nine river steamers, which are described as indifferent, are reported to have been antiquated and honeycombed. A letter that was composed on the 7th of June, 1865, claims that Pirabebé had been known as Ranger before it entered the service of the Paraguayan Armada. Correspondence Respecting Hostilities in the River Plate (In continuation of Papers presented to Parliament on the 30th June, 1865) is comprised of thirty documents and the aforementioned dispatch is the fourth enclosure of the twelfth document. The compilation of thirty documents can be found in Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, which was published in 1866, while the relevant dispatch was composed by Mr. Packenham at Asunción. Mr. Packenham, who addressed the letter to Mr. Thornton, was onboard H.M.S. Dotterel at the time in which the dispatch was composed. George Thompson, on pages 69 and 112 of The War in Paraguay, identifies Pirabebé as a steam yacht that was armed with one gun. It is revealed, on pages 249 and 250, that Pirabebé lacked the necessary firewood to fuel its engine and was forced to burn its bulwarks as well as its furniture to escape the ironclads. The Paraguayan gunboat, minus the schooner that it had in tow, used its speed to outrun the lumbering ironclads and return to Asunción unscathed.
Tacombú Engages the Fire of the Brazilian Ironclads and a Diplomatic Incident is Averted.
Official Report of the Expedition to Asuncion, which was composed by Delfin de Carvalho and reproduced in a variety of languages, claims that a battery of 68-pounder guns engaged the ironclads that were under his command while they approached Asunción. The battery, which Delfin claims to have bombarded for two hours, was situated at Tacombú. It is reported that the naval commander ordered the bombardment to cease when he noticed the American, French and Italian flags flying in the distance. A diplomatic incident, therefore, was averted due to the fact that these flags were hoisted above the embassy buildings of their respective nations. Tacombú, therefore, was situated on the outskirts of Asunción and the Flag of the United States may have been flying over the American Legation building in which Charles Ames Washburn resided. Washburn, who documented the incursion of the ironclads in the second volume of The History of Paraguay and who offered shelter to foreign nationals who did not wish to be evacuated into the interior of the country, had witnessed the attack from the roof of the American Legation building. It is revealed, on page 241, that the chimneys of the protected vessels could be seen from the rooftops as they engaged the battery that defended the capitol. A harsh, hissing sound is reported to have accompanied the passage of the Brazilian projectiles through the air while the accuracy of the gunnery is claimed to have been poor. This contradicts the official report of Delfin, however, who claims that the gunboats under his command were able to damage the arsenal and set fire to the presidential palace. George Thompson, on pages 249 and 250 of The War in Paraguay, claims that the ironclads were unable to inflict any damage on the arsenal and that they retreated after Criollo launched three projectiles in their direction. Thompson, therefore, disagrees with Delfin about the effectiveness of the bombardment and the motivations for the Brazilian withdrawal.
Asunción is Bombarded by the Ironclads.
It is revealed, on page 21 of the fourth volume of Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, that Asunción was abandoned in the February of 1868 and bombarded soon afterwards. Francisco Solano López is given his own chapter in the biography, which was published in 1888 and edited by James Grant Wilson as well as John Fiske, while the Paraguayan War is shown to be the most significant event to have occurred during his presidency. Charles Ames Washburn, on page 223 of The History of Paraguay, claims that four ironclads participated in the Passage of Humaitá while two of the protected vessels approached Asunción along the river. José Berges, the Minister of Foreign Relations, is reported to have disclosed this information to Washburn. It is worth noting that Washburn, who chose to remain in Asunción after the city had been evacuated by its civilian population, was an eyewitness to the events that followed. An artillery fort, which is described on pages 241 and 242, provided the sole means of resistance to the approaching ironclads. The engagement of the ironclads with the battery, which is reported to have consisted of a single 150-pounder gun and an undisclosed number of field pieces, is claimed to have occurred on the 24th of February. It is reported that the large gun, which could not be depressed to a sufficient elevation to strike the approaching gunboats, fired no more than three or four shots during the engagement. The protected vessels, in comparison, fired thirty projectiles and withdrew from the artillery duel without receiving a blow to their iron plates. George Thompson, on page 249 of The War in Paraguay, claims that the bombardment of Asunción occurred on the 22nd of February. Criollo, which may be the 150-pounder gun that Washburn describes, is reported to have fired three shots at the ironclads before they withdrew. It is revealed, on page 250, that the ironclads fired sixty shells at Asunción rather than the thirty projectiles that Washburn reports.
Rio Grande Suffers Casualties During an Ambush.
An ambush was set for the Brazilian ironclads as they returned, via the Paraguay River, from their raiding expedition against Asunción. George Thompson, on page 250 of The War in Paraguay, states that the ambush party consisted of two guns and a handful of infantry. Nuñez, whose rank and first name are not provided, is stated to have led this ambush party while the woods that lined the river are reported to have hidden these forces from view. It is claimed that the guns, the caliber of which is not reported, inflicted an unspecified amount of damage on the ironclads as they made their way back to Tayí while no mention is made of any casualties that were suffered by the crews. The Paraguayan ambush, therefore, was more of a nuisance to the Brazilian fighting vessels than a threat to their survival. All three of the ironclads, following the ambush, returned to Tayí and rejoined the other fighting vessels of the Third Division. It is revealed, on Chapter X, that Major Nuñez was placed in command of the defensive forces at Encarnación during the initial Allied invasion of Paraguay. Nuñez, at a later date, was promoted to Colonel and it is probable that he maintained this rank at the time in which he led the ambush against the ironclads. It had taken the monitors, which had passed Humaitá on the 19th of February and arrived at Asunción on the 22nd of February, three days to ascend the river as far as the capitol. The date on which Nuñez launched his assault on the monitors is not disclosed but it may be inferred, from the duration of time that the previous expedition had taken, that it occurred at some point between the 22nd and the 25th of February. Delfin C. de Carvalho mentions the ambush in a dispatch to the Marquis of Caxias that was composed on the 26th of February, 1868, and claims that Rio Grande suffered two casualties. The report, which appears in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, claims that the attack occurred at the mouth of the Tebicuary River.
Disappointment Surrounds the Passage of Humaitá and the Bombardment of Asunción.
The War in South America, which appears in the thirtieth volume of The Latter-day Saints' Millennial Star, contains information about the Allied invasion of Paraguay. It is asserted that the military situation in the River Plate, between the February and the July of 1868, remained stagnant. Accusations of inertia had been directed at the Brazilian naval commanders, whose ironclads had languished between the forts of Curupayty and Humaitá for six months, since the Allied invasion of Paraguay had begun. Hopes that the Passage of Humaitá, in the February of 1868, would bring the war to an earlier conclusion would prove to be unfounded. Humaitá, which received supplies via its land and water lines of communication, remained in Paraguayan hands. Asunción, which lay exposed before the advanced ironclad division, had not been captured and had suffered little from its bombardment. George Thompson, on page 248 of The War in Paraguay, reports that the Paraguayan steamers that operated between Humaitá and Timbó would hide from the ironclads in Arroyo Hondo. If a couple of ironclads had been left between the two locations, Thompson continues, the supply lines upon which Humaitá depended would have been severed. Tacuari and Ygurei, which hid in the Arroyo Hondo on the 19th of February, would have been the principle target of Allied depredations. Descending the river, however, and passing Timbó a second time would have been an unwelcome prospect. Alagoas, Pará and Tamandaré were still undergoing repairs at Tayí while Bahia, Barroso as well as Rio Grande were focusing their attentions on Asunción. Charles Ames Washburn, on page of the second volume of The History of Paraguay, articulates his disgust at the failure of the Allies to capture Asunción. Washburn is disappointed that the ironclads did not capture the capitol while Delfin C. de Carvalho, in Official Report of Expedition to Asuncion, implies that his gunboats were performing a reconnaissance mission.
Attempts are Made to Cut the Water Line of Communication Between Humaitá and Timbó.
Attempts to sever the water line of communication between Humaitá and Timbó did not occur until the end of March, which was over a month since the Advance Division of ironclads forced the river batteries, while the supply route that ran through the Chaco was still in operation during this time. George Thompson, on page 255 of The War in Paraguay, claims that two Brazilian ironclads passed Timbó in search of Paraguayan transportation vessels. It is reported that the passage of Timbó occurred on the 22nd of March, 1868, which was the same day that the Paraguayans evacuated Curupayty. The Paraguayan forces, withdrawing from the defensive lines, concentrated in Humaitá and severing their communications may have eliminated a large portion of their army. Ygurei, which may also have been known as Igurey, is reported to have been sunk by the monitors in the middle of the river while Tacuari is claimed to have been scuttled in the Riacho Guaycurú. It is revealed that the ironclads, for as long as they remained between Humaitá and Timbó, were not in communication with the rest of the fleet. Dispatches, carried down river by the current, were sealed in glass bottles and collected by the ironclad division that lay below Humaitá. It would be necessary, therefore, for the ironclads to return to the main body of the Allied force once their provisions ran out. Chapter XXI, which is dedicated to the Siege of Humaitá, helps to explain how the Paraguayan stronghold was able to resist the Allies for as long as it did. The ironclads that lay between Timbó and Humaitá, for example, were unable to sever all communications between the fortress and the Chaco side of the river. It is revealed, on page 269, that cattle were passed over the river under the cover at darkness while the stronghold itself was well supplied with provisions. Charles Ames Washburn, on page 249 of The History of Paraguay, describes the manner in which cattle were moved across the river from the Chaco to Humaitá.
Two Brazilian Ironclads Sink A Paraguayan Steamer.
It is reported, in an article that appears in the eighth volume of The American Annual Cyclopædia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1868, that three Brazilian ironclads descended the Paraguay River past the battery at Timbó and sank a Paraguayan streamer. Barroso, Pará and Rio Grande are the three ironclads that are reported to have been involved in the act of riverine warfare while Igurey is identified as the target vessel. Rio Grande is reported to have sunk Igurey on the 23rd of March, 1868, after perforating the hull of the latter vessel at the waterline. The Paraguayan steamer, pierced by a 70-pounder rifle bolt, took three hours to sink while the depth of the water was so great that it covered the smokestack of the stricken vessel. Charles Ames Washburn, in the second volume of The History of Paraguay, mentions Igurey on no less than seven occasions but provides no record of its destruction at the hands of the Brazilian ironclads. It is reported that Washburn, who was the United States Minister to Paraguay during the War of the Triple Alliance and who had been carried through the Brazilian blockade onboard USS Shamokin, traveled onboard Igurey while moving from Curupayty to Asunción. At the time in which Rio Grande sank Igurey, which was one of the few vessels to have survived the Battle of Riachuelo, the latter vessel was performing transportation duties on the Paraguay River and its tributaries. Francisco Felix Pereira da Costa, on the eleventh chapter of the third volume of Historia da Guerra do Brasil Contra as Republicas do Uruguay e Paraguay, mentions the destruction of Igurey by the Pará-class monitor. It is explained, on page 571, that Barroso and Rio Grande passed Timbó at half-past four in the morning. Igurey, which was blockaded by Bahia, had no choice but to wait as Barroso and Rio Grande made their approach. The destruction of Igurey, by the guns of the Brazilian ironclads, is detailed on page 572 and it is stated that the Paraguayan steamer sank in fourteen fathoms of water.
Ceará and Santa Catharina are Launched in March.
Ceará and Santa Catharina, the final two monitors of the Pará-class to be completed, were launched in the March of 1868 while Piauby had been completed on the 8th of January. A Marinha D'Outr'Ora, which was written by the Viscount of Ouro Preto, contains the launch dates of the final pair of Pará-class monitors to be completed. Ceará is reported to have been launched on the 26th of March, 1868, and took the longest of any of its classmates to enter service. It took one year and three months for Ceará, which was laid down on the 8th of December, to be constructed from start to finish. Santa Catharina, despite being the last of the Pará-class monitors to enter the shipyard, was completed within the space of eleven months. Alagoas, Pará and Rio Grande had already passed Curupayty, Humaitá as well as Timbó by the time that the final pair of Pará-class monitors entered service. Rio Grande had participated in the bombardment of Asunción and, having returned to the stretch of the Paraguay River between Humaitá and Timbó, sank Igurey three days before Ceará was launched. Curupayty, which the first three monitors of the Pará-class had been forced to pass on the 13th of February, had been abandoned by the Paraguayans before Ceará had descended the slipway. A water line of communication, which had been interrupted by Curupayty, now reached the ironclad division that lay downriver of Humaitá. The strategic importance of Curuzú and Port Elizario, therefore, would have been reduced by the capture of Curupayty by the Allies. Richard Burton, on Letter XIII, describes Curupayty after it had fallen into Allied hands. It is revealed, on page 304, that Curupayty had become an Allied port since it was abandoned by the Paraguayans. Communication between Curuzú and Port Elizario, since the capture of Curupayty, had been restored. Ceará and Santa Catharina, with Humaitá and Timbó blocking access to Tayí, may have been anchored at Curupayty when they first arrived on the Paraguay River.
Humaitá is Besieged and Francisco Solano López Seeks an Ironclad.
It was apparent that the ironclads, alone, were unable to sever the line of communication that allowed Francisco Solano López to retain control of Humaitá. Paraguay lost Tacuari and Ygurei, the latter of which was sunk by a monitor of the Pará class in the March of 1868, yet the Allies were unable to prevent supplies from arriving at Humaitá. Placing a pair of ironclads between the shore batteries and sinking the supply vessels did not prevent the Paraguayans, whose land line of communication remained in tact, from swimming cattle across the river at night. It was necessary, therefore, for the Allied land forces to disrupt the supply routes that ran through the Chaco. George Thompson, on page 269 of The War in Paraguay, explains that the fall of Paso Puco as well as Curupayty allowed a water line of communication to be established between the Allied supply bases and the Brazilian ironclad division that was situated below Humaitá. General Rivas is reported, on page 270, to have led a force of 1,500 Argentinians and 2,500 Brazilians whose task was to block the road that ran from Monte Lindo to Timbó. The presence of the ironclads in the stretch of river that ran between the Paraguayan stronghold and its outwork enabled the Allied troops, who landed below Timbó, to cross that stretch of the river and make their way into the Chaco. Success in severing the line of communication that ran through the Chaco, however, did not arrive overnight. It is revealed, on page 271, that López had become concerned about Humaitá by the June of 1868 and sought a means of relieving its garrison. It was decided, in light of the desperate situation in which Humaitá found itself, that another attempt should be made to capture an ironclad. Barroso and Rio Grande, which are claimed to have been situated above Timbó, are identified as the intended targets of the raid. Capturing an ironclad, therefore, may have prevented the fall of Humaitá by reestablishing its communications with Monte Lindo.
Allied Troops are Transported from Araçá to the Chaco by the Brazilian Ironclads.
Delphim Carlos de Carvalho, who commanded the Vanguard Division of the Brazilian Squadron, was called upon to assist the Allied land forces in their invasion of the Chaco during the month of May. Allied troops were ordered to disrupt the line of communication that ran, via the Chaco, from Monte Lindo to Timbó while the Imperial Navy was tasked with severing the water line of communication that connected Timbó with Humaitá. The ironclads of the Vanguard Division, which was anchored at Tayí, provided the only means of fluvial transport that were available to the Allies on the upper reaches of the Paraguay River. João Vicente Leite de Castro relates his experiences of the Paraguayan War in Diccionario Geographico e Historico das Campanhas do Uruguay e Paraguay, or Geographical and Historical Dictionary of the Campaigns in Uruguay and Paraguay, and includes an article that mentions the role that the Brazilian ironclads played in the Allied invasion of the Chaco. The dictionary, which was published in 1892, contains a series of articles about the wars that occurred in the the Rio de la Plata and are arranged in alphabetical order. It is revealed, on page 75, that the expeditionary force marched from Estabelecimento to Araçá and boarded the ironclads of the Vanguard Division. Araçá, which is the subject of the chapter in the dictionary, is described as a peninsula on the Paraguay River. Bahia, Barroso, Pará, Rio Grande and Tamandaré are reported to have ferried the troops across the Paraguay River while the expeditionary force is claimed to have been comprised of the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 16th infantry divisions. On the night of the 1st of May, 1868, the ironclads are reported to have transported the expeditionary force across the river while the Paraguayans are claimed to have opposed the landings from their fortified positions. It is reported that the column on ironclads, on the following morning, shadowed the expeditionary force as it made its way through the Chaco.
Five Ironclads Provide Fire Support to the 1st Corps of the Brazilian Army in the Chaco.
Theotonio Meirelles da Silva, on pages 341 to 342 of Historia Naval Brazileira, reports that five ironclads provided fire support to the 1st Corps of the Brazilian Army while it was under attack from the Paraguayans in the Chaco. On the 2nd of May, 1868, the Baron of the Passage was ordered to embark and disembark the Brazilian troops on the Chaco side of the Paraguay River. Paraguayan forces in the Chaco, who are reported to have been hidden in ditches, opposed the landings and the ironclads fired grapeshot at the defenders. Bahia, Barroso, Pará, Rio Grande and Tamandaré are reported to have been the five ironclads that were involved in the engagement. It is revealed that the supporting fire of the ironclads, which caused the Paraguayans to retreat, allowed the Brazilians to dig trenches. On the 4th of May, 1868, the Paraguayans are claimed to have sent four infantry divisions and two cavalry regiments to attack the entrenched positions of the 1st Corps of the Brazilian Army. It is reported that the Paraguayans, who lost four hundred men in the engagement, were routed before they reached the Brazilian camp. Bahia and Pará, both of which were armed with Whitworth rifles, are reported to have provided accurate fire support to the Brazilian land forces. It is revealed, on pages 432 and 433, that the Paraguayans made another attempt to assault the Brazilian land forces in the Chaco. On the 8th of May, 1868, a force of 1,000 Paraguayans advanced against the Brazilians and were repulsed by the combined firepower of the naval as well as the land forces. Bahia, Tamandaré and Rio Grande are reported to fired grapeshot at the Paraguayans during the engagement. The table that can be found on page 566 of the first volume of The British Navy: its Strength, Resources, and Administration by Earl Thomas Brassey claims that Pará was armed with one 70-pounder Whitworth gun while Bahia is claimed to have been equipped with four 7-inch Whitworth rifles.
Canoe Attack At Tayí.
Richard Burton, on page 311 of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, claims that Paraguayan canoes assaulted Barroso and Rio Grande in the vicinity of Tayí. The raid occurred on the 9th of July, 1868, and is mentioned in the fourteenth letter of the series. Letter XIV was composed on the 23rd of August, 1868, and describes the journey that Burton took from Curupayty to Humaitá along the Paraguay River. It is explained that the canoes, which are reported to have been between twenty and thirty feet in length, were descended from a type of vessel that the Payaguá people used to navigate the inland waterways of Paraguay. A rounded stem and stern, which Burton describes as following the arc of a circle, meant that only a small central section of the canoe sat in the water and this made it easier to maneuver with a spoon-like paddle. It is explained that the Paraguayan canoe attacks, while they were never successful in capturing a Brazilian ironclad, compelled the Allies to place a chain boom across the river in order to guard the fleet against further raids of this nature. A more detailed account of the action of the 9th of July can be found on Chapter XXI of The War in Paraguay, which was written by George Thompson, and states that the unnamed commander of Rio Grande was killed on the deck of his vessel. It is explained, on page 271, that Francisco Solano López sought to relieve the besieged garrison of Humaitá by capturing an ironclad and that two divisions of twenty-four canoes were involved in the assault. Barroso and Rio Grande, it is claimed, were the only ironclads above Timbó at this time. One of the divisions, it is reported on page 272, were able to board Rio Grande while Barroso was able to evade the other division and come to the assistance of the monitor. Alberto Amerlan, on page 114 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, names Captain-Lieutenant Antonio Joaquim as the commander of Rio Grande who was slain during the defense of his monitor.
A Decision is Made to Reinforce the Vanguard Division with Three Ironclads.
José Bernardino Bormann, on page 158 of the second volume of Historia da Guerra do Paraguay, describes a conference that was held between Marshal Caxias and Vice-admiral Delphim Carlos de Carvalho. Carvalho had been appointed Barão da Passagem, or Baron of Passage, at the time of the conference was held. On the 20th of July, 1868, it was decided that the Vanguard Division of the Brazilian Squadron needed to be reinforced with additional ironclads. The Vanguard, or Advance, Division had been called upon to reconnoiter São Fernando as well as positions on the Tebicuary River. Piauby, alongside Cabral and Silvado, were ordered to pass what remained of the batteries of Humaitá on the following day. Eduardo Wandenkolk is identified as the commander of Piauby while Cabral and Silvado are reported to have been commanded by Nogueira as well as Garcindo. Captain-lieutenant Juan Antonio Alves Nogueira, on page 56 of Memoria Presentada por el Ministro de Estado en el Departemento de Guerra y Marina al Congreso Nacional en 1868, is reported to have served onboard Cabral at the time in which it was attacked by canoes and came close to being captured by the boarding parties. The Viscount of Ouro Preto, on 376 of A Marinha D'Outr'Ora, claims that Frigate-captain Garcindo de Sá was in command of Silvado during the events of the 21st of July while Piauby is reported to have been under the command of First-lieutenant Eduardo Vandenkolk. Vandenkolk and Wandenkolk, which are different spellings of the same name, refer to the same naval officer who commanded Piauby during the action of the 21st of July. Francis Felix Pereira da Costa, on page 638 of the third volume of Historia da Guerra do Brasil contra as Republicas do Uruguay e Paraguay, mentions the same conference that was held on the 20th of July. Nogueira, Garcindo and Wandenkolk were ordered by the Baron of Passagem to move Cabral, Piauby and Silvado past the batteries of Humaitá on the following day.
Three Ironclads Pass Humaitá on the 21st of July.
George Thompson, on page 274 of The War in Paraguay, states that three ironclads passed Humaitá in the latter part of July. Pianhy, in the company of Cabral and Silvado, passed the Paraguayan stronghold and joined a larger division of ironclads that were situated further up the river. The Second Passage of Humaitá occurred on the 21st of July, 1868, and this strategic maneuver was part of a wider series of operations that Thompson describes in the the twenty-first chapter of his history of the conflict. Chapter XXI focuses on the Siege of Humaitá, which remained in Paraguayan hands after the ironclads had forced its batteries five months before, and the series of events that led to the abandonment of the fortification. It is stated, on page 269, that the Allied transport fleet was able to land its supplies at Curupayty after the Paraguayans abandoned Paso Puco. Water lines of communication, therefore, had been established between the Allied supply bases further down the Paraguay River and what remained of the Second Division of the Brazilian squadron. The ironclads that were stationed between Humaitá and Curupayty, until that time, had received their supplies from Port Elizario. Richard Burton describes Port Elizario, on Letter XIV of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay and states that it was once home to 10,000 troops. Port Elizario, Burton explains, was the terminus of a three-and-a-half mile railway that ran through a swamp and a lagoon. Provisions for the ironclads, Burton explains, were conveyed along this land line of communication. Water lines of communication were, and remain, the most efficient means of conveying provisions from supply bases to the front line. The action of the 21st of July is recorded on page 218 of A Marinha de Guerra Brasileira em Paysandú e Durante a Campanha do Paraguay, or The Brazilian Navy in Paysandú and During the Paraguay Campaign, by Theotonio Meirelles and names the same ships as those mentioned by Thompson.
Paraguayan Positions Along the Riacho Guaycurú are Bombarded by the Ironclads that are Situated Below Timbó.
On the 2nd of August, 1868, the Commander-in-chief of the Brazilian Navy reported on the bombardment of Paraguayan fortifications that were situated along the Tebicuary River. Francisco Félix Pereira da Costa, on page 638 of the third volume of Historia da Guerra do Brasil Contra as Republicas do Uruguay e Paraguay, introduces the report and names the five ships that converged to bombard the Paraguayan fortifications at Novo Establecimiento. Two detachments of ironclads are reported to have converged on the evening of the 21st of July, 1868, and shelled the Paraguayan trenches that were situated along the Tebicuary River. It is claimed that Bahia, Piauhy and Silvado joined Barroso and Rio Grande after passing Timbó. The report of the 2nd of August, which was composed by the Viscount of Inhauma, claims that a separate detachment of ironclads remained below Timbó and bombarded the Paraguayan positions at the Riacho Guaycurú. Pará remained below Timbó with Tamandaré and Cabral, the latter having passed Humaitá on the same day, while the other three ironclads ascended the Paraguay River. Theotonio Meirelles da Silva, on the tenth chapter of Historia Naval Brazileira, describes the bombardment of the Riacho Guaycurú and Novo Establecimiento by the ironclads that were situated above as well as below Timbó. Cabral, Pará and Tamandaré are reported to have bombarded the battery as well as the camp at the Riacho Guaycurú. José Bernardino Bormann, on page 132 of the second volume of Historia da Guerra do Paraguay, claims that Taquary had sought refuge in the Riacho Guaycurú when Delphim Carlos de Carvalho descended the Paraguay River with his division of ironclads. Taquary, on the 23rd of March, was sunk by the Brazilian ironclads and its wreck may have been present in the Riacho Guaycurú stream during the events of August. George Thompson, on page 255 of The War in Paraguay, documents the sinking of Tacuari in the Riacho Guaycurú.
New Estabelecimento is Bombarded by the Vanguard Division.
Bahia, Piauhy and Silvado ascended the Paraguay River on the 21st of July and joined Alagoas, Barroso as well as Rio Grande in the vicinity of Novo Estabelecimento. Joaquim Pinto de Campos, on 285 of Vida do Grande Cidadão Brazileiro Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva, claims that the Paraguayans occupied a new position at Novo Estabelecimento after the Brazilians had forced the batteries of Humaitá and stormed the original Estabelecimento. It is revealed that Novo Estabelecimento, or New Establishment, was situated in front of Timbó. Piauby, alongside Cabral and Silvado, had passed Humaitá earlier in the day. Theotonio Meirelles da Silva, on page 345 of Historia Naval Brazileira, claims that Rio Grande was placed under the temporary command of Second-lieutenant Simplicio Gonsalves Oliveira during the activities that occurred on the 21st of July. Captain-lieutenant Antonio Joaquim, the previous commander of the Pará-class monitor, had been slain in the canoe attack that had occurred earlier in the month and Oliveira had been chosen as his replacement. It is claimed, on page 346, that Cabral led the procession of ironclads while Rio Grande is reported to have been tethered to Silvado at its port side. Brazil, Colombo, Herval, Lima Barros and Mariz e Barros are claimed to have remained below Humaitá and provided fire support to the three ironclads that were passing the batteries. Three rockets, fired into the air, are reported to have heralded the success of the Second Passage of Humaitá while the crews of the waiting ironclads are claimed to have cheered the new arrivals. A meeting took place between the two divisions of ironclads at the mouth of the Hondo River and the Baron of the Passage, who was onboard Bahia, greeted his reinforcements before splitting the fighting vessels into two new divisions. Alagoas, Bahia, Barroso, Piauby, Rio Grande and Silvado bombarded Novo Estabelecimento after they converged on the upper reaches of the Paraguay River.
Activities on the Paraguay River Between the 21st and the 24th of July.
Theotonio Meirelles da Silva, who mentions the Second Passage of Humaitá in the tenth chapter of Historia Naval Brazileira, provides insight into the events that occurred between the 21st of July and the 24th of July. It is revealed, on page 347, that the ironclads bombarded the Paraguayan fortifications until seven 'o clock in the evening. The ironclads are reported to have arrived at Tayí on the 22nd of July, 1868, at six 'o clock in the morning and departed for Pilar at two 'o clock in the afternoon. On the 23rd of July, 1868, the ironclads are claimed to have approached the batteries that were situated at the mouth of the Tebicuary River. It is reported that three ironclads passed the batteries of San Fernando on the 24th of July, 1868, and Alagoas is identified as one of the fighting vessels that participated in the action. George Thompson, on page 247 of The War in Paraguay, claims that the Paraguayans evacuated Humaitá between the 21st and the 24th of July. A flotilla of canoes, of which there were thirty in number, are reported to have conveyed the women and the wounded from Humaitá to the Chaco. The exodus occurred on the night of the 23rd of July, which was on the same day that the ironclads approached the batteries at the mouth of the Tebicuary River, and it is reported that the canoes made it across the river without being intercepted. Richard Burton, on Letter XXI of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, describes Fortín after it had been captured by the Allies. Fortín, on page 399, is described as an island that was fortified by the Paraguayans. An eleven gun battery is reported to have faced the Paraguay River while the island itself is claimed to have been formed by the Tebicuary River, which was located at the south of the island, and by a stretch of carrisal that lay to the north. Fortín is reported to have been fortified with épaulements, gabions and sod-revetted embrasures. A second battery of three field-guns is claimed, on page 400, to have faced the Tebicuary River.
Fortín is Passed by Rio Grande and Two Larger Monitors.
George Thompson, on Chapter XX of The War in Paraguay, describes how Francisco Solano López withdrew to the Tebicuary River in the weeks that followed the Passage of Humaitá and the Bombardment of Asunción. It was necessary to cross the Bermejo River, which was a tributary of the Paraguay River, and negotiate the inhospitable terrain of the Chaco in order to reach the Tebicuary River. Men and horses, with wagons as well as heavy artillery in tow, had to wade through deep mud as they hacked their way through the impenetrable forest of the Chaco. It is revealed, on page 259, that López ordered Thompson to move the battery at Monte Lindo to the mouth of the Tebicuary River. Fortín, an island at the confluence of the Tebicuary River and the Paraguay River, was chosen as the location for the batteries and defensive works were constructed. The first of the three batteries to be installed on the Island of Fortín, which faced the mouth of the Tebicuary River, consisted of seven 8-inch guns and two 32-pounder guns. Three 32-pounder guns and two 8-inch guns comprised the second battery while the third battery, which faced the a landing place between the island and the river bank, consisted of two 32-pounder rifled howitzers. Alberto Amerlan, on page 121 of Nights on the Rio Paraguay, claims that three Brazilian monitors passed the batteries at the mouth of the Tebicuary River and were struck by a number of projectiles. It is reported, however, that these projectiles exploded into fragments against the iron plates that protected the gunboats. Bahia, Rio Grande and Silvado are named as the three monitors that passed the Paraguayan batteries that Thompson commanded. The Passage of Fortín occurred on the 24th of July, 1868, which was the birthday of López. Lieutenant Luciano Recalde, a political opponent of López who served in the Paraguayan Legion, is reported to have been onboard Bahia on this occasion and shouted an indecipherable message as the ironclads passed the batteries.
Two Monitors of the Pará Class Retrieve a Pair of 32-pounder Guns from the Paraguay River.
Letter XVII of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, which was written by Richard Burton, describes the battery of Timbó after it had fallen into Allied hands and mentions that a pair of Pará-class monitors had retrieved a number of 32-pounder guns from the water. Burton composed the letter on the 26th of August, 1868, and states that the Paraguayans had rolled the guns down a timber slope before they abandoned Timbó. It is claimed, on page 343, that the monitors had killed a number of Paraguayan soldiers on the left bank of the river and that their corpses remained under the trees that lined the shore. The remains of two Paraguayan steamers, that the monitors had destroyed, are reported to have been visible near Isla de Guaycurú. No mention is made of the number of guns that were deposited into the river but the 106th volume of Blackwood's Magazine claims that Francisco Solano López, following the capture of Tayí by the Allies, established a battery of thirty field-guns at Timbó. It is worth noting, however, that 32-pounder rifles are weapons of a heavier caliber. Document number seven of the continuation of Correspondence Respecting Hostilities in the River Plate contains information, which can be found on page 6, about the guns of Timbó. On the 8th of March, 1868, George Buckley Mathew informed Lord Stanley that Timbó was situated on the other side of the Paraguay River to Humaitá and that it was equipped with two 68-pounder guns as well as two 32-pounder Whitworth rifles. The dispatch was composed in Rio de Janeiro and can be found in the seventy-third volume of Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons, which was published in 1868, that includes reports of events that were occurring overseas. It is revealed, on page 600 of the fifth volume of The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette of the Regular and Volunteer Forces, that the 32-pounder Whitworth rifles at Timbó had been captured by the Paraguayans at Tuyutì.
Admiral Inhauma Flanks the Allied Armies as they March along the Tebicuary River.
Lieutenant-commander Kirkland wrote a letter to Rear-admiral Davis on the 22nd of September, 1868, while he was onboard USS Wasp and anchored at Montevideo. The letter, which is included in the seventy-ninth executive document of the third session of the fortieth Congress of the United States and which appears in Official Documents Relating to Paraguay 1858-1869, mentions the activities of the Brazilian Navy on the Tebicuary River. Four ironclads are reported to have entered the Tebicuary River on the 30th of August, 1868, while the Paraguayans were under bombardment from the division on the main river. Arthur Jaceguay, on pages 240 and 241 of Quatro Seculos de Actividade Maritima: Portugal e Brasil, claims that Admiral Inhauma flanked the Allied armies as they followed the course of the Tebicuary River. It is revealed that Inhauma, having left Port Elizario, had ascended the Paraguay River beyond Timbó. On the 29th of August, 1868, three monitors of the Pará-class are reported to have entered the Tebicuary River without facing any opposition from the Paraguayan forces. Pará, Piauhy and Rio Grande are identified as the three ironclads that entered the river on that day. A separate force of three monitors are reported to have ascended the Tebicuary River on the 31st of August, 1868, which was on the same day on which the Paraguayans abandoned São Fernando. Alagoas, Bahia and Ceará are named as the second detachment of ironclads that participated in the expedition. It is reported that the fire of the Brazilian monitors persuaded the Paraguayans, who were attempting to hinder the progress of Marshal Caxias, to abandon a small stronghold that guarded the main pass of the Tebicuary River. Guns, such as those which were present in the São Fernando garrison, were thrown into the water by the retreating Paraguayans. Admiral Inhauma is reported to have been present at Villa-Franca on the 10th of September, 1868, when the Allied armies entered the town.
Angostura Stands in Opposition to the Ironclads on the Pikysyry River.
Francisco Solano López, after the fall of Humaitá in the July of 1868, withdrew his forces to the Pikysyry River and the Brazilian ironclads were active on that stream from the beginning of October until the end of December. Richard Burton, on page 78 of Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay, mentions two occasions in which protected fighting vessels passed Angostura and occupied the upper reaches of the Pikysyry River. On the 1st of October, 1868, four ironclads are reported to have undertaken the first Passage of Angostura. A second passage of the batteries is claimed to have occurred on the 15th of November, 1868, and Admiral Inhauma is reported to have commanded the division that undertook the operation. Arthur Jaceguay, on page 240 of Quatro Seculos de Actividade Maritima: Portugal e Brasil, writes about the naval operations that were conducted by the Brazilians along the Pikysyry River. It is reported that Angostura, which was situated on the right bank of the river, was too powerful for the Allied forces to capture via a frontal assault. An armed reconnaissance of the river, that was led by the Baron of the Passage and which is explained on page 242, was performed by the ironclads of the Brazilian Squadron. On the 1st of October, 1868, four of the larger ironclads in the Brazilian Squadron are reported to have passed Angostura but their attempts to navigate the upper reaches of the river were frustrated by natural impediments. Silvado, with a message for the Admiral, was ordered to descend the stream and had to pass the batteries again. Alagoas and Lima Barros are claimed to have passed Angostura on either the 10th of October or the 10th of November, 1868, and joined the division on the upper river. Five ironclads are reported to have passed the batteries on either the 15th of October or the 15th of November, 1868, and three of these are identified as Pará-class monitors. Brasil, Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande and Silvado are named as the ironclads that ascended the stream on that day.
Controversy Arises Over a Flag of Truce in the Vicinity of Angostura.
An act of treachery is described on the twenty-seventh chapter of A Marinha D'Outr'Ora, which was written by the Viscount of Ouro Preto, that involved two Brazilian monitors and the Paraguayan batteries of Angostura. It is explained, on page 398, that Silvado and Piauhy corresponded with the garrison of Angostura under a flag of truce in the December of 1868 but were fired upon while the white flag was still flying. It is uncertain whether this was a deliberate act of treachery or an honest mistake but Ouro Preto, in his reporting of the event, seems convinced that it was a conscious act of betrayal. The eighth volume of The American Annual Cyclopædia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1868 contains an article about the Paraguayan War that states that the garrison of Angostura surrendered to the Allies on the 30th of December, 1868, after the Paraguayans had refused a previous call to lay down their arms. George Thompson, on pages 311 and 312 of The War in Paraguay, explains the circumstances in which the Brazilian monitors were fired upon while flying a flag of truce. It is claimed that Thompson, who commanded the batteries at Angostura, informed the Brazilians that he could not agree to the truce. An unnamed monitor, flying the white flag, is reported to have approached the batteries and refused to drop its anchor when ordered. A blank cartridge was fired and, when the monitor continued to drift downstream, a volley of 8-inch projectiles was fired at the ironclad. This event is reported to have occurred on the 28th of December, 1868, during the afternoon. Thompson wrote a letter to the Allied generals on the 29th of December, 1868, which accuses the commander of the monitor of attempting to profit by the use of the flag of truce. On the 28th of January, 1869, Thompson wrote a letter in which he claims that it was the Brazilians who broke the truce and not the Paraguayans. The letter, which appears in the appendix of The War in Paraguay, was addressed to the Marquis of Caxias.
Brazilian Monitors Search For Paraguayan Steamers in the Manduvirá River .
George Frederick Masterman, on Chapter XX of Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay, explains that two light-draught ironclads entered the Manduvirá River with the intention of capturing the three remaining steam vessels of the Paraguayan Navy and to attack Francisco Solano López from the rear. It is explained, on 294, that López ordered the smaller vessels to be sunk in order to prevent the ironclads from navigating the river. The names of the ironclads are not mentioned, nor is it explained if they carried their guns in turrets or in a broadside arrangement, but it is probable that the vessels in question belonged to the Pará-class of monitors. Theotonio Meirelles mentions a similar naval expedition in A Marinha de Guerra Brasileira em Paysandú e Durante a Campanha do Paraguay but describes a greater number of vessels, both protected and unprotected, as having participated in it. It is mentioned, on page 253, that five of the six Pará-class monitors entered the Manduvirá River in the January of 1869 and that these vessels were accompanied by Bahia as well as two unprotected vessels. Alagoas, Ceará, Pará, Piauhy and Santa Catharina are named as the monitors that accompanied Bahia and the wooden gunboats. It is explained that the expedition began on the 5th of January, 1869, and was intended to capture or destroy the remaining water craft that were operated by the Paraguayan forces. What little remained of the Paraguayan Navy, which had suffered a high level of attrition over the years of war and faced total annihilation, made its last stand against the Allied forces on the Manduvirá River. The expeditions along the Manduvirá River, which is a tributary of the Paraguay River, were the final operations to be undertaken by the Brazilian Navy during the War of the Triple Alliance. George Thompson, on page 316 of The War in Paraguay, mentions that the paltry force that was available to López during the closing phases of the war included five small steamers.
Barbosa Lomba Leads an Expeditionary Force Along the Manduvirá River.
It is explained, on pages 404 and 405 of A Marinha D'Outr'Ora by the Viscount of Ouro Preto, that Paraguayan resistance had not been extinguished along the waterways by the April of 1869 and that the Brazilian Navy was still active on the Manduvirá River. On the 18th of April, 1869, Barbosa Lomba took command of an expeditionary force that consisted of three Pará-class monitors and two wooden gunboats. Lomba, who is described as a Captain of Sea and War, led the expeditionary force along the Manduvirá River. First-lieutenant Severiano Nunes is reported to have commanded Santa Catharina, First-lieutenant Balthasar da Silveira is claimed to have captained Piauby while Ceará is reported to have been commanded by First-lieutenant Machado Dutra. João das Botas and Jansen Muller, the unprotected gunboats, are reported to have been commanded by First-lieutenant Gregorio Pavia as well as First-lieutenant Rodrigues de Vasconcellos while Lomba is claimed to have used Santa Catharina as his flagship during the expedition. It is reported, on page 206, that the two remaining Paraguayan steamers ran aground at Caraguatay. On the 29th of April, 1868, the Brazilian expedition encountered a fortified position at Garayo Pass. A battery of two guns, mounted on barbettes, and a garrison of nine-hundred entrenched Paraguayans stood in the path of the Brazilian gunboats. The obstructions that were placed in the river are described on page 407 and include beams, chains, canoes and torpedoes. Carts, which were filled with stones, also blocked the river while Ceará caught its propellors in a system of nets that were woven from vines and ropes. It is claimed, on page 295 of the first volume of Annaes do Senado do Imperio do Brasil, that Ceará was following Jansen Muller at the time in which is propellers became entangled in the nets. Suppressive fire from the garrison of Garayo Pass made the task of freeing the propellors of the monitor, which was undertaken by the crew members, more difficult.
Pluto Explodes and Damages Three Monitors of the Pará-class.
An article that was published in Anglo-Brazilian Times on the 5th of February, 1870, reports that a gunpowder vessel exploded at Cerrito and damaged three monitors of the Pará-class. It is reported that the event occurred on the 2nd of January, 1870, and caused widespread devastation as well as the loss of life. Cerrito is situated in Rio Grande do Sul, in what was then the Empire of Brazil, and the fact that the monitors were in Brazilian territory suggests that the war on the rivers of Paraguay had reached its conclusion. The article was reproduced in The Island on the 15th of April, 1870, and in the twenty-third volume of The Mechanics Magazine that was edited by H. Gardner. The three monitors that were affected by the disaster are named as Pará, Alagoas, and Ceará while Pluto as well as Quickstep are identified as the gunpowder vessels that exploded. Quickstep, which is described as a pontoon, had been conveying gunpowder from a shore magazine to Pluto at the time of the disaster. Pluto, according to the article, was a schooner-rigged vessel and would have been among the fleet of supply vessels that supported the Brazilian armada. It is reported that 360-tons of gunpowder, divided between the two gunpowder vessels and the shore magazine, exploded in three separate detonations at eleven 'o clock in the morning. It is reported that nineteen persons, including the wife and daughter of the captain, were onboard Pluto when it exploded while the captain of the schooner was receiving orders onshore. The commander of Alagoas, who is not named in the article, witnessed the event from the deck of the monitor and provided an eyewitness account of the disaster. Pluto was the first to explode, according to the commander of the monitor, followed by Quickstep and then the shore magazine. An unnamed tender of the pontoon was also destroyed by the explosion while two vessels, one of which was a pontoon and the other of which was a bomb vessel, were submerged by the waves.
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